Roger Shallow

A Toronto Police officer, Christopher Hutchings, was charged with assault following an incident on a TTC bus involving a "disorderly male" Chase Richards.

The court assessed whether Officer Hutchings had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and if his use of force was reasonable, proportionate, and necessary.

The judgment relied on video evidence, expert testimony on police use of force, and witness credibility.

The court found that Officer Hutchings had objectively and subjectively reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Richards for mischief due to his non-compliance and aggressive behaviour, which caused the bus to go out of service.

The court rejected Mr. Richards' claim of being choked, finding his actions on video inconsistent with such an event.

While acknowledging the social context of racial profiling, the court found no evidence that race influenced the officer's actions.

Officer Hutchings was found not guilty.

The Crown appealed a 12-month sentence imposed on a young Black first-time offender for possession of a loaded handgun.

The trial judge had significantly reduced the sentence based on social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal held that while social context evidence of anti-Black racism is highly relevant to assessing an offender's moral blameworthiness and rehabilitative prospects, it does not reduce the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence.

The Court also held that the Gladue framework for Indigenous offenders does not apply directly to Black offenders, though it can inform the approach.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to two years less a day, but permanently stayed due to the passage of time.

Constable Daniel Montsion was tried on charges of manslaughter, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon arising from his role in the arrest of Abdirahman Abdi on July 24, 2016, in Ottawa.

Mr. Abdi died in cardiac arrest shortly after the arrest.

The Crown alleged that Constable Montsion unlawfully assaulted Mr. Abdi by punching him multiple times in the face and head while wearing hard-knuckled gloves, and that this assault was a significant contributing cause of Mr. Abdi's death.

The defence argued that Constable Montsion's use of force was legally justified under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code and that he did not cause Mr. Abdi's injuries or death.

After a 72-day trial, Justice Kelly found Constable Montsion not guilty on all charges, concluding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was unlawful or criminally negligent, that he caused Mr. Abdi's nasal injuries, or that he caused Mr. Abdi's death.

The appellant, L.K., appealed her convictions for sexual assault, criminal negligence, failing to provide necessaries of life, child abandonment, and obstructing justice, stemming from her involvement in the sexual abuse of her minor daughter by two acquaintances and her conduct during the police investigation.

She also sought leave to appeal her sentence and brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence, both of which were abandoned during oral argument.

The appeal focused on alleged deficiencies in the jury charge, including the absence of a W.D. instruction for exculpatory evidence, failure to provide a "no probative value" instruction for obstruction evidence, leaving criminal negligence with the jury, and an objective assessment of intent for child abandonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge functionally adequate, the criminal negligence charge properly left to the jury, and the error in the child abandonment instruction harmless due to the curative proviso.

The Crown sought leave for eight organizations and groups to intervene in an appeal concerning the role of systemic racism and background factors in sentencing of racialized, non-Indigenous offenders and the use of judicial notice and social context evidence in sentencing proceedings.

The motions judge granted leave to all proposed interveners, finding that the issues transcended the interests of the parties and were of significance to the administration of criminal justice.

The interveners were well-recognized organizations with relevant expertise and could offer perspectives different from those of the Crown and respondent.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his roommate.

The trial judge refused to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury, finding no air of reality to the defence because the accused had initiated a confrontation while armed, anticipating that the victim could react violently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no absolute rule precluding the provocation defence merely because an accused initiates a confrontation while armed.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the contextual analysis required under the provocation defence framework and that the defence had an air of reality and should have been left with the jury.

The Court considered whether accepting a benefit to use government contacts to promote private sales to First Nations constituted influence peddling connected to government business under s. 121(1)(d)(i) of the Criminal Code.

A majority held the phrase should be interpreted broadly and includes matters that could be facilitated by government given its mandate.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent that would have restored the acquittal.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his pregnant wife who drowned in a bathtub.

He was charged with first degree murder but convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on the ground that the trial judge misapprehended a jury question during deliberations and introduced a new theory of liability based on section 215 of the Criminal Code (failure to provide necessaries of life) that was not previously advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's answer to the jury's question introduced an alternative route to conviction that was incompatible with how the trial had been conducted, thereby compromising trial fairness.

