Jon Doody

The appellants, Joshua and Jordan Powell, appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm and mischief (Jordan only) stemming from a group altercation.

They raised five grounds of appeal, including unreasonable verdicts, misunderstanding of mens rea, deficient reasons, improper rejection of exculpatory police statements, and erroneous rejection of a witness's testimony based on unraised bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's verdicts were reasonable, the mens rea for assault causing bodily harm was correctly applied, the reasons were sufficient, and the handling of exculpatory statements and witness credibility did not infringe the appellants' rights or legal principles.

The accused brought Charter applications to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent searches of cell phones and a vehicle GPS device following a home invasion robbery.

The court found no breaches of the accused's rights under ss. 8, 9, or 10 of the Charter during the initial stop and arrest.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrants and production orders.

Although the police failed to file a timely report to justice for the seized items, the court assumed a s. 8 breach but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach was not serious and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the prosecution.

The applicant, charged with drug-impaired driving, sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The applicant argued the appeal judge erred in calculating the delay by excluding the time taken by the Crown's certiorari application regarding the disclosure of drug recognition expert logs, and by selecting an incorrect end-date for the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no clear error of law or issue of significance beyond the case, as the appeal judge properly applied the Tsega framework to the certiorari delay and reasonably relied on the end-date accepted by the parties below.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit twelve statements made by the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder.

The statements were categorized as 'background statements', 'interrogation statements', and 'implied confession' statements.

The court excluded the 'implied confession' and 'background' statements, finding their probative value was far outweighed by the extreme prejudice of introducing vague allegations of other homicides.

The court allowed edited segments of two 'interrogation statements' to be admitted, finding they retained their proper meaning and provided highly probative evidence regarding blood found in the accused's truck.

The Crown applied under s. 652 of the Criminal Code for an order directing the jury to view the scene where the victim's remains were found and two other nearby locations.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder.

The court applied the test from R. v. Johnson, requiring the applicant to establish a real and demonstrable advantage to the jury's understanding of the evidence.

The court found that the extensive photographic, video, and 3D model evidence available would sufficiently convey the topography, remoteness, and size of the culvert.

The application for a jury view was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct towards a third party, arguing it demonstrated animosity towards mentally ill persons or those who upset him, which was relevant to motive in a circumstantial murder case.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence lacked context, was not sufficiently cogent to establish a bona fide theory of motive, and its prejudicial impact far outweighed its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit hearsay statements made by deceased persons in a first-degree murder trial.

The central issue was the threshold reliability of the statements under the principled exception and the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The court considered the deceased victim's mental health history, specifically evidence of schizophrenia and paranoia, as a relevant factor in assessing whether statements were made under 'circumstances of suspicion'.

The court admitted one statement made by the victim to a friend, finding it materially corroborated, but excluded the remaining disputed statements due to insufficient threshold reliability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude statements made to police under s 24(2) of the Charter, arguing they were tainted by a prior s 8 breach involving an invalid search of his residence.

The court found that statements made during police visits where search-related property was returned or discussed were causally and contextually linked to the prior breach.

The court rejected the Crown's request to merely edit the statements, ruling that the tainted statements must be excluded in their entirety to prevent the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute.

Statements made during visits unrelated to the seized property were not excluded.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a covert search of his residence authorized by a general warrant.

The police sought to find items linking the accused to the murder, including a composition book containing a map of alleged crime scenes.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the general warrant lacked sufficient objective and subjective grounds, relying on stale-dated information and a conditional psychiatric opinion.

Consequently, the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against Mr. Mansour for drug-impaired driving, based on an alleged breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's calculation of delay, specifically regarding time attributed to defence counsel changes and certiorari proceedings.

The Superior Court, applying new guidance from R. v. Tsega, found that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by incorrectly calculating defence delay and by including the entire period of reasonable certiorari proceedings in the Jordan delay calculation.

The court re-calculated the net delay to be below the presumptive ceiling, thus allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.

This decision addresses two applications for certiorari brought by the Crown, RCMP, and Ottawa Police Services to quash lower court rulings that ordered the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs in drug-impaired driving cases.

The Superior Court considered the impact of recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) on the relevance and disclosability of these logs, particularly in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Stipo.

The court found that the Code amendments constituted a significant change in circumstances, but ultimately concluded that the amendments do not alter the requirement for disclosure of rolling logs where the DRE's opinion is not corroborated by toxicological results.

However, where toxicological analysis does corroborate the DRE's call, the rolling log is no longer relevant to challenge the DRE's opinion.

The court indicated it would quash the disclosure orders in the specific cases at hand because the DRE calls were corroborated by toxicology, but declined to issue a mandamus order.

