His Majesty the King v. Aubrey Cottle, 2026 ONSC 3774

CITATION: R. v. Cottle, 2026 ONSC 3774

COURT FILE NO.: CR-26-00017311-0000

DATE: 20260626

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

AUBREY COTTLE

Defendant

David Tice and Victoria Di Iorio, for the Crown

Riaz Sayani and Arash Ghiassi, for the Defendant

HEARD: June 18, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

DI LUCA J.

Overview

1On June 18, 2026, Mr. Cottle entered guilty pleas to the following offences:

(a) Unauthorized Use of a Computer, contrary to s. 342.1(1)(a) of the Code;

(b) Mischief to Data, contrary to s. 430(5) of the Code; and

(c) Fail to Comply with a Release Order contrary to s.145.5 of the Code.

2After hearing submissions, I reserved my decision to today’s date and now give these reasons for the sentence I am about to impose.

Admitted Facts in Support of Guilty Pleas

(i) Unauthorized Use of Computer (s. 342.1(1)(a)) and Mischief to Computer Data (s. 430(5))

3On September 11, 2021, Aubrey Cottle defaced the Texas GOP website in association with “Anonymous”, a loosely-affiliated group of hacktivists. He altered the website to contain cartoon characters, a pornographic image, a link to a Rick Astley music video, and a message from Anonymous about a campaign in response to the Texas ban of abortions.

4In addition to the defacement, Mr. Cottle accessed and downloaded data from a Texas GOP webserver that contained 180 GB of data. The defacement and theft of data was possible because Mr. Cottle hacked the website’s hosting provider, EPIK. The collection of released data exfiltrated from EPIK was distributed to the public via a torrent. The size of the torrent file was approximately 180 gigabytes. It included thousands of records with credit card data, personal identifying information like Tax ID or dates of birth, and passwords.

5On September 14, 2021, Anonymous issued a press release about the hack of EPIK and shared a link to a torrent file containing the 180 GB of stolen data. The FBI learned that a BitTorrent user with a Canadian IP address downloaded 100% of the data when the torrent file went live. The IP address of this user was provided to the Ontario Provincial Police, who obtained a production order for Bell Canada. The results of that production order indicated that the IP address belonged to Aubrey Cottle.

6Online open-source investigation conducted by the FBI revealed screen captures of Discord chats from December 2021 and January 2022 in which Mr. Cottle claimed responsibility for the hack. Legal process served on Discord confirmed the screen captures as Mr. Cottle’s posts to Discord on “420chan” a forum founded by Mr. Cottle in 2005. These screen captures were provided to the Ontario Provincial Police.

7In February 2022, Mr. Cottle participated in a live, public TikTok video in which he claimed responsibility for the EPIK hack.

8In August 2022, the Ontario Provincial Police executed a search warrant at Mr. Cottle’s residence in the City of Oshawa. The police seized approximately 20 terabytes of data, including computer towers, external drives and phones. Analysis of the data revealed the steps taken by Mr. Cottle to gain access to EPIK’s networks and the GOP website, effectively taking over control of both the server and website. The police also located thousands of documents, emails and pictures belonging to the Texas GOP, containing personal information such as full names, county seat locations, email addresses, and phone numbers. For example:

(a) Applicant resumes containing names, mailing addresses, contact numbers and email addresses;

(b) Emails from info@texasgop.org to infor@texasgop.org, where new users entered their email addresses to sign up for Texas GOP updates;

(c) Emails routed through hosting9.epik.com to various @texasgop.org emails;

(d) A Republican candidate endorsement letter;

(e) A ballot application checklist and primary candidate application review for County Court at Law, County Criminal Court, and County Probate Court;

(f) A ballot application checklist for District Attorney and State Representatives;

(g) A draft biography containing the subject’s date of birth;

(h) The 2014 amended rules for conventions and meetings;

(i) A resolution about the election of party officers; and

(j) A special session call item relating to patient protections.

9On September 3, 2024, an arrest warrant for the offence of identity theft was issued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

10On March 26, 2025, Mr. Cottle was arrested and charged by the Ontario Provincial Police. He provided a statement to police where he admitted to hacking EPIK’s servers and seeding the torrent of data.

(ii) Fail to Comply with Release Order (s. 145.5)

11On April 1, 2025, Mr. Cottle was released on bail. As part of his release conditions, Mr. Cottle was required to: (1) reside with his mother, Noreen McLean, in a Toronto apartment, and (2) not to use or possess any computer or electronic device capable of accessing the internet unless in the presence of his mother, for court or legal purposes, or when contacting other named individuals.

