James Gifford Foy

The accused was charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences following a search of his apartment.

The trial proceeded as a Charter application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Three primary issues were raised: (1) whether the search warrant was validly issued based on confidential informant information; (2) whether covert pre-warrant entries into the apartment building constituted unlawful trespasses and section 8 violations; and (3) whether the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel were violated when police failed to facilitate access to counsel following arrest.

The court found that while the warrant was validly issued and the pre-warrant entries constituted only minor section 8 breaches, the failure to facilitate access to counsel was a serious and gross violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a child.

The Crown's case involved online conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer posing as a mother of two daughters.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make an explicit or implicit finding that the appellant had agreed to commit the offence, which was an essential element of the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

A police officer convicted by jury of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to eight months in prison sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed release, arguing the grounds of appeal lacked merit and that public confidence in the administration of justice required incarceration pending appeal.

The motion judge granted bail, finding the grounds of appeal relating to sufficiency of focus on the dangerous driving and guidance on marked departure were not frivolous and warranted close examination.

The judge held that public interest was best served by allowing the applicant to challenge the conviction before serving the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault arising from a collision during a recreational hockey game.

The Court of Appeal allowed his initial appeal and ordered a new trial due to impermissible speculative reasoning by the trial judge.

On retrial, the appellant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing unreasonable delay.

The trial judge dismissed the stay application and convicted the appellant again.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the delay in the retrial was unreasonable and breached the appellant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court held that the clock for calculating delay should have started from the date the Court of Appeal ordered the new trial, not from when the summons was issued.

The court also found that the Crown failed to prioritize the retrial and breached its duty to expedite proceedings by insisting on consecutive trial dates when earlier non-consecutive dates were available.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 13.5 months' imprisonment followed by 2 years' probation for fraud over $5,000.

The appellant had defrauded a family friend and client of $110,000 through a fabricated immigration scheme.

The trial judge found the fraud was planned and involved a breach of trust but lasted only a few days.

The appellant argued that a non-custodial sentence could meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence, proposing either a suspended sentence or a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the non-custodial alternatives and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.