Christian Jacques Deslauriers

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The offences involved unwanted sexual touching of three female victims during yoga classes where the accused was the instructor.

The Crown sought six to nine months imprisonment; the defence sought 90 days intermittent jail.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence to be served in the community with strict house arrest conditions for two-thirds of the sentence, followed by two years' probation.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence against mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior record, remorse, and serious degenerative medical condition (Primary Progressive Multiple Sclerosis).

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and related offences, as well as his eight-year sentence.

The trial judge found that police unlawfully detained the appellant by deliberately delaying his appearance before a justice of the peace beyond the 24-hour requirement under section 503 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge declined to stay proceedings, finding that the integrity of the justice system would be better served by proceeding to trial on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction but modified the sentence, correcting errors in the application of the Kienapple principle and reducing the global sentence to five years concurrent with one-year sentences on related charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the guilty verdict was unreasonable, that the photographic identification procedure was flawed, that the DNA evidence was weak and that the trial judge misunderstood its limitations, and that it was unreasonable for the judge to conclude that the appellant's two-hour flight from police could not be explained by a license plate issue or traffic violation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered the identification issues, correctly understood the limitations of DNA evidence, and reasonably concluded there was no plausible alternative to the appellant's guilt based on the totality of the evidence.

The accused was charged under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act with genocide and crimes against humanity for allegedly participating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide by intentionally killing Tutsis during attacks in the Kibuye region.

Numerous witnesses described massacres at Mugonero hospital and subsequent attacks in Gitwe, Murambi, and Bisesero.

The Crown relied on both direct eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence that the accused joined groups of attackers.

The court found serious credibility issues in several key Crown witnesses, including evidence that some allegations had been fabricated or exaggerated after investigators revealed the accused as the target of an investigation.

Given inconsistencies, unreliable identifications, and lack of corroboration, the court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the killings or materially assisted the attacks.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking an order compelling the Crown to produce a structured “livre de procès” setting out all material facts supporting each alleged criminal act and identifying the witnesses tied to those facts.

The accused argued that the exceptional measure was necessary due to the alleged complexity of the prosecution and relied on the court’s case‑management powers under the Fair and Efficient Criminal Trials Act.

The court rejected the request, finding that the case itself was not unusually complex and that the Act applies to mega‑trials involving numerous accused and counts.

The court further held it could not restrict the Crown’s discretion to call admissible evidence where full disclosure had already been provided.

The motion was dismissed, although the Crown was ordered to provide a final witness list prior to trial.

The accused brought a motion seeking a declaration that evidence placing him within a broad geographic region during the alleged offence period should not be treated as an alibi defence requiring advance notice to the Crown.

The accused argued the indictment was too vague as to time and location to permit a specific alibi disclosure obligation.

The court held that the disclosure provided by the Crown gave sufficient detail for the accused to understand the allegations and determine whether an alibi existed for particular incidents.

The court also held that there is no freestanding right to an alibi defence and that issues regarding late disclosure must be assessed contextually when the evidence is presented.

The motion was dismissed.