12Mr. Cottle did not live with his mother. The Ontario Provincial Police located Mr. Cottle’s social media posts in September and October 2025 that suggested he was living in Oshawa and accessing the internet unsupervised. Police contacted Mr. Cottle, and he admitted to the investigator that he never lived with his mother because of the size of her apartment. Mr. Cottle made arrangements via counsel to surrender on October 28, 2025. He was held for a bail hearing, following which he was detained in custody.

Community Impact Statements

13A Community Impact Statement was filed on behalf of the Republican Party of Texas and authored by its former general counsel, Rachel Hooper.

14Ms. Hooper notes that the cyber attack occurred on September 11, 2021, on the 20^th^ anniversary of the terrorist attacks in the United States and involved not only the public defacing of the Texas GOP website with offensive imagery and messages but also the downloading of server data containing sensitive personal identifying information belonging to donors, volunteers, candidates and supporters. The sensitive data was then made publicly available.

15Ms. Hooper relates that this deliberate and public violation of the organization undermined trust and left its members and staff shocked and concerned about the potential misuse of the private data. Ms. Hooper conveys that the attack was publicly humiliating and left community members feeling personally violated.

16The Republican Party of Texas incurred expenses required to hire IT professionals to assess the damage and secure the systems. The impact of the offences was also felt through reduced political donations stemming from a loss of donor trust.

17Ms. Hooper conveys that the community’s deepest fear is that the stolen data will be used to harm a wide range of individuals who entrusted their data with the Republican Party of Texas.

18Ms. Hooper concludes by noting that the offences erode the foundation of democracy by attacking the secure operation of a major political party and exposing ordinary Texans to lifelong risk simply because they chose to support a particular set of political values.

19A second Community Impact Statement was submitted by the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, a national intake centre coordinated in partnership with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Ontario Provincial Police and the Competition Bureau of Canada. The goal of this organization is to reduce fraud in Canada through integrated and intelligence‑based approaches., including the development and dissemination of education and awareness, running disruption campaigns, and providing operational assistance to law enforcement.

20According to the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, the exposure of personal identifying information and sensitive data from data breaches poses a significant threat of harm to the individuals and entities affected. A by-product of the commission of these offences is that an illicit marketplace for the data obtained has developed. Cybercrime and fraud represent an increasingly complex and sophisticated criminal ecosystem through which losses, including financial, personal, and security-related losses, continue to increase. The statement concludes by noting that the cybercrime ecosystem represents a significant and complex threat to Canada on a multitude of levels, including public safety, cyber security and economic integrity.

Mr. Cottle’s Background

21Mr. Cottle is currently 39 years of age. He is in a romantic relationship, and he has a son from a previous relationship whom he supports. His son is 5 years of age and currently lives in the United States. The relationship with his son’s mother was abusive and ended poorly, resulting in significant stress and emotional upset for Mr. Cottle.

22Mr. Cottle grew up in a disadvantaged setting. His father was abusive and left the home when he was a young age. That said, Mr. Cottle remains close with his mother.

23Despite his circumstances, Mr. Cottle became a self-taught computer engineer with a very high level of skill and knowledge.

24Initially, this high level of skill and knowledge resulted in contract work building websites for hotels, law firms and the like. He then began working for private companies and was engaged in the lawful testing of security vulnerabilities, which is commonly referred to as “white hat hacking.” In this capacity, he did work for the Government of India, and Ford Motor Company and his efforts were even recognized by the United Nations.

25According to letters in support filed with the court, Mr. Cottle is described as a loyal friend who takes the time to teach and support colleagues, especially colleagues in need. He is noted for being driven, creative, and innovative and for having a positive impact on those around him. In terms of his work-related skills, he is noted for having extensive knowledge, technical proficiency, and a high degree of professionalism.

26Mr. Cottle has no prior criminal record. He does not have any drug and/or alcohol-related dependencies.

27When asked to address the court, Mr. Cottle expressed sincere remorse for his offences. He explained that his decision to engage in this criminality has cost him dearly. It cost him his home and his livelihood. In short, he has no desire to ever engage in similar conduct.

Pre-Trial Custody Credit and Related Mitigation

28Mr. Cottle was arrested on March 26, 2025 and held for a bail hearing. On April 1, 2025, he was released on bail. He violated the terms of that bail and was returned to custody on October 28, 2025.

