Brent Kettles

The applicant sought to review a trial judge's release order, made under s. 672.46(1)(2) of the Criminal Code, following a finding that she was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR).

The Court of Appeal found the application moot because the Review Board had since made a disposition, rendering the challenged release order inoperative.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, noting the applicant has an outstanding appeal from the NCR finding where she can raise related issues.

The appellant sought to appeal a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had properly applied legal principles and that the imposed short period of incarceration was not unfit.

The court noted the trial judge's adherence to the principle of restraint and consideration of significant mitigating factors, including the appellant's addiction.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for child luring, arguing an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant was 18 years of age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings.

The trial judge found that the complainant had explicitly told the appellant she was 14, and the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the complainant was under 18.

The appellate court affirmed that the trial judge's credibility findings, which were fully explained and entitled to deference, precluded any air of reality for the appellant's defence.

Nathaniel White, found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that removed his community living and 30-day pass privileges.

The ORB had accepted his request for a lateral transfer to another facility but removed the privileges based on clinical opinion that community living was not realistic due to his recent decompensation and need for a slower, more supported approach to treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision was not unreasonable or based on an error of law, distinguishing it from a case where there was a misapprehension of information.

The accused, Mikhail Koralov, faced charges of impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

He brought several Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including delayed and insufficient communication of the right to counsel, denial of access to counsel from the police car, unreasonable handcuffing at the police division, and failure to obtain breath samples as soon as practicable.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the breaches outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission, leading to the exclusion of the breath sample readings and the dismissal of the blood alcohol charge.

This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of robbery and one count of forcible confinement.

The appellant argued that the trial judge subjected his evidence to uneven scrutiny, reversing the burden of proof, and failed to adequately assess the elements of forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the forcible confinement conviction, which was supported by the evidence.

Following Stage Two of a complex treaty rights trial, the plaintiffs sought costs against Ontario.

Ontario disputed the quantum and the partial indemnity rate, arguing the plaintiffs expended an unreasonable amount of time compared to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs' time expenditure was reasonable given the complexity of the issues, including Crown immunity and limitations, and the risks involved.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiffs on a partial indemnity basis at a rate of 65%, taking into account an offer to settle made by the Superior plaintiffs and the unique nature of the Anishinaabek-Crown treaty relationship.

The plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties, brought a motion for partial summary judgment in Stage Two of their action against the federal and provincial Crowns.

They sought declarations that their claims for breach of the treaties' annuity augmentation promises were not barred by Ontario's limitations legislation or the doctrine of Crown immunity.

The Superior Court of Justice granted partial summary judgment on these issues, finding that treaties are not contracts or specialties subject to the Limitations Act, 1990, and that equitable claims for breach of fiduciary duty could historically be pursued by petition of right, thus falling outside Crown immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The court declined to grant summary judgment on the issues of joint and several liability and whether Canada should act as paymaster, deferring those matters to the Stage Three trial.

The Crown defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's civil claim alleging negligence, Charter breaches, and bad faith arising from the Crown's intervention in a private prosecution and the OIPRD's handling of a police complaint.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion and struck the claims without leave to amend.

The court found the claims against the Crown were barred by issue estoppel and prosecutorial immunity, while the claims against the OIPRD constituted an impermissible collateral attack and were barred by statutory immunity under the Police Services Act.

The Ontario government cancelled an electric car subsidy program but extended it for a two-month transition period.

The applicant, Tesla Motors Canada ULC, was explicitly excluded from this transition program by a condition limiting it to "franchised automobile dealerships." Tesla sought judicial review, arguing the exclusion was arbitrary, unlawful, and made for an improper purpose without procedural fairness.

The court found the decision to exclude Tesla was arbitrary, unrelated to the stated policy goal of protecting small to mid-sized dealers, and constituted an egregious exercise of discretion for an improper purpose.

The court quashed the minister's decision to implement the transitional program.

Electricity ratepayers brought an action seeking damages and declaratory relief concerning the sale of shares in Hydro One, alleging that the Premier and Ministers acted in bad faith to reward political donors and obtain further donations to the Ontario Liberal Party.

The motion judge struck out the claim under Rule 21, finding it was not justiciable as it concerned core policy and the pleadings were inadequate to support an inference of bad faith.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in assessing the facts in isolation, misconstruing material facts, and failing to accept pleaded facts as true.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants' allegations were insufficient to plead bad faith and that accepting such a pleading would undermine the immunity afforded to core policy decisions.

