Jon Doody

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a violation of the accused's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application judge had found the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in her treatment of a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from the release of a Supreme Court of Canada decision that necessitated a rehearing of a change of venue motion.

The Court found the Crown had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay and deducted an additional 93 days.

This brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant, Igor Kononenko, appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge’s treatment of prior consistent statements, the use of the complainant’s out-of-court utterances, and the application of the W.(D.) framework.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s approach to the evidence or reasoning, and dismissed the appeal.

Cameron Ortis, convicted of offences under the Security of Information Act and Criminal Code, sought bail pending appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court granted bail, finding that the appeal was not frivolous, the applicant would surrender into custody, and detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The decision emphasized the significant reviewability interest due to novel issues raised on appeal, including the constitutional validity of s. 14 of the SOIA and the impact of s. 38 Canada Evidence Act redactions on the right to a fair trial, which outweighed the enforceability interest given the strict bail conditions and absence of flight or public safety concerns.

The court addressed a constitutional challenge to section 14 of the Security of Information Act, which criminalizes the unauthorized communication of special operational information by persons permanently bound to secrecy.

The challenge argued that the term "without authority" was unconstitutionally vague, violating section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the term was not vague when interpreted in its statutory context, particularly for the specific class of individuals to whom it applies.

It clarified that "without authority" pertains to the actus reus of the offence, meaning the power or right to act, derived from one's official position or a superior's grant of authority.

The appellant, Mark Cameron, appealed his conviction for break and enter, firearm offences, and cocaine possession, arguing several Charter violations related to his detention, arrest, and search.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's Charter ruling.

The court upheld the lawfulness of taking keys during investigative detention, the sufficiency of information provided, the reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on cumulative circumstances, the lawfulness of the incidental search, and the justified delay in advising the right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

This sentencing decision concerns an individual found guilty of historical sexual assault and gross indecency against two young relatives.

The offences occurred between 1979 and 1985, involving a significant breach of trust.

The court applied the sentencing principles from the Criminal Code, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for child abuse cases, in line with the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen.

Aggravating factors included the multiple victims, the extended duration and invasive nature of the abuse, the perpetrator's position of trust, and the profound impact on the victims.

The court also considered the perpetrator's personal circumstances and the limited applicability of Gladue factors.

A global sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed, along with various ancillary orders, while a victim fine surcharge was waived due to undue hardship.

The offender, a high-ranking civilian member of the RCMP, was convicted of communicating special operational information to targets of international investigations, breach of trust, and unauthorized use of a computer.

The Crown sought 22 to 25 years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a sentence of time served (seven years).

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's extreme breach of trust and the potential risk to undercover operations, but also considered his historically good character and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, reduced by 2400 days of pre-trial custody credit, leaving 7 years and 155 days to serve.

The Crown appealed a sexual assault sentence but failed to perfect the appeal by missing deadlines for filing materials.

The Crown sought an adjournment, which the respondent opposed, requesting dismissal and costs.

The court denied the adjournment, dismissed the appeal due to the Crown's lack of diligence and non-compliance with rules, and declined to award costs against the Crown.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing child pornography, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding that s. 8 of the Charter was not engaged when his wife voluntarily turned over computers containing evidence to the police, and by failing to find a s. 8 breach due to delayed reporting of the seizure.

The Court of Appeal found that s. 8 was engaged when police took control of the computers, constituting a seizure.

While the seizure of Computer 1 was found to be lawful under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code, the delay in filing the report to a justice for Computer 1 was a Charter breach.

The court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breaches were not serious and the evidence was reliable and essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code to exclude the public and media from the courtroom during the testimony of the accused and three other witnesses due to national security concerns.

The accused, a former civilian member of the RCMP, was charged under the Security of Information Act.

Applying the Sherman Estate test for discretionary limits on court openness, the court found a serious risk that classified information could be inadvertently disclosed during cross-examination.