The court allowed the appeal and directed a new trial on the charge of manslaughter.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for dangerous driving that was upheld on summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that neither proposed ground of appeal met the merits threshold.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's rejection of expert evidence regarding reaction time, which the trial judge was entitled to reject and which was irrelevant to the facts as found.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, which also failed the merits test.

The court noted that dangerous driving law is well-settled and each case turns on its own facts.

The defendants applied to replace police bail conditions imposed under section 503(2.1) of the Criminal Code with a judicial bail order under section 515.

The defendants were charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and public mischief arising from an altercation with a civilian.

The Crown sought to maintain three contested conditions: residency in Ontario, a curfew from 10:00 pm to 6:00 am, and abstention from alcohol consumption.

The court found that the residency condition was unnecessary to ensure attendance in court, the curfew was punitive and unnecessary given the situational nature of the alleged offence, and the alcohol prohibition lacked evidentiary support and was not necessary to address public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The court replaced the police bail with a judicial bail order removing the three contested conditions while maintaining no-contact provisions, weapons prohibitions, and notification requirements.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of an illegal weapon, challenging the trial judge's finding that the firing pin for the weapon was "readily sourced and available." The appellant argued this conclusion was speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidentiary record, including evidence that the gun was common in the United States where parts were readily available, and that smuggling of parts into Canada occurs despite legal prohibitions.

A Hamilton Police officer with approximately two years of experience was charged with assault causing bodily harm after punching a suspect in the face during an arrest.

The suspect, a 35-year-old man with mental health issues, had spat on the officer.

The officer delivered three punches total: one immediately after being spat upon (conceded as reasonable by the Crown), and two additional punches while the suspect was on the ground and handcuffed.

The court found the latter two punches were excessive and not protected by section 25 of the Criminal Code, as they were delivered in retribution rather than for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either of the two excessive punches caused the suspect's facial fracture, which required surgery.

The officer was acquitted of assault causing bodily harm but convicted of the lesser included offence of assault.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm, which was entered following a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was invalid and not unequivocal due to shifting facts presented by the Crown, the appellant's statements suggesting a lack of mens rea, and indications she pleaded guilty primarily to be released from jail where she was allegedly denied HIV medication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and breach of a court order.

He was unaware that his guilty plea to dangerous driving would result in an automatic, indefinite suspension of his driver's licence under the Highway Traffic Act due to his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal held that the collateral consequence of an indefinite licence suspension was legally relevant and significant to the appellant, a truck driver.

Because he was uninformed of this consequence, his plea was invalid.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea and conviction for dangerous driving were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that charge.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a five-year penitentiary sentence imposed after the respondent pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences against his daughter.

The court considered whether the sentencing judge misapprehended the applicable range for repeated parental sexual abuse and whether the sentence was manifestly unfit in light of prior authorities and the respondent's dated prior sexual offence record.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not treat the earlier authority as binding in a way that precluded a higher sentence and remained alive to both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Although the sentence was at the bottom of the applicable range, it was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of manslaughter in the drowning death of his wife and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals.

The Crown conceded the appellant was not a flight risk or a danger to the public, but argued the appeals were frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the conviction appeal raised an arguable issue regarding the trial judge's response to a jury question, which introduced a new route to liability based on failing to provide the necessaries of life.

Concluding the appeal was not frivolous and the principle of reviewability outweighed enforceability, the Court granted release pending appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for firearm offences.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence in rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge made one factual error, it was not material to the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, the Court agreed that the sentence for unauthorized possession should be concurrent, not consecutive, to the sentence for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The Court upheld the trial judge's calculation of presentence custody credit, noting the appellant's poor conduct in custody negated the quantitative rationale for enhanced credit.

The total sentence was reduced from six to five years.

The appellant, a deaf man with a lengthy record of sexual offences, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in finding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding the sentencing judge reasonably concluded that the appellant's history of medication non-compliance and need for concurrent, specialized treatments meant his risk could not be managed outside a secure setting.

The appeal was dismissed.