The plaintiffs, Hydro One ratepayers, brought an action for misfeasance in public office against the Premier and Ministers of Finance and Energy regarding the privatization of Hydro One.

They alleged the sale was motivated by improper purposes to reward Liberal Party benefactors.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding the decision to sell Hydro One shares was a core policy decision authorized by the Electricity Act, 1998, and thus immune from judicial review in a civil tort action absent bad faith, which was not adequately pleaded.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application challenging the Crown's assumption of a private prosecution and subsequent withdrawal of charges against a police officer for alleged assault in custody.

The appellant had commenced a private prosecution against Constable Labreche, and after a prima facie case was found, the Crown intervened to assume carriage.

The appellant challenged this intervention in the Superior Court, alleging breach of Charter rights and bias.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown subsequently withdrew the charge.

The appellant brought a second application asserting constitutional challenges to the legislative regime permitting Crown intervention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis of issue estoppel, finding that both applications raised identical issues regarding the Crown's decision to take over the prosecution and the appellant's exclusion from it.

The applicant sought a conditional stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded counsel, arguing indigence and the necessity of counsel for a fair trial given the serious and complex charges.

The Crown opposed, alleging lack of financial transparency and prudence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to discharge the heavy burden of proving indigence, having not provided sufficient financial documentation, made reasonable sacrifices, or prioritized legal fees over other expenditures.

The applicant sought declarations that s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 11(d) of the Crown Attorney’s Act were unconstitutional, and to set aside the Attorney General's intervention and withdrawal of a private prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issues raised had already been judicially determined in prior proceedings (a recusal application and an extension of time to appeal), and therefore the doctrine of issue estoppel applied.

Costs were awarded against the applicant.

The applicant sought an order for state-funded counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 7, for a child protection trial where the Children's Aid Society sought a supervision order.

The applicant's section 7 rights to security of person were engaged because the proposed supervision order would significantly restrict her parental role, force her to become a single parent, and subject her family to ongoing state intrusion.

The court found the applicant was indigent and ordered the state to provide counsel, establishing that section 7 protections extend beyond cases involving loss of custody to include highly intrusive supervision orders.

The applicant, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought reconsideration of a prior decision denying a stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded counsel under a Rowbotham order.

The court reconsidered the issue after receiving additional evidence regarding the proceeds of the applicant’s home sale and psychiatric evidence concerning his ability to represent himself.

Although the court accepted that the applicant appeared indigent and lacked access to the sale proceeds, the psychiatric evidence remained insufficient and procedurally deficient to establish that he could not conduct his own defence.

The applicant failed to properly introduce expert evidence or provide adequate foundation for the medical opinions.

The court concluded the applicant had not met the requirement that counsel was necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought a conditional stay of proceedings unless the Attorney General provided publicly funded counsel pursuant to a Rowbotham order.

Legal Aid had denied coverage and characterized the accused’s financial disclosure as incomplete and not credible.

The court considered whether counsel was necessary for a fair trial and whether the accused was indigent.

The judge found the case was not beyond the accused’s abilities and that he was familiar with the underlying transactions, could use an interpreter, and had previously managed a significant business enterprise.

The court also found the accused was not forthright about ownership and proceeds from the sale of a home and therefore failed to establish indigence.

The request for a Rowbotham order was dismissed.

The applicant sought prerogative relief challenging the Attorney General’s decision to intervene in and assume carriage of a private prosecution against a police officer for alleged assault during an arrest.

The applicant alleged bias and abuse of process, arguing that Crown counsel’s handling of prior charges against him and the disclosure of a police video demonstrated partiality.

The court held that the Attorney General has authority to intervene in private prosecutions and that such prosecutorial decisions fall within core Crown discretion, subject to review only for abuse of process.

The evidence relied on by the applicant was largely hearsay and insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias or abuse of process.

The court found no improper conduct in the Crown’s disclosure practices or earlier settlement discussions.

The appellant appealed a probation term imposed following guilty pleas to criminal harassment, multiple counts of mischief under $5,000, breaches of recognizance, possession of a prohibited weapon, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The sentencing judge had imposed a ten‑month conditional sentence followed by three years’ probation.

The appellant argued that the probation period should be reduced to one year and that the sentencing judge failed to properly consider mitigating factors including guilty pleas, pretrial custody, and rehabilitation prospects.

The court held that appellate intervention requires an error in principle or a demonstrably unfit sentence and found that the sentencing judge properly considered the mitigating factors and reasonably emphasized deterrence and protection of the victims.

The sentence, including the maximum probation period, was upheld.