Ian Carter

The respondents in an application under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act brought a motion for a publication ban and confidentiality order regarding a public hearing.

The Court found it had authority to grant a publication ban based on its inherent powers and a confidentiality order under Rule 151.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the Court found the orders were necessary to prevent serious risks to trial fairness and prior publication bans, and that the benefits outweighed the negative effects.

Four appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that their Charter s. 11(b) rights to be tried within a reasonable time were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The application judges had dismissed their s. 11(b) applications, finding that despite delays exceeding the Jordan ceiling (18 months), the Crown had demonstrated the cases were complex and had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judges' decisions, finding no reversible error in their assessment of the Crown's plan and the complexity of the cases.

The applicants, charged with aggravated assault, applied to sever their trial from a co-accused charged with second-degree murder on the same indictment.

They argued the charges did not arise from the same transaction and that a joint trial would cause prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding the events shared a factual, temporal, and legal connection under s. 589 of the Criminal Code.

The court also held that severance under s. 591(3) was not required in the interests of justice, as the evidence of the murder was highly relevant to the aggravated assault charges and the risk of prejudice was low.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit twelve statements made by the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder.

The statements were categorized as 'background statements', 'interrogation statements', and 'implied confession' statements.

The court excluded the 'implied confession' and 'background' statements, finding their probative value was far outweighed by the extreme prejudice of introducing vague allegations of other homicides.

The court allowed edited segments of two 'interrogation statements' to be admitted, finding they retained their proper meaning and provided highly probative evidence regarding blood found in the accused's truck.

The Crown applied under s. 652 of the Criminal Code for an order directing the jury to view the scene where the victim's remains were found and two other nearby locations.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder.

The court applied the test from R. v. Johnson, requiring the applicant to establish a real and demonstrable advantage to the jury's understanding of the evidence.

The court found that the extensive photographic, video, and 3D model evidence available would sufficiently convey the topography, remoteness, and size of the culvert.

The application for a jury view was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct towards a third party, arguing it demonstrated animosity towards mentally ill persons or those who upset him, which was relevant to motive in a circumstantial murder case.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence lacked context, was not sufficiently cogent to establish a bona fide theory of motive, and its prejudicial impact far outweighed its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit hearsay statements made by deceased persons in a first-degree murder trial.

The central issue was the threshold reliability of the statements under the principled exception and the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The court considered the deceased victim's mental health history, specifically evidence of schizophrenia and paranoia, as a relevant factor in assessing whether statements were made under 'circumstances of suspicion'.

The court admitted one statement made by the victim to a friend, finding it materially corroborated, but excluded the remaining disputed statements due to insufficient threshold reliability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude statements made to police under s 24(2) of the Charter, arguing they were tainted by a prior s 8 breach involving an invalid search of his residence.

The court found that statements made during police visits where search-related property was returned or discussed were causally and contextually linked to the prior breach.

The court rejected the Crown's request to merely edit the statements, ruling that the tainted statements must be excluded in their entirety to prevent the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute.

Statements made during visits unrelated to the seized property were not excluded.

Following the dismissal of a motion to quash a CSIS warrant, new evidence was brought to the Court's attention.

The judge faced a procedural dilemma regarding whether the new evidence should be considered by the Federal Court of Appeal or on a motion for reconsideration.

Given the unique circumstances, the judge ordered that a motion for reconsideration proceed at his own instance (proprio motu) and amended the style of cause.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a covert search of his residence authorized by a general warrant.

The police sought to find items linking the accused to the murder, including a composition book containing a map of alleged crime scenes.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the general warrant lacked sufficient objective and subjective grounds, relying on stale-dated information and a conditional psychiatric opinion.

Consequently, the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded.

The appellant was convicted of knowingly using forged documents, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

As executive director of a non-profit organization providing services to new immigrants, he orchestrated a large-scale, sophisticated fraudulent scheme against the federal government over several years, causing the organization to claim reimbursement for expenses that were not incurred or paid.

The fraud resulted in a surplus of approximately $2 to $2.5 million, led to the organization's bankruptcy, and caused approximately 150 employees to lose their jobs.

