Mimi Singh

The appellant, M.J., appealed the dismissal of her habeas corpus application seeking Charter remedies for damages following her transfer between detention facilities while facing a charge of second-degree murder.

The application judge found the matter moot as M.J. had been released on bail prior to the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge’s conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision declaring her a vexatious litigant after she filed over 160 applications.

The applicant argued the HRTO hearing was procedurally unfair and the decision was unreasonable, seeking to adduce a surreptitious recording of the hearing as new evidence.

The Divisional Court admitted the recording but dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO provided a fair hearing and reasonably concluded the applicant's conduct was vexatious.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal which upheld the denial of his application for Ontario Disability Support Program benefits.

The Tribunal found that while the appellant had continuous impairments, they were not substantial and did not substantially restrict his activities of daily living.

The Divisional Court applied the correctness standard of review and found no error of law in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Social Benefits Tribunal (SBT) decision denying him income support under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The appellant argued the SBT erred in law by ignoring evidence of his mental health impairments, engaging in discriminatory reasoning regarding his substance use disorder, and failing to apply the 'whole person' test.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the SBT misapprehended the appellant's testimony, made contradictory findings, and improperly blamed the appellant for his inability to comply with treatment due to his disabilities.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel of the SBT for a new hearing.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's action challenging the termination of her Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits.

The plaintiff alleged the ODSP was negligent in suspending her benefits after she transferred her condominium to her son.

The court struck the claim, finding it disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the governing statute provides immunity for good faith decisions and establishes no private law duty of care.

The court also held the action was an abuse of process, as the plaintiff had previously initiated and abandoned multiple proceedings in various forums regarding the same issue.

The appellant, an ODSP recipient, appealed an interim ruling of the Social Benefits Tribunal regarding its jurisdiction to hear complaints about overpayment calculations from 2010 and prior years.

The Director raised a threshold issue of prematurity, arguing that appeals to the Divisional Court under s. 31(1) of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act are only permitted from final decisions.

The Divisional Court agreed, holding that the administrative law doctrine of prematurity applies to prevent fragmentation and delay, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the denial of her Ontario Works benefits due to having assets in excess of the allowable limit.

The Tribunal found that the appellant owned three vehicles, the value of which exceeded the $5,000 limit for a single person.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law by equating legal ownership with the definition of an 'asset' under the Act and failing to consider if the vehicles were exempt.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal made no error in law as the appellant failed to adduce evidence that the vehicles were inaccessible or exempt under the regulations.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program brought a motion to quash the respondent's application for judicial review.

The respondent sought mandamus to compel the Director to pay ODSP benefits based on a Social Benefits Tribunal order, and to review the actions of the Director's representatives who allegedly prevented her from re-applying for benefits.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash the portion of the application regarding the SBT order, finding it plain and obvious it could not succeed because the Director had not made a binding determination of financial eligibility.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the portion regarding the denial of the right to re-apply, finding it was a reviewable exercise of a statutory power of decision.

The court also struck portions of the respondent's affidavits but admitted evidence necessary to supplement the record regarding the denial of the right to re-apply.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision regarding the calculation of income for social assistance purposes.

The Tribunal had included a loan incurred for refinancing an existing student loan as income.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The Court held that there is implicit discretion under s. 48(1) of O.Reg. 134/98 to exclude a loan where the recipient receives no actual financial benefit or increase in assets.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that denied her claim for $100,000 in general damages.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry's subcontracting rules under the Ontario Disability Support Program discriminated against the applicant based on her disability.

However, applying the Mackin rule, the Tribunal held that damages were not available because the government's conduct in applying the policy was not clearly wrong, in bad faith, or an abuse of power.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's application of the Mackin rule to the policy directive and its conclusion that no exceptions applied were reasonable.

The moving party sought review of a single judge’s refusal to extend the time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal from the Divisional Court’s dismissal of an application for judicial review of a social benefits tribunal decision.

The Court of Appeal applied the leave to appeal framework from Sault Dock Co. v. Sault St. Marie (City).

It held that the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law or an issue of public importance and was of interest only to the parties.

Because the proposed appeal lacked merit, the interests of justice did not support granting an extension of time.

The motion was dismissed without costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Social Benefits Tribunal decision that upheld the termination of her ODSP benefits and established an overpayment of over $22,000 due to undisclosed assets.

The applicant had a statutory right to appeal the Tribunal's decision to the Divisional Court but failed to do so, instead bringing an application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that judicial review is a discretionary remedy not available where an adequate alternative remedy exists, and the applicant demonstrated no exceptional circumstances to justify bypassing the statutory appeal process.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal that upheld the cancellation of his income support and assessed an overpayment of $25,712.30 for allegedly failing to declare his income and assets.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal fundamentally misapprehended the evidence, including ignoring documentary proof that the appellant had disclosed his real estate partnership to Ontario Works at the outset.

The Court set aside the Tribunal's decision, cancelled the overpayment for the period prior to the sale of the partnership interest, and remitted the remaining calculations back to the Director.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding he did not meet the definition of a person with a disability under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law by misapprehending new medical evidence filed before the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal correctly weighed the new evidence, determining it was either inconsistent with earlier reports or reflected a deterioration in condition after the Director's decision.

The appellant, a disabled senior, received an overpayment of ODSP income support due to an innocent reporting error regarding his rent.

The Director ordered full repayment.

The Social Benefits Tribunal reduced the recovery to half the amount, but the Divisional Court overturned this, finding no discretion to forgive a Crown debt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Director's discretion under section 14(4) of the ODSPA includes the authority to forgo recovery of an overpayment, and that the Tribunal has the same discretion on appeal.

The appellant's disability benefits were suspended for failing to provide required financial information.

Two years later, she requested an extension of time for an internal review, which the Director denied.

The Social Benefits Tribunal reinstated her benefits, finding her disabilities prevented timely compliance.

The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision, ruling it lacked jurisdiction due to the one-year limitation period for appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was statute-barred and the Director's refusal to extend the time for an internal review was a prescribed decision that could not be appealed.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding the respondent to be a person with a disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal committed a reversible error by relying on social and external factors—such as the respondent's lack of education, her husband's unemployment, and her childcare responsibilities—rather than her medical impairments to conclude she was substantially restricted in her ability to function in a workplace.

The Court also found the Tribunal's reasons to be inadequate.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.