Matthew Morley

The appellant was convicted of failing to stop after an accident causing bodily harm and driving while prohibited.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in cross-examination on Charter rights, an imbalanced jury charge, and failure to excuse a juror.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence of 54 months was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors.

The Crown appealed directed and trial acquittals arising from a fatal collision in which the respondent accelerated through an intersection and struck a left-turning vehicle, causing one death and one serious injury.

On the impaired driving counts, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the evidentiary presumption in s. 320.31(2) of the Criminal Code could not apply because the blood samples were seized under a s. 487 warrant rather than under Part VIII.1.

On the dangerous driving counts, the court held that the trial judge misapplied the Roy mens rea analysis by focusing unduly on the other driver’s conduct instead of assessing whether the respondent’s manner of driving created foreseeable and avoidable risks to the public when all relevant evidence was considered.

All four counts were remitted for a new trial.

The applicant, convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and sentenced to twelve years in custody, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest ground.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's extensive history of driving infractions and non-compliance with court orders posed a significant public safety risk.

Furthermore, the enforceability interest outweighed the reviewability interest given the seriousness of the offence, the length of the sentence, and the lack of strong grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 6 years' imprisonment and a 16-year driving prohibition following guilty pleas to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

He argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and the sentencing judge erred in weighing mitigating and aggravating factors, including a psychological report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious conduct, excessive speed, and legislative increases to maximum penalties for dangerous driving.

Appeal from convictions for dangerous driving causing death, five counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and failure to comply with a term of bail.

The appellant argued the trial judge's jury charge failed to distinguish between the actus reus and mens rea of the dangerous driving offences, risking conflation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the charge generally followed the model instruction in Watt's Manual, clearly instructed the jury on both the objective dangerousness of the driving and the marked departure standard, and when read as a whole equipped the jury to decide the case.

The jury question about the Highway Traffic Act definition of dangerous driving did not indicate confusion about the instructions.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Arsenije Lojovic’s conviction appeal but allowed his sentence appeal, reducing his sentence from 10 years to 8 years (less pre-trial custody).

The court found that the trial judge erred by treating Lojovic’s bipolar disorder as an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating one.

The decision reviews the proper approach to NCR (not criminally responsible) assessments and the role of mental illness in sentencing, emphasizing that mental health conditions can reduce moral blameworthiness and the weight of deterrence and denunciation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted Morthaza Amirdad’s application for bail pending appeal after his conviction for 50 firearms offences.

The court found that the applicant’s argument regarding the trial judge’s failure to properly apply the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Debot to confidential informant information was a credible ground of appeal.

The court also considered public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice, ultimately concluding that the applicant’s strict compliance with bail conditions, strong proposed bail plan, and status as a first-time offender justified release pending appeal, despite the seriousness of the offences.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of causing death while driving with excess blood-drug concentration (THC) and dangerous driving causing death, following a fatal collision with a horse and buggy.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove a causal nexus between the respondent's impairment and the collision, and failed to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code does not require proof that the impairment itself caused the death, only that the accused caused the death while committing the predicate offence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective standard for dangerous driving.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs/100 mL.

The Crown conceded a s. 8 Charter breach because the arresting officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) on scene when making the breath demand, as per R. v. Breault.

The trial judge found consequential s. 9 and 10(b) breaches but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, citing the officer's good faith error due to a change in law.

On appeal, the court re-evaluated the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, excising the ASD result as required by R. v. Zacharias, which led to findings of unlawful arrest, detention, and breath samples.

Despite these breaches, the court upheld the trial judge's decision not to exclude the evidence, finding that the seriousness of the state conduct and impact on the appellant's rights were outweighed by society's interest in adjudication on the merits, particularly in impaired driving cases.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal of a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appellant alleged multiple Charter breaches, including an invalid Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand due to the officer not having the device present, delays in informing and facilitating the right to counsel, and a privacy breach during washroom use at the police station.

The appeal court, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Breault, found the ASD demand invalid, leading to cascading Charter breaches (sections 8, 9, 10(b)).

Despite these breaches, which were deemed unintentional and situational, the court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the highly reliable breathalyzer evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, given the strong societal interest in prosecuting impaired driving.

Correy Dunn was charged with Over 80 and impaired driving following a motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued for exclusion of evidence due to Charter breaches, specifically concerning a delay in the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand and the muting of police body-worn cameras (BWCs), and challenged the Crown's proof of driver identity.