The court granted the order, directing that the public be excluded during the specified testimony, but required that vetted transcripts be released as soon as possible to balance the open court principle with national security interests.

Mark Cameron was found guilty of break and enter with intent, robbery with a firearm, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and possession of cocaine.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the home invasion-style robbery, the significant impact on the victims, Mr. Cameron's dated but extensive criminal record including prior robberies, and his personal circumstances.

The court applied sentencing principles, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, while also considering rehabilitation and the parity principle with co-accused.

The court granted a two-year credit for pre-sentence custody and onerous bail conditions.

A global sentence of 8 years imprisonment was imposed, reduced to 6 years after credits.

The accused, Cameron Ortis, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act, arguing that non-disclosure of highly classified information by the Crown compromised his right to a fair trial and full answer and defence.

The court dismissed counts 5 to 8 of the indictment, finding that the prohibited classified information was of immense importance to Ortis's defence regarding the mens rea element of those charges, making the national security interests and fair trial rights irreconcilable.

However, the court denied the stay for counts 1 to 4, 9, and 10, determining that the non-disclosure did not sufficiently impact Ortis's ability to present his defence for those charges.

The applicant, a former high-ranking civilian member of the RCMP charged with serious national security offences under the Security of Information Act, sought a bail review after spending over three years in pre-trial custody.

Following the dismissal of four of the ten charges against him, the court found a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the applicant met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, noting that the passage of time and strict proposed conditions mitigated the risks of flight, reoffending, and loss of public confidence.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on strict conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, unlawful confinement, choking with intent, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault against his former girlfriend.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the core details of the assault and sexual assault to be credible and reliable, despite some inconsistencies and delayed disclosure.

The accused was found guilty of unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault, but not guilty of attempted murder and choking with intent, as the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for attempted murder and the choking was considered part of the assault.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising arguments of insufficient reasons from the trial judge, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous findings regarding evidence that confirmed the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the scrutiny of evidence balanced, and the corroborating evidence (specifically the complainant's demeanour) properly considered, despite some disagreement with the trial judge's assessment of one piece of corroborating evidence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder, raising three grounds: a breach of jury secrecy during a juror inquiry, errors in a s. 8 Charter analysis and subsequent s. 24(2) exclusion of evidence, and errors in excluding hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the jury inquiry, upholding the application judge's decision to exclude evidence under the Charter, and affirming the exclusion of hearsay statements due to reliability concerns.

The appellant, Mohamed Faisal, appealed his conviction for driving over 0.80, arguing a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) breach but admitted the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant factors.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, specifically regarding the consideration of the police officer's problematic testimony and the overall assessment of whether admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's holistic consideration of the evidence and the Grant factors, and affirming the deference owed to the trial judge's discretion in s. 24(2) assessments.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching, invitation to sexual touching, sexual touching while in a position of trust, and uttering a death threat against his stepdaughter.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in using a statement he made to the police.

Specifically, he contended the judge improperly inferred prior sexual activity from an admission of later consensual sexual activity (propensity reasoning/stereotypical assumptions) and failed to properly analyze the statement's exculpatory aspect under R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's use of the statement was a permissible evidence-based credibility assessment, not based on prohibited reasoning.

The court also found the W.(D.) analysis was properly conducted, as the trial judge recognized the statement's partially exculpatory nature but gave it little weight due to its lack of spontaneity and its character as an "alternate narrative" rather than a denial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the respondent's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The respondent was initially arrested for driving while prohibited, but the officer subsequently began an impaired driving investigation without informing the respondent of the change in focus and delayed providing rights to counsel for four and a half minutes while asking incriminating questions.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error of law in the trial judge's findings of Charter breaches and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant G.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving three complainants.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's application of the rule in R. v. W.(D.), the rejection of the appellant's evidence without sufficient reasoning, and reliance on the absence of a proven motive for fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including the W.(D.) rule, and provided reasoned explanations for credibility assessments, demonstrating proper deference to the trial judge's findings.