Davin Michael Garg

The appellant, Daniel Wright, appealed a three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence for sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, committed between 1988 and 1990.

He argued the sentence was excessive, the judge erred in applying contemporary sentencing principles to a historical offence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a risk assessment and prior willingness to take responsibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact, and that the sentence was fit.

The court also denied the fresh evidence application, concluding it would not have affected the outcome, and declined jurisdiction over the SOIRA order given the sentence was not reduced.

The Crown appealed a decision by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC) that had allowed the respondent's appeal of his "over 80" and impaired driving convictions, ordering a new trial and excluding breathalyzer results.

The SCAC found errors in the trial judge's s. 10(b) Charter compliance findings and the adequacy of reasons for the impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no s. 10(b) breach by the police and that the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The "over 80" conviction was restored, and the stay on the impaired driving charge was maintained.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving causing death, arguing Charter violations (s. 8 and s. 10(b)) related to police conduct at the hospital, which he claimed necessitated the exclusion of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police smelling the appellant's breath in the emergency room did not constitute a s. 8 Charter breach, nor was the appellant detained for s. 10(b) purposes.

The court held that the BAC results were properly admitted as they were obtained via valid warrants based on untainted information.

The applicant, convicted of sexual exploitation and sentenced to 3.5 years, sought bail pending sentence appeal, leave to appeal sentence, and a stay of the SOIRA order.

The court dismissed the bail application, finding the appeal lacked sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship if detained.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted as it was not opposed and not frivolous.

The application for a stay of the SOIRA order was adjourned to the panel hearing the sentence appeal, as the jurisdiction of a single judge to grant such a stay was an open question.

The moving party, convicted of impaired driving, sought to re-open his application for leave to appeal, arguing that due to an administrative error, the panel was not provided with all the material filed.

The moving party had relied on arguments from factums in two other related applications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the panel had in fact obtained and reviewed the related factums before determining the original application.

The moving party failed to establish a clear and compelling case that a miscarriage of justice would likely occur absent a re-opening.

Robert Vanier, former CEO of Onco Petroleum Inc., appealed his conviction for publishing a false prospectus under s. 400 of the Criminal Code, for which he received an 8-year sentence.

The false prospectus misrepresented the company's liquid funds.

Vanier, self-represented at trial, raised several grounds of appeal, including trial unfairness (denial of a Rowbotham application, inadequate preparation assistance, language issues, and evidence presentation), errors in jury instructions (distinction between motive and intent, witness credibility), and the admissibility of evidence found on an abandoned hard drive (Charter s. 8).

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to deduct pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding trial fairness, jury instructions, or the s. 8 Charter analysis.

The court also found no error in the sentence, affirming that the trial judge's assessment of aggravating factors was appropriate and that pre-sentence custody deductions were not warranted as Vanier was incarcerated for a separate conviction.

Robert Vanier was convicted of two counts of perjury for making false statements under oath in Personal Information Forms (PIFs) submitted to the TSX and CNQ exchanges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 131 of the Criminal Code did not apply because the statements were not "permitted, authorized, or required by law" to be made under oath, and that he should have been charged under s. 134.

He also claimed a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statements were indeed permitted by law as they stemmed from the Securities Act and the exchanges' regulatory powers, and that there was no unreasonable delay.

L'appelant a été reconnu coupable d'agression sexuelle.

Il a interjeté appel, alléguant que le juge de première instance avait erré dans l'évaluation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité des témoins, et que les motifs étaient insuffisants.

La Cour d'appel a confirmé les conclusions du juge de première instance, soulignant le degré élevé de déférence accordé aux évaluations de crédibilité et ne trouvant aucune erreur significative dans le raisonnement ou la suffisance des motifs du juge.

L'appel a été rejeté.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and driving with excessive blood alcohol after police conducted a random sobriety stop on private property.

The officers had formed the intention to stop the respondent while he was on the highway under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, but only effected the stop after he had pulled onto a private driveway.

The Supreme Court held that s. 48(1) did not authorize random sobriety stops on private property, as the respondent was no longer a 'driver' within the HTA's definition when stopped, and the police breached his s. 9 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the legal uncertainty at the time rendered the breach not egregious, and the reliable and crucial nature of the evidence combined with the serious public interest in combatting impaired driving outweighed the first two lines of inquiry.

