James Gifford Foy

The appellant, Sandra Forcier, appealed her convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge’s credibility findings or conclusions.

The court noted the assistance of amicus curiae due to the appellant’s brain injury and confirmed that the trial judge’s reasons were entitled to deference.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought forfeiture of $99,210 in Canadian currency seized at Fallsview Casino, alleging it was the proceeds of unlawful activity, specifically money laundering.

The respondent, Branavan Kanapathipillai, claimed the funds were from legitimate gambling and a third mortgage.

The court reviewed expert evidence, financial tracing, and the respondent’s explanations, ultimately finding the Attorney General met the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities.

The court ordered the funds forfeited, finding the respondent’s explanations unconvincing and the circumstances highly suspicious.

The appellant, Nicholas Necan, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge: inadequate anti-bias instruction (specifically regarding the appellant's Indigenous identity and the 'firewater myth'), confusing instructions on intoxication, failure to provide an after-the-fact conduct instruction, and failure to provide a propensity reasoning instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, while not perfect, adequately equipped the jury to judge the case, and that no reversible errors occurred regarding the challenged instructions.

The accused, Daniel Gendron, was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged that Gendron had sexual intercourse with the complainant, S.M., while she was incapacitated and unable to consent, possibly due to being drugged.

The court found S.M.'s testimony to be unreliable and inconsistent, particularly regarding the timing of text messages and her belief in her friend's psychic abilities.

Due to the lack of corroboration for the critical aspects of S.M.'s testimony, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that S.M. was unconscious or incapable of consenting, or that she had withdrawn her consent.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual exploitation and uttering death threats following a judge-alone trial.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by relying on an ungrounded "common-sense" assumption to reject his evidence and by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were plausible and grounded in the evidence, and that the burden of proof was not reversed.

The court emphasized the high deference given to trial judges' credibility findings and clarified the application of the rule against ungrounded common-sense assumptions.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a person believed to be under 16.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding an agreement by failing to consider inconsistent inferences (actus reus), and whether the mens rea for the offence requires an intent to actually carry out the underlying sexual offence, beyond the intent to enter into the agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of a sufficiently detailed agreement and clarifying that the mens rea only requires the intent to enter into the agreement, aligning the offence with other inchoate child protection provisions.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to address inadvertent tainting of the complainant's evidence and by making a finding of no motive to fabricate without evidentiary foundation, thereby reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the inadvertent tainting argument given the nature of the allegations, and interpreting the trial judge's finding of "no motive to fabricate" as a rejection of the defence's assertion of animus, rather than an improper bolstering of credibility or reversal of the burden of proof.

Timothy Knight was charged with three counts of domestic assault.

The complainant, Ms. Rigato, was the sole witness.

The defence argued Ms. Rigato had a motive to fabricate due to an impending custody dispute.

The court found Ms. Rigato to be a truthful and thoughtful witness, accepting her uncontradicted evidence that she reported the assaults because they occurred, not to gain a family law advantage.

While minor inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony did not undermine her credibility, the court had a reasonable doubt regarding the first alleged assault (a push in bed) due to its context.

Knight was found not guilty of the first assault but guilty of the second and third assaults.

The appellant, Dwayne Campbell, appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

The total delay was 28 months and 26 days, below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge erred in assessing the appellant's "meaningful steps to expedite," the case did not "markedly" exceed the reasonable time requirements, largely due to the co-accused's actions and the Crown's reasonable decision not to sever the trials.

A police officer, Remo Romano, appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death and his eight-month custodial sentence.

The conviction arose from a fatal collision where he struck and killed a pedestrian while driving at excessive speed during undercover surveillance.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly focused the jury on the consequences of his driving rather than the manner of driving, and failed to adequately explain the "marked departure" standard for mens rea.

He also sought a reduction in sentence or a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the jury charge was appropriate and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, even considering the newfound availability of conditional sentences for this offence.

This appeal concerned the admissibility of evidence obtained following an unlawful arrest and unreasonable search, and the reasonableness of the conviction for drug and firearm offences.

Police, after a search warrant was denied, arrested the accused as a suspected drug buyer.

A search incident to arrest yielded drugs and a firearm.

The trial judge found Charter breaches (ss. 8 and 9) but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding police conduct negligent but not egregious.

The accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding sufficient grounds for investigative detention, no improper disregard of the justice of the peace's decision, and that negligent conduct does not automatically lead to exclusion.

The Court also found the conviction reasonable based on circumstantial evidence of the accused's knowledge of the contraband.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms and narcotics offences, arguing that police surveillance violated his s. 8 Charter rights, the initial search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations, and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, or that the police conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police surveillance from a distance on neighbouring property did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.

While acknowledging minor s. 8 breaches related to delayed reporting and a defective warrant, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) and found no abuse of process, noting the police trespass was not serious and based on erroneous legal advice.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences following a search of his apartment.

The trial proceeded as a Charter application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Three primary issues were raised: (1) whether the search warrant was validly issued based on confidential informant information; (2) whether covert pre-warrant entries into the apartment building constituted unlawful trespasses and section 8 violations; and (3) whether the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel were violated when police failed to facilitate access to counsel following arrest.

The court found that while the warrant was validly issued and the pre-warrant entries constituted only minor section 8 breaches, the failure to facilitate access to counsel was a serious and gross violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a child.

The Crown's case involved online conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer posing as a mother of two daughters.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make an explicit or implicit finding that the appellant had agreed to commit the offence, which was an essential element of the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

A police officer convicted by jury of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to eight months in prison sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed release, arguing the grounds of appeal lacked merit and that public confidence in the administration of justice required incarceration pending appeal.

The motion judge granted bail, finding the grounds of appeal relating to sufficiency of focus on the dangerous driving and guidance on marked departure were not frivolous and warranted close examination.

The judge held that public interest was best served by allowing the applicant to challenge the conviction before serving the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault arising from a collision during a recreational hockey game.

The Court of Appeal allowed his initial appeal and ordered a new trial due to impermissible speculative reasoning by the trial judge.

On retrial, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable delay.

The trial judge dismissed the stay application and convicted the appellant again.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the delay in the retrial was unreasonable and breached the appellant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court held that the clock for calculating delay should have started from the date the Court of Appeal ordered the new trial, not from when the summons was issued.

The court also found that the Crown failed to prioritize the retrial and breached its duty to expedite proceedings by insisting on consecutive trial dates when earlier non-consecutive dates were available.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 13.5 months' imprisonment followed by 2 years' probation for fraud over $5,000.

The appellant had defrauded a family friend and client of $110,000 through a fabricated immigration scheme.

The trial judge found the fraud was planned and involved a breach of trust but lasted only a few days.

The appellant argued that a non-custodial sentence could meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, proposing either a suspended sentence or a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the non-custodial alternatives and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.