29As of today’s date, he has served 248 days on a 1:1 basis. Credited at 1.5 to 1, this amounts to 372 days or one year and one week.

30The defence seeks additional mitigation for harsh conditions of pre-trial custody. In support of this position, the defence has filed an affidavit from Mr. Cottle setting out his account of the conditions he has endured while in custody.

31He describes the small, cramped cells, which often had to be shared with a third person. He also describes a two-week period during which the toilet was not functioning, resulting in limited opportunity to use a toilet outside the cell, especially during lockdowns. He also described having no access to fresh air during January and February and very limited access to outside air during other times. Lastly, he explains that access to books and reading material is significantly limited. Taken all together, he asserts that the conditions he has endured have negatively affected his mental health.

32The defence also relies on institutional records filed, which set out the lockdown periods for the time when Mr. Cottle was housed at the Central East Correctional Centre. Over a period of 237 days at CECC, Mr. Cottle was under lockdown for 6 hours or more on 56 occasions and for less than 6 hours on an additional 80 occasions.

33He was also triple bunked for 195 days, which works out to 78% of his days in custody up to the date of the records.

34To state the obvious, these lockdown and triple bunking records paint a grim picture of the current and enduring state of pre-trial custody.

The Positions of the Parties

35The Crown seeks a global sentence of 2 ½ years less credit for pre-trial custody, followed by 12 months probation.

36The Crown argues that the offence involves a highly sophisticated and large-scale cyber attack on a political organization and its service provider. The Crown notes that in committing the offence, Mr. Cottle not only gained unauthorized access to the secure computer systems, but also exfiltrated and widely disseminated vast quantities of sensitive personal and financial information. The offences were committed against a political organization and as such serve to undermine the democratic process by trammelling on a legitimate political party’s ability to engage with voters and support political discourse.

37The defence argues that a sentence of time served is appropriate in this case. The defence notes that once pre-trial custody is accounted for and appropriate mitigation for the harsh conditions of pre-trial custody is considered, Mr. Cottle has spent a significant amount of time in custody as a first offender with positive rehabilitative prospects.

38The defence does not oppose the Crown’s request for the following ancillary orders: a DNA order and a forfeiture order.

Principles of Sentencing

39The objectives of sentencing long recognized at common law have been codified in section 718 of the Criminal Code. They are: the protection of society and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the denunciation of unlawful conduct; deterrence, both general and specific; the separation of the offender from society where necessary; rehabilitation; reparation for harm done to the victims or the community; and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done.

40Section 718.1 provides that the fundamental principle of sentencing is that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender, see R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at para. 10, and R. v. M.(L.) 2008 SCC 31.

41Section 718.2 provides that a sentence should be increased or decreased to account for any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It also requires that a sentence be similar to those imposed on similar offenders in similar circumstances, that an offender not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate, and that all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances must be considered. The principle of restraint is important particularly with a first-time offender with positive rehabilitative prospects.

42Ultimately, sentencing is a highly individualized exercise that extends beyond mathematical calculation, see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 60. The Court must weigh and consider applicable sentencing principles in the context of the specific facts of the case and the specific facts of the offender.

The Specific Offences in this Case

43Count 1 in the Indictment is the offence of fraudulently and without colour of right obtaining a computer service, namely the computer systems of Epik LLC, contrary to s. 342.1(a) of the Criminal Code. This offence is punishable by a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.

44Count 2 in the Indictment alleges mischief to data belonging to the Texas GOP Party, by defacing the Texas GOP website, contrary to s. 430(5) of the Criminal Code. This offence is also punishable by a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison.

45Lastly, count 4 in the Indictment, which alleges a failure to comply with the terms of a release order, carries a maximum sentence of 2 years in prison.

46None of the offences have a mandatory minimum.

47I turn next to the caselaw that assists in assessing the seriousness of these offences. In this regard, I note that there are two important facets to the offences committed by Mr. Cottle. First, they are cybercrimes. Second, they are offences that attack the integrity of the democratic process.

48In terms of the cybercrime nature of the offences, I am guided by the comments of Miller J.A. in United States v. Baratov, 2017 ONCA 481 at para. 23-24 wherein he states:

[23] Counsel for Mr. Baratov argues that what is alleged against his client is a comparatively minor and victimless crime.

[24] It is anything but. Whether the applicant was paid nothing or was paid millions; whether the skill and energy expended were advanced or basic; whether he thought he was dealing with the FSB or with a high school principal, the alleged conduct remains a destabilizing attack on the integrity of systems that are vital to all of our wellbeing. Even unsuccessful attacks imperil public confidence and require the commitment of substantial resources for defence. The public cost, monetary and psychological, is broad and deep.