The Crown and Ottawa Police Service brought certiorari applications to quash disclosure orders made by three application judges.

These orders required the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs and face sheets to the respondents, who were charged with drug-impaired driving.

The Crown argued that disclosure was prohibited by s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code or, alternatively, that the records were third-party records and not relevant.

The court dismissed the certiorari applications, finding that the application judges did not exceed their jurisdiction, s. 258.1 of the Code did not bar disclosure, and the rolling logs and face sheets were relevant third-party records.

The court also declined to order a new hearing for one respondent despite an error in denying standing to the Ottawa Police Service, citing judicial efficiency and the respondents' s. 11(b) rights.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts: possession of child pornography for the purpose of transmission and possession of child pornography.

The defendant's collection contained 60,165 still images (14,207 unique) and 1,626 videos (1,290 unique) depicting various forms of child sexual abuse.

The court imposed a global sentence of 28 months imprisonment (28 months on the making available count and 18 months on the possession count, served concurrently), along with ancillary orders including a mandatory DNA order, lifetime SOIRA registration, a 10-year section 161 order, and forfeiture of seized materials.

The sentencing was guided by the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Inksetter, which established that denunciation and general deterrence are paramount sentencing objectives for child pornography offences.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking disclosure of the Drug Recognition Expert's rolling logs, which document all tests performed by the expert including the suspect's name, witnessing officer, date, the expert's opinion, and whether the opinion was confirmed by toxicological testing.

The Crown opposed disclosure, arguing the records were third-party records not in Crown possession.

The court granted the application, finding that the rolling logs are relevant for court purposes as mandated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police standards, and that s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code does not prohibit disclosure of anonymized rolling logs as part of the expert's curriculum vitae.

The accused faced 31 criminal charges including fraud, breach of trust, and bribery relating to his Senate expense claims and a $90,172.24 payment from the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff.

The charges were divided into categories: primary residency claims, travel expense claims, consulting contracts, and the $90,000 payment.

The court found that the accused's residency declarations and travel claims were made in accordance with the Senate Administrative Rules and advice from Senate leadership.

The consulting contracts were used to pay for legitimate Senate-related work.

Regarding the $90,000 payment, the court found that the accused was coerced by the Prime Minister's Office into accepting the funds as part of a political damage control strategy, and lacked the requisite corrupt intent.

All 31 charges were dismissed.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence from forensic accountant Mark Grenon regarding Senator Duffy's travel claims, financial practices, Senate contract funds, and a payment to the Receiver General.

The Crown sought to adduce comprehensive forensic accounting evidence analyzing Senator Duffy's expense claims submitted to the Senate, his personal financial situation, Senate funds procured and distributed through third parties, and a specific payment.

The defence objected to most of the evidence as overreaching, unnecessary, and prejudicial.

The court applied the two-step Mohan/Abbey framework for admissibility of expert evidence and admitted substantially all of the Crown's proposed evidence, with limited restrictions on the scope of certain areas.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and mischief arising from an incident on a public bus.

The Court of Appeal previously dismissed the sexual assault conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal.

In this endorsement regarding the mischief conviction, the Court found that the trial judge erred by convicting the appellant without particularizing the property interfered with or conducting a separate analysis of the elements of the offence.

The mischief conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The court ruled on the admissibility of the Eleventh Report of the Senate's Standing Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration dated December 15, 2010.

The defence sought to admit the report as a public document and under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Crown opposed admission, arguing the report lacked reliability and constituted inadmissible hearsay.

The court found the report met the criteria for admissibility as a public document, demonstrating necessity, reliability, and relevance to the trial.

The report provided background information on Senate administrative rules and internal audit findings regarding senators' expense claims and administrative practices.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for sexual assault and mischief arising from an incident where he touched the complainant and raised her skirt on a public bus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for sexual assault, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the original sentence of six months' imprisonment was wholly disproportionate for a first offender with 13 days of pre-sentence custody.

The sentence was varied to a suspended sentence with two years' probation.

Following jury convictions for conspiracy to facilitate a terrorist activity and facilitating a terrorist activity, the court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine disputed facts relevant to sentencing.

Applying s. 724 of the Criminal Code and the principles in R. v. Gardiner, the judge determined which aggravating facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and which alleged mitigating facts were established on a balance of probabilities.

The court found that the accused supported violent jihadist causes, assisted associates involved in terrorist activity, provided funds intended for foreign terrorists to purchase weapons and grenades, and participated in recruiting others into the group.

The court also addressed possession of explosive components but concluded that the purpose of that possession was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the jury’s acquittal on the explosives charge.

The decision sets out factual findings to guide the subsequent sentencing determination.