Mimi Singh

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding he did not meet the definition of a person with a disability under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred in law by misapprehending new medical evidence filed before the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal correctly weighed the new evidence, determining it was either inconsistent with earlier reports or reflected a deterioration in condition after the Director's decision.

The applicant, an ODSP recipient, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability after his benefits were suspended for refusing to sign an assignment of potential settlement funds from another Tribunal application.

The respondent requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that while the applicant experienced a negative event, there was no evidence connecting the suspension of his benefits to his disability.

The Tribunal also noted it has no jurisdiction to enforce the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant alleged discrimination with respect to employment because of disability, claiming she was denied training and startup funding under the ODSP program.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer the Application because an appeal dealing with the substance of the allegations was scheduled before the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Tribunal found that proceeding concurrently would risk inconsistent findings and require the parties to address substantially the same issues in two forums.

The Tribunal deferred the Application pending the conclusion of the Social Benefits Tribunal appeal.

The appellant, a disabled senior, received an overpayment of ODSP income support due to an innocent reporting error regarding his rent.

The Director ordered full repayment.

The Social Benefits Tribunal reduced the recovery to half the amount, but the Divisional Court overturned this, finding no discretion to forgive a Crown debt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Director's discretion under section 14(4) of the ODSPA includes the authority to forgo recovery of an overpayment, and that the Tribunal has the same discretion on appeal.

The intervenor, the Ontario Human Rights Commission, requested an order for the production of documents from the Ministry of Children and Youth Services relating to funding for children with non-physical disabilities from 2005 to date.

The Tribunal found that only the policies and guidelines in effect in 2012, when the applicant sought funding, were arguably relevant.

The Ministry was ordered to produce the 2012 policies and guidelines, along with other agreed-upon documents.

The applicant, a child with significant disabilities, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and family status regarding the funding of treatment and a Crown wardship application.

The Ministry requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application, and the Children's Aid Society requested to be removed as a respondent.

The Tribunal denied the request for a summary hearing, finding that factual disputes regarding funding criteria and the decision to proceed with Crown wardship required a hearing on the merits.

The Tribunal ordered the parties to produce documents to the intervenor Commission and deferred the decision on removing the Children's Aid Society until after production.

The applicant, a child with significant disabilities, alleged discrimination based on disability and family status regarding the funding of his treatment and a child protection application seeking Crown wardship.

After the child protection application was withdrawn and funding was approved, the respondents sought to dismiss the human rights application as moot.

The Tribunal found the application was not moot, as there remained a live controversy over whether the past actions were discriminatory and caused the applicant damages, including injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The applicant filed a human rights application related to child protection proceedings and funding for services.

After the respondent Ministry granted funding for a year and the Society agreed to withdraw the child protection application, the Ontario Human Rights Commission sought to intervene.

The respondent argued the application was moot and opposed the intervention.

The Tribunal ruled that the Commission is entitled to intervene as of right under s. 37(2) of the Human Rights Code, regardless of whether the application is moot.

The Tribunal also revoked the order expediting the application and set a schedule to hear arguments on mootness.

The applicant, a child with complex disabilities, alleged that the Ministry's funding regime discriminated against him based on disability and family status, potentially forcing his grandmother to give up custody to obtain necessary treatment.

The applicant requested to expedite the Tribunal proceedings.

The Ministry opposed, arguing the matter should be deferred pending a related child protection proceeding.

The Tribunal declined to defer, noting the child protection proceeding would not address the human rights allegations.

The Tribunal granted the request to expedite, finding the circumstances truly urgent given the potential loss of treatment or the parent-child relationship.

The appellant's disability benefits were suspended for failing to provide required financial information.

Two years later, she requested an extension of time for an internal review, which the Director denied.

The Social Benefits Tribunal reinstated her benefits, finding her disabilities prevented timely compliance.

The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision, ruling it lacked jurisdiction due to the one-year limitation period for appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was statute-barred and the Director's refusal to extend the time for an internal review was a prescribed decision that could not be appealed.

The applicant, a single father, alleged discrimination on the basis of sex after being denied participation in a recreation and support program designed for single mothers and their children.

The respondents argued the program was a special program protected by s. 14(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the program was designed to relieve the economic and social disadvantage experienced by single mothers and that admitting men would negatively impact the group dynamics, particularly regarding discussions of male violence.

The Tribunal concluded the program was a protected special program and dismissed the application.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to services.

The Tribunal directed a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the scheduled teleconference hearing despite receiving proper notice.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability by the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP), claiming she was underpaid and treated unfairly.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that it lacks general jurisdiction to review decisions under disability-based benefit programs for fairness or correctness, and the applicant did not allege differential treatment compared to others with different disabilities.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success, with the Tribunal noting the proper forum is the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding the respondent to be a person with a disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal committed a reversible error by relying on social and external factors—such as the respondent's lack of education, her husband's unemployment, and her childcare responsibilities—rather than her medical impairments to conclude she was substantially restricted in her ability to function in a workplace.

The Court also found the Tribunal's reasons to be inadequate.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.