49Miller J.A. went on to adopt the comments of the application judge in Baratov who stated:

Individuals are financially ruined by the pirating of their identifying details (which includes passwords) and the plundering of their accounts.

Commercial mayhem flows from the pirating of trade secrets, technical information and confidential communication.

National security is compromised by the acquisition of sensitive information. The hacker is a menace to a system that struggles to preserve its integrity. There are no known social benefits to the activity. We cannot afford to be romantic about this crime.

50I also take note of the comments of Mainville J. in R. v. Belmkaddem, 2026 ONCJ 24, 2026 ONCJ, at para. 24, where, in the context of a cybercrime committed in relation to stolen identifying data, she explained:

In addition to the financial and psychological repercussions of such crimes, the repercussions include the erosion of public trust in the marketplace, the financial sector, and the government. This is a complex and significant threat facing Canada, including to the country’s security and economic integrity. In my opinion, this is a pernicious course of conduct.

51In terms of offences that have an impact on the democratic process, I take guidance from the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Sona, 2016 ONCA 452, a case dealing with offences under the Canada Elections Act relating to the intentional misuse of a robocall system to divert legitimate voters away from designated voting stations. At paragraph 12 of the decision, the Court of Appeal includes the following quote from the sentencing judge’s reasons:

Individuals such as Mr. Sona notwithstanding the lack of record and their apparent good character must appreciate that this type of an offence is an affront to the electoral process and is conduct that simply cannot be classified as anything less than very serious. Individuals who choose to take part in this type of conduct can expect significant consequences.

Mr. Sona and another or others by their conduct have impacted the lives of many. Presumably Mr. Sona, given his background and his involvement with government services, was an individual who championed the democratic right of everyone to cast their vote in a fair and unhampered manner. He took very active steps to see that that did not happen and the sentence must be such that the serious nature of this conduct is made apparent to those similarly inclined. Anything less than a period of imprisonment would fall short in my view of properly denouncing such conduct.

52Later in the judgment at paras. 33-34, the Court of Appeal referred to the following passage as a “forceful and eloquent comment about Canadian democracy and its institutions and processes”:

The plan to which Mr. Sona was a party was effectively an attempt to manipulate the outcome of the election in the Guelph riding by endeavouring to prevent voters from voting. This was a federal election undertaken to elect representatives who form the governing body in our nation. This was not an amateurish Grade 8 election campaign for student council. Conduct such as that of Mr. Sona is not suitable at any time. It is not only criminal, but distasteful and disturbing and is a step above other political "tricks" that the court has heard of in evidence including such things as sign removal and bingo cards. Defence counsel argues that this was simply a "prank" gone "terribly bad". This was much more than a "prank" and nothing in the evidence points to it being such. The evidence in fact points in the other direction that this was a deliberate and considered course of criminal conduct specifically designed to subvert the inherent fairness of the electoral process.

53When these dual facets of the offences committed in this case are considered in concert and in context, it is clear that denunciation and deterrence are the primary factors in the sentencing analysis. A message that denounces these types of offences and deters others from committing them must be sent. That said, this message must nonetheless reflect the principles of rehabilitation, restraint and totality.

54In terms of the range of sentence, counsel have filed helpful casebooks. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are no cases that closely match the facts of this case. That said, I take significant guidance from the following decisions: R. v. S.F., 2025 ONSC 1487 at paras. 14-17, R. v. Livingston, 2018 ONCJ 231, R. v. Vachon-Desjardins, 2022 ONCJ 43, R. v. Desgagnes, 2025 QCCQ 549, aff’d at 2026 QCCA 475, R. v. Philbert, Ontario Court of Justice, January 26, 2024, unreported decision of Dumel J., R. v. Belmkaddem, 2026 ONCJ 242, and R v. Vassilev, 2024 ONSC 1423.

55I also note that some of the cases filed are dated, stemming back over 20+ years. I find these dated authorities to be of limited value in ascertaining a range of sentence for the types of offences before the court, the severity and extent of which has only come into focus in recent years.

56Discerning a clear range from these cases is difficult as the facts of the offences vary significantly. The rough range stems from a discharge to two years in jail. There are cases above two years in jail, though they generally involve instances where the offence was committed in concert with a fraud, extortion or other similar offences. Offences at the low end of the range usually involve minor data breaches and/or other extenuating circumstances.

