Davin Michael Garg

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and proceeded only with a sentence appeal.

The appellate court found that the trial judge had been misinformed regarding the amount of pre-sentence custody credit available, resulting in an understatement of credit by two months.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the pre-sentence custody credit was adjusted from the original calculation to 27.5 months against a three-year sentence, resulting in a net sentence of 8.5 months.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered on September 4, 2013 by Justice James Ramsay of the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant took no steps to advance the appeal for several years and could not be located despite efforts by the RCMP.

The Crown sought dismissal of the appeal as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's request and dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Diane Werendowicz, who was sexually assaulted and strangled in 1981.

The appellant's DNA matched semen found on the victim.

The case proceeded through four trials: the first resulted in conviction (later overturned on appeal), the second and third ended in hung juries, and the fourth resulted in conviction.

The Crown's key evidence included a 911 call traced to a phone booth near the appellant's workplace, voice identification evidence, and DNA evidence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the call tracing evidence, voice identification evidence, and other matters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and fair.

The appellant was convicted of knowingly using forged documents, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

As executive director of a non-profit organization providing services to new immigrants, he orchestrated a large-scale, sophisticated fraudulent scheme against the federal government over several years, causing the organization to claim reimbursement for expenses that were not incurred or paid.

The fraud resulted in a surplus of approximately $2 to $2.5 million, led to the organization's bankruptcy, and caused approximately 150 employees to lose their jobs.

The trial judge imposed a two-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence as demonstrably unfit, while the appellant appealed his conviction on grounds of Crown disclosure breaches and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of dangerous driving after his dump truck collided with the Burlington Skyway Bridge on the Queen Elizabeth Highway.

The collision occurred when the trailer box rose higher than the bridge's clearance because the Power Take-off (PTO) system was left engaged.

The appellant was detained in a police cruiser for approximately 2.5 hours at the accident scene, during which police detected the smell of alcohol on his breath.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence relating to the alcohol detection, arguing the detention was arbitrary and his Charter rights were violated.

The trial judge excluded breath sample evidence but admitted the evidence of the smell of alcohol.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to one year in custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the guilty verdict was unreasonable, that the photographic identification procedure was flawed, that the DNA evidence was weak and that the trial judge misunderstood its limitations, and that it was unreasonable for the judge to conclude that the appellant's two-hour flight from police could not be explained by a license plate issue or traffic violation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered the identification issues, correctly understood the limitations of DNA evidence, and reasonably concluded there was no plausible alternative to the appellant's guilt based on the totality of the evidence.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial.

The SCAJ had found that the trial judge improperly interfered with the respondent's right to make full answer and defence by preventing cross-examination on 45 photographs.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCAJ erred in interfering with the trial judge's discretion to control the trial process.

The trial judge had properly vetted the photographs to prevent redundant and repetitive evidence.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions on five counts of assault, three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of theft under $5,000.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault by Justice G. King of the Superior Court of Justice on May 4, 2015.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the trial judge committed reversible error in his application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal agreed with this concession and found reversible error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the sexual assault charge.

The appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as moot.

An appeal from a conviction and sentence was dismissed as abated following the death of the appellant.

The appeal had been brought from a conviction entered on October 25, 2012 and a sentence imposed on December 31, 2012 by Justice Richard Lococo of the Superior Court of Justice, sitting with a jury.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside a conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and ordered a new trial.

The SCAC judge found that the respondent's s. 10(a) Charter rights had been breached because he was not properly informed that he was subject to a criminal investigation when questioned in the ambulance.

The Crown argued the SCAC judge erred in finding a detention occurred and that the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to make submissions on relevant case law.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that neither the significance nor clear error branches of the applicable test were met.

The respondent was arrested for robbery and released on bail.

While on bail, he committed a second offence (procuring sexual services) and was denied bail for that charge.

He was subsequently convicted of the robbery offences and sentenced with credit for pre-trial custody accumulated after his detention on the second offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing that pre-trial custody incurred following a later, unrelated charge could not be credited against the sentence for the earlier robbery offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code do not limit credit for pre-trial custody only to the offence that directly triggered detention.

Rather, courts must assess whether a sufficient causal link exists between the pre-trial custody and the offence being sentenced, which may encompass custody arising from later charges if those charges contributed to the denial of bail or the offender's decision not to seek bail.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that set aside a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal found no legal or factual basis for the stay of charges based on the police's failure to lay the information within the statutory time limit or serve the summons timely.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the possibility of mitigating a driving suspension sentence constituted a credible Charter violation justifying a stay of serious criminal charges.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that set aside his acquittal on a charge of driving while over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge had found a breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded evidence obtained by police.

The appellate court refused leave to appeal, finding that the real issue involved the application of settled Charter jurisprudence to the specific facts and did not have significance to the administration of justice beyond the case itself.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving while disqualified from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The applicant proposed to argue that the courts below failed to properly address eyewitness identification issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave application, finding that the legal issues did not raise questions of significance to the general administration of criminal justice and that no clear legal error was disclosed.

The summary conviction appeal court judge correctly articulated the applicable legal principles and properly resolved the weaknesses in the identification evidence.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had set aside a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge had found that the respondent raised a doubt regarding the reliability of the breath-testing instrument based on a low calibration check.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge erred by failing to apply the proper standard of appellate review and by substituting his own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge.

The Court restored the conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 for failing to report a $9,500 Canada Pension Plan payment to the Ontario Disability Support Program for over five months.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by not expressly addressing whether a reasonable person would consider the delay dishonest given the complexity of the social assistance system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly stated the law and reasonably concluded the appellant's knowing delay and immediate withdrawal of the funds constituted a dishonest act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial.

After convicting the appellant but before sentencing, the trial judge realized he had concurrently presided over a preliminary inquiry in an unrelated attempted murder case where the appellant testified as an alleged victim.

The trial judge granted a mistrial in the preliminary inquiry but refused one in the appellant's trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that a reasonable person would apprehend that the trial judge may have been unconsciously influenced by the evidence from the preliminary inquiry, particularly regarding voice identification and wiretap evidence.

The appellant was convicted of intentional discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault after shooting an unarmed man in his home following a drug deal gone wrong.

The appellant claimed self-defence, arguing he believed the victim was armed and part of a group that included another man carrying a shotgun.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant's response unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by holding the appellant to a standard of perfection, failing to consider the fast-paced and stressful context, and making unreasonable factual findings based on a blanket rejection of the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in accepting the complainant's testimony despite contradictions and memory gaps, and that he should have had his trial in French.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and noting the appellant had consented to a trial in English.