Brent Kettles

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction arising from an indictment that included multiple violent offences against an intimate partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on uncorroborated complainant evidence and by reversing the burden of proof through an odd-to-fabricate remark.

The court held corroboration was not legally required and found the trial judge properly conducted a charge-by-charge credibility and reliability assessment, accepting only portions of witness evidence.

The court further held the burden of proof was correctly articulated and applied, and that the impugned remark was a permissible common-sense credibility observation.

Appellate intervention was not warranted.

The appellant was convicted of one count of sexual assault, three counts of assault, and one count of uttering threats against his common law spouse.

He was acquitted of one count of assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred by artificially compartmentalizing the complainant's testimony and by relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to bolster her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing credibility and the weight of evidence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition order dated December 13, 2024.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge or, alternatively, authorization for 14-day travel passes to the United States.

The Board maintained a detention order requiring continued residence at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with community housing privileges and extended Canadian travel passes to 14 days.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in law and that the disposition was reasonable and not a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, Zachary Wittke, sought a fresh psychiatric assessment under section 672.11 of the Criminal Code, arguing that it would demonstrate psychiatric disorders relevant to his mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that a prior assessment at trial already addressed these issues and that no new evidence justified a further assessment.

The court held that strategic decisions at trial and the absence of new or flawed evidence did not warrant a new assessment at the appeal stage.

In a sentencing appeal arising from guilty pleas to sexual assault, uttering threats, and unlawful confinement, the Court addressed whether anticipated completion time for institutional programming may be considered in fixing a fit sentence and when delay-related conduct can justify denying enhanced pre-sentence credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that programming and treatment timelines may be considered where supported by an adequate evidentiary record, provided the sentence remains proportionate to offence gravity and moral blameworthiness.

The Court further held that delay alone is insufficient to constitute wrongful conduct; conduct must be intended to frustrate the proper operation of the criminal justice system.

Applying the sentencing standard of review, the custodial term was upheld as fit, but the denial of enhanced credit for confinement in a mental health facility was varied because the offender’s delay-related conduct was materially linked to mental and cognitive impairment.

The appeal was allowed in part with additional enhanced credit awarded.

The appellant, Randall Thring, appealed the imposition of a 20-year SOIRA order following his guilty plea to communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services from a person under 18.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in treating the SOIRA order as mandatory, but held that the order was still appropriate in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, and the request for anonymization of the appellant's name was also denied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Crown’s appeal from a sentencing decision that declined to impose a SOIRA order on the respondent, who had pled guilty to sexual interference with a 15-year-old.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to apply the statutory presumption in favour of a SOIRA order and by not properly considering all relevant factors under s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court set aside the exemption and imposed the SOIRA order.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to uphold her detention order.

The ORB found she remained a significant threat to public safety due to diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and substance use disorders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the ORB's application of the "significant threat" test from Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), which requires a real risk of serious physical or psychological harm to the public resulting from criminal conduct.

The accused appealed a finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), arguing procedural unfairness and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Crown conceded the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the NCRMD finding, and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the critical importance of procedural fairness in NCRMD cases due to the significant deprivations of liberty involved.

The appellant, Qiao Zeng, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and inadequate, particularly regarding the two distinct routes to liability (aiding a planned murder and common intention in a kidnapping resulting in death) and the evidence relevant to each.

The blending of these routes and the lack of clear delineation between them for the appellant and co-accused likely confused the jury and may have led to a compromise verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his daughter and two nieces, for which he received a 10-year sentence.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The court found the grounds of appeal, concerning similar fact evidence and the trial judge's assessment of credibility, to be weak, though not frivolous.

In balancing enforceability and reviewability under section 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, the court emphasized the seriousness of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the breach of trust, concluding that the public interest in enforceability outweighed the interest in reviewability.

The appellant, Richard Jackman, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and attempted extortion, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the rejection of his not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR) defense, the consideration of treatability at the dangerous offender designation stage, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal tests, reasonably rejected the NCR defense, properly considered treatability in the dangerous offender analysis, and reasonably imposed an indeterminate sentence given the appellant's poor prospects for treatability and risk to the public.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a choking charge, arguing the trial judge erred in handling the complainant's prior inconsistent statement.

The trial judge had acquitted due to doubts about the complainant's reliability.

The Court of Appeal found no material error in the trial judge's use of the statement, noting it was used for inconsistency, not for the truth of its contents.

The court also highlighted that the Crown did not take steps at trial to address the inconsistencies.

Furthermore, the trial judge had multiple independent reasons for doubting the complainant's reliability, including memory issues, drug/alcohol consumption, and inconsistencies regarding alleged injuries.

The appeal was dismissed as the Crown failed to meet the threshold for appellate intervention.

The Crown appealed a decision by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC) that had allowed the respondent's appeal of his "over 80" and impaired driving convictions, ordering a new trial and excluding breathalyzer results.

The SCAC found errors in the trial judge's s. 10(b) Charter compliance findings and the adequacy of reasons for the impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no s. 10(b) breach by the police and that the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The "over 80" conviction was restored, and the stay on the impaired driving charge was maintained.

The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) appealed a decision by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that granted David Aliko an absolute discharge after he was found Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for various offences due to mental disorder.

CAMH sought to set aside the absolute discharge and reinstate a conditional discharge, citing Mr. Aliko's significant deterioration and new criminal charges post-disposition.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence detailing Mr. Aliko's post-discharge behaviour and mental state, which indicated a substantial risk of serious harm to the public without Board supervision.

The court found it was in the interests of justice to admit this evidence.

The appellant, M.V., appealed an eight-year global sentence for sexual interference, child luring, and child pornography.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by relying on aggravating circumstances from the sexual interference offences to determine the sentence for the child luring offences, effectively sentencing the appellant twice for the same conduct.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a five-and-a-half-year global sentence, emphasizing the importance of respecting joint sentencing submissions and the principle of totality.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing and relying on the complainant's voice identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the voice recognition evidence was a minor part of a broader constellation of evidence, including DNA, physical injuries, and the complainant's visual identification of the appellant.

The court held that the trial judge's overall scrutiny of the complainant's evidence, despite minor mischaracterizations, was sufficient to address reliability concerns.

The appellant, David Norris, appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the sentencing judge erred in reversing the onus of proof, misapprehending psychiatric evidence, and misusing Correctional Services Canada evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge applied the correct legal framework despite a misstatement on onus, properly considered the psychiatric evidence, and appropriately relied on the Correctional Services Canada evidence regarding supervision differences.

The appellant, J.W., appealed a global sentence of nine years' imprisonment for sexual assault, uttering a death threat, and unlawful confinement.

The appeal raised three grounds: the sentencing judge erred by increasing the sentence due to anticipated programming needs, miscalculating pre-sentence custody, and refusing enhanced pre-sentence credit for time spent at Providence Care Hospital.

The Court of Appeal found a miscalculation of 22 days in pre-sentence custody, allowing the appeal to that extent (33 additional days credit).

However, the court dismissed the appeal on the other two grounds, affirming that the nine-year sentence was fit and that the refusal of enhanced credit for Providence was a proper exercise of discretion, given the appellant's delays and the conditions at Providence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for attempted murder and assault, appealed a DNA order granted by the trial judge under s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for imposing a DNA order on an NCR offender and did not err in granting the order based on stereotypical reasoning or speculation, as the conclusions were anchored in evidence.