5 total
Charter application failed; impaired driving and Over 80 convictions entered.
Following a motor vehicle collision, the accused was tried on impaired operation and Over 80 charges and brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).
The court held that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and to make a breath demand based on red, glossy, bloodshot eyes, disorientation, odour of alcohol, and beer cans in the vehicle.
The court further held that an 11-minute delay in advising the accused of his right to counsel in Punjabi was justified by officer safety, pat-down, custody-transfer, and collision-scene management concerns, and that police did not breach the right to counsel of choice by failing to facilitate contact with the accused's brother where the reason for that request was not disclosed.
The application to exclude the breath samples was dismissed, and findings of guilt were entered on both counts.
Impaired driving charges were stayed because the 674-day net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling.
The defendant, Mohamed Osman, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.
The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was 822 days (27 months and 12 days).
The court calculated the net delay by deducting defence delay (77 days) and delay attributable to a discrete event (70 days for prosecutor's family death, where mitigation was insufficient).
The net delay was found to be 674 days, exceeding the 18-month (548 days) Jordan presumptive ceiling by 126 days.
The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.
The charges were stayed.
The court dismissed the accused's Charter application regarding police entry into his home and convicted him of impaired driving.
The defendant, Allen Benson, was charged with impaired driving.
The defense brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) related to police entry into his home without a warrant and delay in reading rights to counsel.
The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no violation of the implied invitation to knock doctrine or section 10(b) rights.
The court then found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Benson's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, based on erratic driving, a collision, the smell of alcohol, and breath samples.
Benson was convicted.
The offender received a 12-month conditional sentence for violently assaulting his puppy.
The defendant, Anitosh Chopra, pleaded guilty to one count of causing unnecessary suffering to his dog, Max, contrary to s. 445.1 of the Criminal Code.
The incident involved the defendant violently hitting and slamming his 6-7 month old puppy after it urinated on the floor, which was captured on CCTV.
The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 4-6 months, a 5-year animal prohibition, and a 2-year probation order.
The defence argued for an 8-12 month conditional sentence.
The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence (first half under house arrest, second half with a curfew), a 2-year probation order, and a 3-year animal prohibition.
The judge emphasized the increased seriousness with which Parliament views animal cruelty offences, while also applying the principle of restraint given the defendant's rehabilitative efforts and low risk of re-offending.
The court admitted breath evidence and convicted the accused of impaired driving, finding no Charter breaches despite a delayed ASD demand and muted body-worn cameras.
Correy Dunn was charged with Over 80 and impaired driving following a motor vehicle accident.
The defence argued for exclusion of evidence due to Charter breaches, specifically concerning a delay in the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand and the muting of police body-worn cameras (BWCs), and challenged the Crown's proof of driver identity.
The court found that the accused was not detained prior to the ASD demand, thus the "forthwith" requirement for the demand was applied flexibly and not breached.
The BWC muting, while an erroneous interpretation of policy, did not prejudice the accused's right to make full answer and defence or constitute an abuse of process, as the muted conversations were not material to the grounds for the ASD demand.
The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver based on circumstantial evidence.
Consequently, all evidence was admissible, and the accused was found guilty on both counts.