Michael Rombis

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration following a motor vehicle collision.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to rely on the approved screening device 'fail' result due to a failure to consider residual mouth alcohol.

The court dismissed the application, finding the officer's reliance on the device was objectively reasonable.

The court also summarily dismissed a late Charter argument regarding whether breath samples were taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The court concluded the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver and entered a finding of guilt.

Four co-accused were tried for their alleged roles in a coordinated jewellery store robbery and a preceding distraction shooting.

The Crown relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, including covert video surveillance, intercepted communications, and DNA.

The court acquitted Hadi of all charges due to reasonable doubt regarding his identification from video evidence.

Mitsakis and Bangura were convicted of conspiracy, robbery, and firearms offences related to the distraction shooting, as DNA and circumstantial evidence proved their involvement.

Mohamed was acquitted of robbery but convicted of being an accessory after the fact, dangerous driving, and fleeing from police after he attempted to escape the arrest scene in a vehicle containing evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The matter proceeded by way of a blended Charter application and trial.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and also alleged a violation of the right to counsel of choice under section 10(b).

The court found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make the breath demand, the accused's section 10(b) rights were violated when police failed to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and instead funneled the accused toward duty counsel.

The breath samples were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was found passed out in his vehicle in a restaurant drive-thru and was charged with impaired care or control and refusing a breath demand.

The court acquitted the accused of the refusal charge because the Crown failed to prove the arresting officer made a valid demand, as there was no evidence of the exact words used, and the breath technician's subsequent demand was not made 'as soon as practicable' due to an unexplained 41-minute delay.

However, the court convicted the accused of impaired care or control based on the totality of the evidence, including his unresponsiveness, slurred speech, unsteadiness, and the strong odour of alcohol.

The appellant appealed a conviction for an "over 80" offence, arguing that the certificate of a qualified breath technician under Section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code was inadmissible because it was unsigned.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal.

The court held that Parliament did not explicitly require a signature for such a certificate to have evidentiary value, distinguishing it from Section 258(1)(f.1) which does.

While a signature provides an evidentiary assist, continuity between breath tests and the certificate can also be established through *viva voce* evidence or other circumstantial evidence, as was done in this case.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 following a police investigation.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 170 mgs obtained at a police station.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on three grounds: (1) the time of driving was not accurately recorded to satisfy the two-hour requirement; (2) the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable; and (3) the accused's right to counsel under the Charter was violated.

The court found no violations regarding the timing of the breath samples.

However, the court found that a police officer interrupted and curtailed the accused's consultation with duty counsel by making hurry-up gestures through a window, thereby violating s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the breath evidence as the seriousness of the Charter breach and its impact on the accused's protected right outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, the Crown relied on an unsigned certificate of a qualified technician to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration pursuant to section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that while a signature is typically required, the lack of a signature does not foreclose reliance on the certificate provided that the conditions set out in section 258(1)(g) have been established.

The court found that the certificate identified the qualified technician, was provided by him after administering breath tests, and was corroborated by a signed test record.

The accused was found guilty on the count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for driving on the QEW Highway in Burlington on August 12, 2012.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court found that the accused engaged in a classic case of road rage, including passing vehicles using a merge lane at excessive speeds, tailgating, throwing a coffee cup at another vehicle, and deliberately swerving in front of the other vehicle and braking abruptly, causing a collision.

The court applied the modified objective test for mens rea and found that the accused's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a prudent driver.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the reasons could have been fuller, the trial judge directed his mind to the application of W.(D.).

The court noted that the foundation for the conviction was evident from the record and the defence position was utterly implausible.

The respondent was charged with failing to wear a seat belt after a police officer observed him unfastened while stopped at a red light.

The trial justice convicted him, but the provincial offences appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding that the respondent was not 'driving' while the vehicle was in park at the light.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a purposive interpretation of the Highway Traffic Act requires a driver to wear a seat belt continuously from the time the vehicle is put in motion on the highway until it is parked in a position where it can be left unattended.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and the sentence imposed.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because there was no evidence the complainant feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant feared for her safety.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for a global sentence of six months custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of the joint submission, noting the appellant's persistent behaviour and related criminal record made the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.