Melody Martin

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The information was sworn on January 13, 2017, and the trial was scheduled for December 3 and 5, 2019, resulting in a total delay of 35.1 months, well exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the police failed to take any meaningful steps to execute the warrant or advance the investigation after obtaining it, instead remaining passive despite knowing the accused's general location in Alberta.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that the 12-month period between the accused's contact with police and his voluntary surrender constituted defence delay, finding no evidence of deliberate evasion.

After deducting legitimate defence delay of 6.13 months, the net delay of 28.97 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling with no exceptional circumstances to justify it.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

Michael Schmidt appealed his conviction for obstructing a peace officer and his 60-day intermittent custodial sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the obstruction elements, the dismissal of third-party records and s.11(b) Charter delay applications, or the reconciliation of inconsistent verdicts.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, varying the sentence to a one-month conditional sentence.

The court found that the trial judge erred by "jumping the Crown" on sentencing without providing counsel an opportunity to make further submissions, despite the Crown having proposed a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg/100ml.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the trial judge erred in concluding the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the roadside breath demand, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

However, the court upheld the trial judge's findings that the formal breath demand at the station was valid and that the appellant's ambiguous response to the right to counsel did not constitute an invocation of that right.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the breath test evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) despite the s. 8 breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a 33-minute delay in administering an approved screening device (ASD) test at the roadside violated his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

He also argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and relied on inadmissible evidence compelled by statute.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the 20-minute investigation to form reasonable suspicion and the 13-minute ASD administration were reasonable.

While the trial judge erred in considering the appellant's compelled admission of drinking as direct evidence of impairment, the error was harmless given the overwhelming admissible evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised two issues: first, that the breath demand used the singular "sample" rather than the plural "samples," and therefore only one sample could be obtained; and second, that an initial calibration check on the Intoxilyzer showed a reading outside the approved tolerance, indicating machine malfunction or operator error.

The court rejected both arguments, finding that the demand was substantially compliant with statutory requirements and that the anomalous calibration reading did not tend to show malfunction given multiple satisfactory calibration checks before, during, and after the breath tests.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown brought an application to have the accused found not criminally responsible (NCR) on the basis of mental disorder following her conviction for two counts of criminal harassment.

The accused had been found guilty of changing her surname to that of a man she had been obsessed with for approximately fourteen years.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from Delusional Disorder, Erotomanic Type, a chronic psychotic disorder characterized by the false belief that another person is in love with the individual.

The court found that the accused's mental disorder rendered her incapable of knowing that her actions were morally wrong, despite her general understanding that the act was legally permissible.

An NCR verdict was recorded.