57Using this framework, I find the following facts to be aggravating:

(a) The offences have resulted in a significant impact on the victims, particularly the Republican Party of Texas and its members and associates. The impact includes expenses incurred by the Party as well as the significant harm stemming from public exposure of the data relating to hundreds, perhaps thousands of people.

(b) The offences involve the targeting of a political organization and undermine the democratic process. In this regard, it matters not that the political organization is in the United States and not Canada. Similarly, the nature or belief system of the particular political organization involved matters not. A functioning democracy requires respectful exchanges of views and opinions. It does not involve cyber-attacks that demean an organization and then expose the organization’s members to the risk of personal and/or financial harm.

(c) The offence was sophisticated, planned and deliberate. It required a high degree of skill to accomplish. It was committed on a date that was obviously chosen for its historical significance.

(d) The offence resulted in a large-scale data breach involving the exfiltration and dissemination of 180 GB of data, including personal identifying information, credit card data, tax information, and passwords.

(e) In relation specifically to the offence of failing to comply with a release order, while I appreciate that Mr. Cottle did not violate the order by committing additional criminal offences, the circumstances of the breach are flagrant. He clearly made a deliberate choice to simply ignore a crystal-clear term of his bail and did so immediately upon release. This places the offence at the more serious end of the range of conduct, though not at the most serious.

58I find the following facts to be mitigating:

(a) Mr. Cottle has no criminal record.

(b) Mr. Cottle has entered guilty pleas and formally accepted responsibility for his offences. The guilty plea saves court resources and avoids a trial at which there would have been some legal and factual issues, despite what appears to be a very strong Crown case.

(c) Mr. Cottle, through his statement to the court, has also personally shown remorse for his offences. In saying this, I appreciate that Mr. Cottle was interviewed for an article that appeared in Toronto Life Magazine in October 2025, though the date on which he would have been interviewed is unknown. In this article, he discusses the nature and duration of his involvement in hacking culture. He also shares his views on the various targets of the online hacking. Lastly, he discusses events relating to the charges before the court. Viewed charitably, Mr. Cottle’s comments in the article do not display remorse or acceptance of responsibility. They involve a degree of bragging and a commitment to glorifying hacker culture. Mr. Cottle’s comments are not aggravating in the legal sense. However, his comments moderate the degree of mitigation that Mr. Cottle might otherwise be entitled to for his current expression of remorse.

(d) Mr. Cottle has very positive rehabilitative prospects, including a desire and ability to put his obviously exceptional talents to good use. In this regard, I note that he appears to have left his former life behind him. Indeed, over three years have passed since the commission of the offence and there is no suggestion that he has returned to his earlier involvement with the hacker culture.

(e) Mr. Cottle has family support and a positive peer group. Those closest to him clearly see the good in him and they do so for good reason. This bodes well for his future.

(f) While in custody, Mr. Cottle was subject to repeated lock-downs and on many days he was triple bunked. These conditions appear systemic and should be treated as a significant mitigating factor. The courts have repeatedly sent the message that persons in custody awaiting trial and presumed innocent must be treated humanely with a base level of dignity. That is not happening.

Sentence To Be Imposed

59In my view, when I balance the applicable sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, restraint and totality, consider the aggravating and mitigating factors, and consider the range of sentences supported by the case law, I am satisfied that a global sentence of 18 months or 547 days is appropriate.

60I pause to note that in the absence of the significant mitigating effect of the harsh conditions of pre-trial custody, I would have imposed a global sentence of 22 months.

61The 18-month global sentence will be reduced by 372 days to account for time served on a 1.5:1 basis. This leaves a sentence of 175 days from today’s date or approximately 5 months and three weeks.

62The sentence will be broken down as follows:

Count 1 – 17 months less PTC – leaving 145 days to serve.

Count 2 – 9 months concurrent less PTC – noted as 1 day concurrent.

Count 3 – FTC Release Order – 30 days consecutive to count 1.

63Mr. Cottle will also be placed on probation for a period of one year on statutory terms, including report once when released and thereafter as required by probation services.

64I also make the following ancillary orders:

(a) A DNA order; and

(b) A forfeiture order on consent.

65In view of Mr. Cottle’s personal circumstances, including his child support obligations, I decline to impose the VFS.

66Mr. Cottle, I hope you have learned a life lesson through your involvement in these offences. You are an incredibly skilled and talented person. Those skills and talents are a gift and you should put those gifts to good use going forward.

J. Di Luca J.

Released: June 26, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Cottle, 2026 ONSC 3774