Brent Kettles

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for attempted murder and assault, appealed a DNA order granted by the trial judge under s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for imposing a DNA order on an NCR offender and did not err in granting the order based on stereotypical reasoning or speculation, as the conclusions were anchored in evidence.

The applicant sought to review a trial judge's release order, made under s. 672.46(1)(2) of the Criminal Code, following a finding that she was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR).

The Court of Appeal found the application moot because the Review Board had since made a disposition, rendering the challenged release order inoperative.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, noting the applicant has an outstanding appeal from the NCR finding where she can raise related issues.

The appellant sought to appeal a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had properly applied legal principles and that the imposed short period of incarceration was not unfit.

The court noted the trial judge's adherence to the principle of restraint and consideration of significant mitigating factors, including the appellant's addiction.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

Nathaniel White, found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that removed his community living and 30-day pass privileges.

The ORB had accepted his request for a lateral transfer to another facility but removed the privileges based on clinical opinion that community living was not realistic due to his recent decompensation and need for a slower, more supported approach to treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision was not unreasonable or based on an error of law, distinguishing it from a case where there was a misapprehension of information.

The appellant appealed a conviction for child luring, arguing an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant was 18 years of age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings.

The trial judge found that the complainant had explicitly told the appellant she was 14, and the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knew the complainant was under 18.

The appellate court affirmed that the trial judge's credibility findings, which were fully explained and entitled to deference, precluded any air of reality for the appellant's defence.

The accused, Mikhail Koralov, faced charges of impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of operating a conveyance.

He brought several Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including delayed and insufficient communication of the right to counsel, denial of access to counsel from the police car, unreasonable handcuffing at the police division, and failure to obtain breath samples as soon as practicable.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the breaches outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission, leading to the exclusion of the breath sample readings and the dismissal of the blood alcohol charge.

This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of robbery and one count of forcible confinement.

The appellant argued that the trial judge subjected his evidence to uneven scrutiny, reversing the burden of proof, and failed to adequately assess the elements of forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and provided sufficient reasons for the forcible confinement conviction, which was supported by the evidence.

Following Stage Two of a complex treaty rights trial, the plaintiffs sought costs against Ontario.

Ontario disputed the quantum and the partial indemnity rate, arguing the plaintiffs expended an unreasonable amount of time compared to the defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs' time expenditure was reasonable given the complexity of the issues, including Crown immunity and limitations, and the risks involved.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiffs on a partial indemnity basis at a rate of 65%, taking into account an offer to settle made by the Superior plaintiffs and the unique nature of the Anishinaabek-Crown treaty relationship.

Six groups brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an appeal concerning the Ontario government's 'Student Choice Initiative', which allowed students to opt out of certain ancillary fees.

The underlying application quashed the government directives.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to all six groups, finding that the appeal raises issues with far-reaching impacts on publicly-funded universities and colleges, and that each proposed intervener would provide useful and distinct perspectives without causing injustice to the parties.

The applicant, a former justice of the peace removed from office for judicial misconduct involving sexual harassment, applied for judicial review of a panel's decision declining to recommend compensation for his legal costs.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness by not having an oral hearing and that the panel's decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no requirement for an oral hearing on costs and concluding the panel reasonably weighed factors including the nature of the misconduct and the vexatious conduct of the applicant's counsel during the proceedings.

The applicant requested a case management conference to seek a brief adjournment three days before the scheduled hearing, intending to introduce further materials on the issue of anti-black racism.

The responding parties did not consent.

The case management judge declined to convene a conference at this late stage, noting the matter had been pending for almost two years.

The applicant was permitted to bring a formal motion for an adjournment before the hearing panel.

The proposed intervenor brought a motion to reconsider a decision denying him leave to intervene as a party in a pending application for judicial review.

The Divisional Court found no error in the conclusion or reasoning of the motion judge and dismissed the motion to reconsider.

A case management conference was held to schedule a review of a single judge's decision denying a proposed intervener's motion for leave to intervene as a party.

The parties agreed that the review would be heard in writing by a panel of the Divisional Court, and a schedule for the exchange of materials was established.

The plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties, brought a motion for partial summary judgment in Stage Two of their action against the federal and provincial Crowns.

They sought declarations that their claims for breach of the treaties' annuity augmentation promises were not barred by Ontario's limitations legislation or the doctrine of Crown immunity.

The Superior Court of Justice granted partial summary judgment on these issues, finding that treaties are not contracts or specialties subject to the Limitations Act, 1990, and that equitable claims for breach of fiduciary duty could historically be pursued by petition of right, thus falling outside Crown immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The court declined to grant summary judgment on the issues of joint and several liability and whether Canada should act as paymaster, deferring those matters to the Stage Three trial.

A case management conference was held to schedule the hearing of the application following the denial of a motion for leave to intervene.

The court directed that the application proceed by ZOOM videoconference on July 31, 2020, and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of materials, including factums, compendiums, and authorities.

The moving party, former counsel for the applicant, sought leave to intervene as an added party in a judicial review application.

He claimed a pecuniary interest in being paid for his legal services and a reputational interest in defending himself against negative comments made by the hearing panel.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party's interests were entirely aligned with those of the applicant, who was already advancing the same arguments.

Furthermore, the court held that granting intervention would dramatically expand the issues and record, causing undue delay, and that the motion was brought too late in the proceedings.

Greenpeace Canada brought an application for judicial review seeking a declaration that the Ontario government unlawfully cancelled the cap and trade program without following the public consultation requirements of the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR).

The Minister had claimed an exemption under the EBR, arguing that the recent general election was a substantially equivalent process of public participation.

The Divisional Court found that the election was not substantially equivalent and the government failed to comply with the EBR.

However, the application was dismissed because the government subsequently passed valid legislation repealing the cap and trade program and barring proceedings, rendering the requested declaratory relief of no practical effect.

The Crown defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's civil claim alleging negligence, Charter breaches, and bad faith arising from the Crown's intervention in a private prosecution and the OIPRD's handling of a police complaint.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion and struck the claims without leave to amend.

The court found the claims against the Crown were barred by issue estoppel and prosecutorial immunity, while the claims against the OIPRD constituted an impermissible collateral attack and were barred by statutory immunity under the Police Services Act.

The respondents brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review on the basis of mootness.

The underlying application challenged the Minister's decision to invoke an exception under the Environmental Bill of Rights, bypassing public consultation for revoking the cap and trade program by claiming the recent provincial election was a substantially equivalent process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the scope of the Minister's exception power remains a live controversy despite the subsequent repeal of the relevant legislation.

The court further held that even if the matter were moot, it would exercise its discretion to hear the application to provide clarity on the statutory exemption.

The Ontario government cancelled an electric car subsidy program but extended it for a two-month transition period.

The applicant, Tesla Motors Canada ULC, was explicitly excluded from this transition program by a condition limiting it to "franchised automobile dealerships." Tesla sought judicial review, arguing the exclusion was arbitrary, unlawful, and made for an improper purpose without procedural fairness.

The court found the decision to exclude Tesla was arbitrary, unrelated to the stated policy goal of protecting small to mid-sized dealers, and constituted an egregious exercise of discretion for an improper purpose.

The court quashed the minister's decision to implement the transitional program.