William Thompson

The applicant sought severance from her co-accused on the basis that a joint trial would result in significant prejudice and an unfair trial.

The applicant faces a charge of first degree murder while her co-accused faces second degree murder, despite the Crown alleging the same conduct of planning and deliberation against both.

The applicant argued that the differential charges would improperly lead the jury to conclude she is more culpable.

The Crown opposed severance, arguing that any prejudice would be eliminated through proper jury instructions.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding that the presumption of joint trial applies with particular force where co-accused are blaming each other, that the evidence is the same against both, and that jury instructions would adequately protect against any risk of prejudicial reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100 mL.

The Crown conceded a s. 8 Charter breach because the arresting officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) on scene when making the breath demand, as per R. v. Breault.

The trial judge found consequential s. 9 and 10(b) breaches but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, citing the officer's good faith error due to a change in law.

On appeal, the court re-evaluated the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, excising the ASD result as required by R. v. Zacharias, which led to findings of unlawful arrest, detention, and breath samples.

Despite these breaches, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence, finding that the seriousness of the state conduct and impact on the appellant's rights were outweighed by society's interest in adjudication on the merits, particularly in impaired driving cases.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a vessel causing death and criminal negligence causing death after an incident where an eight-year-old boy drowned when their canoe capsized in dangerous river conditions.

The appellant appealed the convictions and sentence, arguing that a canoe is not a "vessel" under the Criminal Code, his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed, and expert evidence was required for the criminal negligence conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a canoe is a vessel, the s. 10(b) right to counsel was permissibly suspended for the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand even in a hospital setting, and expert evidence was not necessary for criminal negligence given the obvious risks.

The six-year sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellants, Vito Buffone and Jeffrey Kompon, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and several substantive offences following a 50-day jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds: the admissibility and scope of analyst's certificate evidence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the trial judge's instructions on conspiracy (specifically the three-step Carter analysis), the instructions regarding inferences to be drawn from a third party's actions concerning an encrypted cellphone, and the instructions on the substantive counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to two counts of operating a motor vehicle while impaired and causing death, two counts of criminal negligence causing death, two counts of operating a motor vehicle while impaired and causing bodily harm, and two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

The collision occurred when the appellant, heavily intoxicated and driving at 187 km/hr, ran a red light and struck another vehicle, killing two passengers and seriously injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to seven years, finding the original sentence demonstrably unfit.

The court also set aside victim surcharges and varied the driving prohibition to eight years commencing at the end of imprisonment.

A dissenting opinion would have reduced the sentence to six years, placing greater weight on Gladue factors relating to intergenerational trauma.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession and importation of child pornography under s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The primary issue was whether images of children in diapers met the statutory definition of child pornography, specifically whether the dominant characteristic of the images was the depiction of children's sexual organs or anal regions for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge applied an objective test and found that 23 images constituted child pornography.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpretation and improperly relied on police officer opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal analysis.

The Crown appealed acquittals on sexual assault and related charges entered by the trial judge.

The complainant, the respondent's biological daughter, testified to two sexual assaults occurring approximately 10-11 years prior when she was 10-11 years old.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts, treating the timeframe alleged in the indictment as an essential element of the offence that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by requiring proof of the specific timeframe, as this was not an essential element of the offence.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, and the judge erred in finding his version of events did not afford a defence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's exculpatory statement were logical and supported by the evidence.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and did not misapprehend the evidence regarding the appellant's involvement in the swarming.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for spousal assault, arguing the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, improperly took judicial notice of medical evidence from photographs, failed to apply the W.(D.) framework correctly, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility, reasonably inferred the cause of injuries from photographic evidence without requiring expert testimony, correctly applied the three-step W.(D.) analysis, and provided legally adequate reasons for the conviction.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after failing a roadside screening test and providing breath samples that exceeded the legal limit.

The trial focused on two issues: whether the breath tests were obtained as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, and whether the police violated the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable given all the circumstances, and that the accused's Charter rights were not violated.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing and making available child pornography.

The Crown sought a 36-month sentence with various ancillary orders.

The defence sought 18 months concurrent with probation.

The court imposed a 15-month sentence (15 months on the making available charge and 4 months concurrent on the possession charge) followed by three years probation.

The court balanced the paramount sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence against mitigating factors including the accused's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, good character, community support, and psychiatric evidence indicating low risk of reoffending.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had excluded the Intoxilyzer certificate, finding the tests were not conducted 'as soon as practicable' due to an unexplained 14-minute delay.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by treating the 'as soon as practicable' requirement as a precondition to admissibility rather than the presumption of identity, and by misinterpreting the requirement to demand an exact accounting of every minute.

A new trial was ordered.