The court found that the accused was not detained prior to the ASD demand, thus the "forthwith" requirement for the demand was applied flexibly and not breached.

The BWC muting, while an erroneous interpretation of policy, did not prejudice the accused's right to make full answer and defence or constitute an abuse of process, as the muted conversations were not material to the grounds for the ASD demand.

The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver based on circumstantial evidence.

Consequently, all evidence was admissible, and the accused was found guilty on both counts.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on "over 80" charges, where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a s. 8 breach due to police delay in taking samples "as soon as practicable." The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by holding that s. 320.28(1) of the Criminal Code imposes a Charter-protected requirement for samples to be taken "as soon as practicable." The court clarified that this phrase relates to an evidentiary shortcut, not a Charter right.

Even if such a requirement existed, the police complied.

The court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis insufficient and incorrect, concluding that the seriousness of the state conduct was low, the impact on the accused's Charter rights was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favored admission.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that a 'deficient sample' registered by the approved instrument constituted a 'sample' under s. 320.31(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, thereby requiring a new system calibration check before the next sample.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, holding that a deficient sample is not a 'sample' within the meaning of the provision and that there is no implied requirement for a calibration check immediately before each sample.

The court also rejected the respondent's argument that the certificate of qualified technician was inadmissible hearsay, finding itself bound by horizontal stare decisis.

A new trial was ordered.

This is a ruling on a challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of the Criminal Code for a drinking and driving offence.

The applicant, Ali Haider Cheema, was found guilty of having care or control of a motor vehicle with excess alcohol and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence (conviction and $1500 fine) under s.12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment due to the risk of removal from Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

The court found that a conditional discharge was not a fit sentence for the offence, considering the gravity of drinking and driving offences and the public interest in deterrence and denunciation, even with the sympathetic personal circumstances and serious immigration consequences.

The application was dismissed, and the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, challenging the trial judge's decision to admit breath test evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter and the admissibility of a qualified technician's certificate.

The appellant argued errors in assessing the seriousness and impact of Charter breaches (s.8, 9, 10(b), and a newly raised s.10(a) issue) and in balancing the factors for exclusion.

She also argued that the certificate contained inadmissible hearsay regarding the alcohol standard solution.

The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's s.24(2) analysis, finding no error in the assessment of the seriousness or impact of the breaches, nor in the balancing of factors.

The court refused to allow the appellant to raise the s.10(a) and hearsay issues for the first time on appeal, citing an insufficient evidentiary record, presumed tactical omission, and no resulting miscarriage of justice.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the arrest, the failure to preserve video evidence, and alleged breaches of the right to counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter applications and found the accused guilty on both charges, though a conditional stay was entered on the impaired driving charge.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on observations of impairment, that the loss of video evidence did not breach the accused's right to make full answer and defence, and that the right to counsel was not breached.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following a traffic stop in Toronto.

The Crown alleged the accused was driving erratically and showed signs of impairment.

The accused was arrested at gunpoint after the officer believed he was attempting to flee.

The accused requested counsel but was not afforded the opportunity to consult before being charged with refusing the breath demand.

The court found the accused not guilty on the refusal charge because his refusal was provisional pending consultation with counsel, which was never provided.

The court also found the accused not guilty of impairment as the evidence did not establish impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on video evidence.

The court additionally found the police violated the accused's Charter rights through arbitrary detention.

The Crown sought to adduce two statements made by the defendant during a motor vehicle accident investigation: (1) that a parked car was not present when she parked, and (2) that damage to her vehicle was sustained six months prior.

The defendant challenged the voluntariness of these statements, arguing she felt obligated to answer police questions.

The court conducted a voir dire and found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that both statements were made voluntarily and admitted them into evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80 after civilians observed him asleep at the wheel and swerving continuously.

The accused raised Charter challenges under ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b), and argued breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court dismissed the ss. 8 and 10(a) claims and found the breath samples were taken expeditiously.

Although the Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach regarding the implementational duty to wait for counsel of choice, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) because the accused spoke to duty counsel and his counsel of choice never called back.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control, over 80 care or control, and possession of crack cocaine following a police investigation that began when officers observed him and a woman in a truck in a laneway.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found multiple Charter breaches: an unjustified flashlight search violating section 8; an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds violating section 8; and multiple violations of the right to counsel under section 10(b), including delayed notification of rights, questioning after invocation of counsel, and failure to re-advise on a new charge.

The court excluded all evidence and acquitted the accused on all charges.