The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted of manslaughter after intentionally steering his vehicle into a longboarder, causing his death.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended witness evidence, erred in assessing credibility, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility, and holding that the reasons were sufficient.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the sentence of 3 years and 11 months was not demonstrably unfit given the high degree of moral blameworthiness.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a vessel causing death and criminal negligence causing death after an incident where an eight-year-old boy drowned when their canoe capsized in dangerous river conditions.

The appellant appealed the convictions and sentence, arguing that a canoe is not a "vessel" under the Criminal Code, his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed, and expert evidence was required for the criminal negligence conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a canoe is a vessel, the s. 10(b) right to counsel was permissibly suspended for the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand even in a hospital setting, and expert evidence was not necessary for criminal negligence given the obvious risks.

The six-year sentence was also upheld as fit.

The accused, Hussein Assaad and Jason Ishraki, brought an application under Section 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay for Assaad was over 26 months and for Ishraki over 30 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued complexity and the COVID-19 pandemic as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that while the case had some hallmarks of complexity, the primary cause of delay was the Crown and police's chosen method of disclosure triage, not inherent complexity.

The court also found the pandemic did not justify the extent of the delay.

The proceedings against both accused were stayed.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The Crown opposed, arguing the applicant failed to satisfy the public interest criterion of the R. v. Oland test, citing the seriousness of the offense, the applicant's criminal record including prior breaches of release conditions, and the perceived weakness of the appeal grounds.

The court granted bail, finding the proposed appeal grounds were not frivolous and that the time already served by the applicant was relevant to public confidence.

The court balanced the enforceability of the judgment against its revisability, concluding that the latter outweighed in this instance.

The offender was convicted of two counts of fraud over $5000 and one count of knowingly using a forged document involving significant loans from private lenders.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence.

The court found the offences constituted a large-scale fraud, attracting a three-to-five-year range.

However, considering the offender's lack of a prior record and the severe collateral immigration consequences (deportation without appeal), the court imposed a sentence of 30 months imprisonment.

The police followed the respondent off a public highway and onto his private driveway to conduct a random sobriety check, where they observed signs of impairment and arrested him for impaired driving.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the stop violated s. 9 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that neither s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act nor the common law ancillary powers doctrine authorized police to conduct a random, groundless sobriety stop on private property.

The Court upheld the exclusion of evidence, concluding that the serious Charter breach outweighed the public interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000 and one count of using forged documents.

The Crown alleged that the accused and a co-conspirator obtained significant loans from two private lenders by falsely representing that the funds would be invested in lucrative Pakistani land deals and by providing forged bank letters to secure further advances.

The court found that the accused knowingly made misrepresentations that induced the lenders to advance funds that were never repaid.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought to admit a four-and-a-half-hour statement given by the accused to the RCMP during a fraud investigation.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary because he was not formally cautioned and was not told the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The Superior Court of Justice found the statement voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the accused was aware of his jeopardy, the nature of the investigation, and that his statements could be used in court.

The failure to use a standard police caution did not render the statement involuntary.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing bodily harm, and causing bodily harm while being over 80.

The respondent had collided with an oncoming vehicle on Lakeshore Boulevard in Toronto, causing serious injuries to three occupants.

The Crown's case was hampered by the unavailability of blood alcohol evidence due to continuity concerns and a malfunctioning breathalyzer.

The only evidence of alcohol consumption was the respondent's own statement to paramedics that she had consumed two glasses of wine.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to consider all evidence regarding impairment and whether the driving constituted a marked departure.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated thorough consideration of all evidence and that the Crown had failed to prove a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application to unseal documents held by an accounting firm (PWC) that were subject to a production order in a fraud investigation.

The respondent claimed blanket solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the entire PWC file, arguing the accountants were retained by his law firm to assist with a CRA voluntary disclosure application.

The court rejected the blanket privilege claim, finding that the accountants were primarily performing independent accounting functions (preparing tax returns) rather than acting solely as a conduit for legal advice.

The court ordered a document-by-document review by appointed referees to identify any specific privileged communications.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but proceeded with a sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded that a Gladue report, which was not considered at the original sentencing, should be accepted as fresh evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and varied the sentence to a global sentence of 7 years less pre-trial custody of 2.5 months.

The Court imposed 6 years for robbery and 1 year concurrent for counts 5 and 6, consecutive to the robbery count, with pre-trial custody applied to reduce the 1-year sentence to a net of 9.5 months.

The Court rejected submissions for a 6-year global sentence and denied credit for house arrest due to bail breaches and absconding.