The trial judge imposed a two-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence as demonstrably unfit, while the appellant appealed his conviction on grounds of Crown disclosure breaches and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code for fleeing Canada to avoid testifying as a Crown witness under a subpoena.

Although the subpoena was issued improperly by the Registrar of the Superior Court of Justice, the trial judge held that it had to be obeyed unless set aside.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the invalidity of the subpoena meant the actus reus of the offence was not proven.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rule against collateral attacks applied and the appellant's evasion of the subpoena had a tendency to obstruct justice regardless of its validity.

The Registrar, Alcohol, Gaming and Racing appealed a decision of the Ontario Licence Appeal Tribunal which directed the Registrar not to suspend the liquor licence of The Royal Oak.

The Registrar had proposed a 60-day suspension after an intoxicated patron left the premises and was later found dead in the snow, arguing the licensee's obligation not to permit drunkenness included ensuring the patron arrived at a safe place.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and holding that s. 45(1) of O. Reg. 719/90 does not impose an ongoing obligation on a licensee to ensure a patron's safe arrival at a destination after leaving the premises.

The appellant appealed his convictions for repeatedly communicating by way of telecommunication with intent to harass contrary to section 372(4) of the Criminal Code, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

The sole issue on appeal was identification: whether the appellant was the person who met the complainant at a bar and subsequently sent her harassing messages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly analyzed the identification evidence as recognition evidence based on the complainant's prior acquaintance with the appellant during several hours of close contact on the night in question.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism after a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's case was that during a camping trip, the appellant used his cellphone to record the complainant changing into her bathing suit.

The appellant denied intentionally recording.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's reasoning regarding the intentional nature of the recording, arguing the trial judge engaged in speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The trial judge had made clear findings that the appellant's conduct—including plugging in the phone as a pretext, positioning it to record, and the series of steps required to activate the video function—demonstrated intentional conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant had bitten off the complainant's ear during an altercation at the complainant's residence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the description of the attack and his drinking habits; and second, that the trial judge impermissibly speculated about the cause of the injury without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, that any inconsistencies were minor and did not undermine the core allegations, and that the trial judge did not speculate but rather accepted the complainant's uncontradicted testimony.

Crown appeal from a successful defence summary conviction appeal.

The respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent based on circumstantial evidence including observations of impairment, prescription pill bottles found in the vehicle, and the effects of the drugs matching the respondent's behaviour.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, finding insufficient evidence that the pill bottles contained the drugs on their labels or that those drugs were in the respondent's system.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal court erred in applying an incorrect standard of review and substituting its opinion for that of the trial judge.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and failing to remain at the scene of an accident arising from a carjacking on May 24, 2016 in Ottawa.

The case turned on identity.

The victim testified that the appellant was not the man who attacked him, providing confused and unconvincing evidence about a prior high school connection and a bar encounter.

The trial judge rejected the victim's testimony as unreliable and hazy, and instead relied on video evidence, testimony from the Brown brothers, and DNA evidence to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's findings and that the verdict was amply supported by the evidentiary record.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges of assault causing bodily harm against the respondent due to unconstitutional delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed a six-month delay to the Crown for failing to disclose the child's neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) medical records.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the NICU records were third-party documents held by the hospital, not first-party Crown disclosure, and the delay in requesting them was attributable to the defence.

Alternatively, the court found that the trial judge erred in applying the transitional exception by failing to properly weigh the seriousness of the offence and the moderate complexity of the case.

The stay was lifted and the matter remitted for trial.

The Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing proposed to suspend the appellant's liquor licence for 60 days, alleging the appellant permitted drunkenness on its premises contrary to s. 45(1) of Regulation 719/90.

A regular patron was served alcohol, became intoxicated, and was asked to leave.

Staff made attempts to help him get home, which he refused.

The patron was found dead in the snow three days later.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the appellant's staff took reasonable steps to ensure the patron's safe departure once it became apparent he was intoxicated.

The Tribunal held that the legislation does not impose an enduring obligation on a licensee to ensure a patron arrives home safely, nor does it require staff to put themselves in danger.

The Tribunal directed the Registrar not to carry out the proposed suspension.