Jonathan Nadler

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision refusing his transfer from the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre back to Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The appellant, aged 69 with schizoaffective disorder, pedophilic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning, had been under the Board's jurisdiction since 1998.

After transferring to the Royal Ottawa in November 2024, he faced significantly enhanced liberty restrictions, including confinement to his ward and a pureed food diet due to choking risk.

The Board refused the transfer request, citing the brief duration of his stay and concerns about therapeutic alliance.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, holding that it improperly focused on the appellant's best interests rather than the statutory "least onerous and least restrictive" standard.

The court ordered the transfer to Ontario Shores.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising arguments of insufficient reasons from the trial judge, uneven scrutiny of Crown and defence evidence, and erroneous findings regarding evidence that confirmed the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the scrutiny of evidence balanced, and the corroborating evidence (specifically the complainant's demeanour) properly considered, despite some disagreement with the trial judge's assessment of one piece of corroborating evidence.

The accused was found guilty of 18 counts of firearms trafficking following an undercover police operation.

He brought applications for a stay of proceedings, alleging entrapment and an abuse of process under s. 7 of the Charter.

He argued that the police exploited his vulnerability as a stateless person and that the use of a volatile police agent in public areas shocked the community.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the police merely provided an opportunity to commit the offences and did not induce the accused.

The court also held that the police conduct, including the monitoring of the agent and the locations of the transactions, did not amount to an abuse of process.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application arguing that police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him without a warrant and unlawfully searched his vehicle incident to arrest.

He also alleged his right to counsel was violated.

The court found that the arresting officer had objectively reasonable grounds to order the arrest based on a combination of witness descriptions, vehicle identification, and a partial licence plate match.

The subsequent search of the vehicle, which yielded a loaded handgun, was deemed a lawful search incident to arrest.

The court also found no violation of the applicant's right to counsel.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following an incident on February 4, 2018, where the complainant alleged that after initially consenting to sexual intercourse, she asked the defendant to stop, but he continued to engage in sexual activity for a few more thrusts.

The defendant denied continuing after the complainant asked him to stop.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant continued to engage in sexual intercourse after the complainant said she wanted to stop.

The court found significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with her police statement, limited memory of key events, and the selective provision of text messages to police.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and concluded that the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault, alleging that while engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on February 4, 2018, the complainant told him to stop, but he continued to penetrate her briefly before stopping.

The defendant acknowledged the complainant told him to stop but testified he immediately complied.

The court held a hearing under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence of other sexual activity and private records relating to the complainant.

The central issue at trial would be whether the defendant stopped when the complainant communicated her withdrawal of consent.

The court admitted certain text messages and Snapchat messages between the parties and the complainant and her friend that directly related to the sexual activity in issue, as they were relevant to the complainant's credibility regarding her account of the events.

However, the court excluded evidence of other sexual activity between the parties occurring on other dates, as such evidence had minimal probative value and would substantially prejudice the complainant's privacy and dignity rights.

The court also excluded a sentence from the complainant's post-incident message to the defendant that the Crown sought to introduce.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault on February 4, 2018.

This decision addresses applications under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine whether certain evidence is capable of being admissible.

The defendant sought to introduce: (a) Snapchat messages between the complainant and a friend dated February 4-8, 2018; (b) text messages between the defendant and complainant dated February 3-4, 2018 of a sexual nature; (c) text messages of other sexual activity from various dates between January and August 2018; and (d) evidence of other sexual activity as outlined in the notice of application.

The Crown also sought to introduce a sentence from a message sent by the complainant to a friend.

The court determined that all evidence should proceed to a s. 278.94 hearing to determine final admissibility, with the exception of certain portions that the defendant agreed to redact.

Trial management order addressing pre-trial motions in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defendant sought to admit Snapchat messages, text messages, and evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of other sexual activity.

The court established a comprehensive procedural framework and timetable for determining admissibility issues in stages, including determinations of standing, document characterization, and application of statutory tests for admission of sensitive evidence.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa sought a finding that two children, A.D. (14) and E.D. (11), were in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Society alleged risk of physical and emotional harm due to the mother's failure to adequately care for, supervise, and protect the children, a pattern of neglect, and her inability to provide or access necessary treatment for their significant special needs (Autism Spectrum Disorder, ADHD, ODD, Reactive Attachment Disorder).

The father did not participate in the trial.

The court found the children in need of protection, citing a lengthy history of child protection involvement, the mother's inconsistent care, lack of stable housing, mental health issues, drug use, and inability to regulate emotions or engage meaningfully with services.

The court ordered extended Society care for both children, determining it was in their best interests, and left access to the mother at the Society's discretion, considering the mother's attributes that could impair future adoption opportunities.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay in a sexual assault case.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan applied only to the period from charge to conviction (27 months and 10 days), not including post-conviction events like dangerous offender applications.

After deducting 85 days for defence delay and 14 days for a discrete exceptional event (flooding), the net delay was well below the 30-month ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable or that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for partial summary judgment on the eve of trial, seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and should be placed in extended care, leaving the issue of the mother's access for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment would not shorten the trial significantly, risked inconsistent findings of fact, and raised fairness concerns given the mother's recent retention of new counsel and evidentiary issues.

The matter was ordered to proceed to a full trial on all issues.