Arash Ghiassi

The offender pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a computer, mischief to data, and failing to comply with a release order after hacking and defacing the Texas GOP website and distributing 180 GB of stolen data.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of a sophisticated, large-scale cyber attack targeting a political organization against mitigating factors including the offender's lack of a prior record, guilty pleas, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

A global sentence of 18 months was imposed, reduced to 175 days to serve after credit for pre-trial custody.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash warrants authorizing forensic searches of his cellphone following charges arising from a political protest that disrupted an off-campus university event.

The court held that the ITO did not establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the phone would contain evidence of the investigated offences, as the asserted conspiracy rationale was conclusory and the limited evidence of cellphone use was too remote and contextually weak.

The court further held that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity because it authorized analysis 'based upon' the offences, listed sweeping data categories, and imposed no temporal limits.

Both search warrants were quashed, with leave to the respondent to seek a stay.

The accused, M.D., faced multiple charges including sexual assault and assault against the complainant, A.E., his former spouse.

The complainant alleged four separate incidents of physical and sexual assault between 2017 and 2018.

The defence argued that the complainant fabricated the allegations due to ongoing family court matters and was not a credible witness.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be intentionally evasive, implausible, and dishonest, lacking internal consistency and external corroboration.

Conversely, the court found the accused's evidence to be thoughtful, clear, and honest, corroborated by police testimony.

Consequently, the court found the accused not guilty on all counts.

This is an appeal from a decision rejecting an application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment in a child luring case.

The appellant argued the undercover officer offered an opportunity to commit the offence without reasonable suspicion.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer's initial ambiguous response ("yea sometimes ..... im 14 tho") did not constitute an "opportunity" to commit the offence, as the appellant himself initiated and steered the conversation towards sexually explicit topics, thereby committing the luring offence.

The court emphasized that the entrapment doctrine is reserved for the clearest cases of uncondonable state conduct.

The applicant, Jacob Hoggard, sought release from custody pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, having been convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and his appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender.

The motion judge focused on the public interest branch of the bail test, specifically public confidence.

The court found that the applicant's proposed leave application, concerning the legal test for the curative proviso under the Criminal Code, was weak as it raised a fact-specific application rather than an issue of national importance.

Given that the conviction had been unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeal and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is sparingly granted, the public interest in enforcing the sentence outweighed the applicant's interest in a second review.

The application for release was dismissed, without prejudice to reapply if leave to appeal is granted by the Supreme Court.

Jacob Hoggard appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm to J.B., arguing the trial judge erred by admitting expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma, failing to correct the Crown's closing submissions, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and improperly admitting discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony as it was not necessary and risked misuse, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred due to the trial judge's effective corrective instructions.

The other grounds of appeal were dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision not to designate the respondent, who pleaded guilty to child pornography offences, as a dangerous or long-term offender.

The sentencing judge erred by requiring a "direct" or "root cause" of psychological harm for Serious Personal Injury Offence (SPIO) designation and by misinterpreting the risk of re-offending for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal clarified that child pornography offences can constitute SPIOs based on a broader causation standard and that the long-term offender criteria do not necessarily require a risk of violent re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a new hearing was ordered.

The Toronto Star and journalist Morgan Bocknek appealed a Superior Court decision refusing to quash a subpoena for journalistic notes related to an interview with a sexual assault complainant.

The subpoena was sought by the accused, Bruce Timothy Cavey, under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for potential prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's discretionary decision not to grant certiorari, finding that the trial judge was the appropriate forum to address issues of journalistic privilege and relevance within the s. 278 application process.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation and uttering death threats following a judge-alone trial.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by relying on an ungrounded "common-sense" assumption to reject his evidence and by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were plausible and grounded in the evidence, and that the burden of proof was not reversed.

The court emphasized the high deference given to trial judges' credibility findings and clarified the application of the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions.

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual offences against two foster children, RY and TY, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding collusion among complainants, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and failed to adequately consider tainting of evidence by police questions.

The Court of Appeal found that while there were minor misapprehensions of evidence, they were peripheral and did not affect the material assessment of credibility or the similar act evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the burden of proof, and rejected the argument of uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an ODSP recipient, appealed an interim ruling of the Social Benefits Tribunal regarding its jurisdiction to hear complaints about overpayment calculations from 2010 and prior years.

The Director raised a threshold issue of prematurity, arguing that appeals to the Divisional Court under s. 31(1) of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act are only permitted from final decisions.

The Divisional Court agreed, holding that the administrative law doctrine of prematurity applies to prevent fragmentation and delay, and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff moved for the production of redacted and unproduced documents from the defendant prior to examinations for discovery, related to his termination from Correctional Service Canada (CSC).

The defendant opposed, arguing prematurity, privilege, and public safety concerns.

The court found the motion was not premature and ordered the production of unedited CCTV footage, rejecting privacy and public safety concerns regarding inmate identities, citing relevance to the plaintiff's alleged conduct and the deemed undertaking rule.

However, the court dismissed the request for an unredacted email concerning a parking lot incident, finding it irrelevant to the pleadings.

It also dismissed the production of five emails claimed under litigation privilege, finding the defendant failed to prove litigation was reasonably apprehended at their creation.

One email, initially misdated, was found to be litigation privileged as it was created after litigation commenced.

Two emails related to security clearances were also deemed irrelevant to the remaining pleaded issues.