Brian C. Eberdt

The appellant was convicted of failing to stop after an accident causing bodily harm and driving while prohibited.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in cross-examination on Charter rights, an imbalanced jury charge, and failure to excuse a juror.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence of 54 months was upheld as fit given the aggravating factors.

The Ontario Review Board held an initial disposition hearing for an accused found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder.

The accused suffers from schizoaffective disorder and opioid use disorder.

The Board found that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

Relying on uncontroverted expert psychiatric evidence, the Board ordered a Detention Order with the privilege of indirectly supervised passes into the community, finding this to be the least onerous and least restrictive disposition necessary to manage the risk while supporting reintegration.

The applicant sought bail pending conviction and sentence appeal.

Although the court accepted that the appeal was not frivolous and that surrender could be expected, it held detention remained necessary in the public interest.

Repeated breaches of release conditions, further offending while on bail, and the enforceability and public safety components of the test required continued detention.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The defendant, Jesse Bleck, was found guilty by a jury of failing to stop at an accident causing bodily harm and driving while prohibited.

The victim sustained catastrophic injuries.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the defendant's prior driving record and defiance of court orders, and mitigating factors, such as his age, role as a primary caregiver, and pre-trial detention conditions.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the high moral blameworthiness and the legislative intent for harsher penalties for such offenses.

A global sentence of 54 months (4.5 years) imprisonment was imposed, along with driving prohibitions and other ancillary orders.

Judge-alone first degree murder trial arising from an execution-style shooting captured on surveillance video.

The Crown relied on circumstantial identification evidence including post-offence vehicle tracking, cellphone location records, recognition evidence from a probation officer, and items seized under warrant from one accused's residence.

The court admitted the recognition evidence under the prior acquaintance/better position test, upheld the search warrant, and rejected defence photogrammetry evidence as unreliable despite admitting it.

The alternate suspect theory was also rejected.

Both accused were found guilty of first degree murder.

The appellant, Richard Jackman, appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and attempted extortion, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding the rejection of his not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR) defense, the consideration of treatability at the dangerous offender designation stage, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal tests, reasonably rejected the NCR defense, properly considered treatability in the dangerous offender analysis, and reasonably imposed an indeterminate sentence given the appellant's poor prospects for treatability and risk to the public.

A.G. was found guilty of five criminal charges, including assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement against D.H. The court considered aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence, breach of trust, and the severe impact on the victim, balanced against mitigating factors including the offender's youth, first-offender status, and significant delay in sentencing.

The Crown sought 7 years, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years for the September 2017 offences and two months consecutive for an August 2017 assault, totaling five years and two months, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence due to the seriousness of the crimes.

The accused, A.G., was charged with five counts including assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and sexual assault.

The trial involved a "she said, he said" scenario, with the Crown relying on the complainant's testimony bolstered by four pieces of independent confirmatory evidence: a text message apology for a bite, a hole in the wall, surveillance video, and extensive bruising on the complainant's body.

The defence argued self-defence and challenged the complainant's credibility.

The court found the defendant's explanations implausible and the confirmatory evidence substantial, leading to a finding of guilt on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his fraud convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in refusing to allow a second s. 11(b) application post-trial but pre-sentencing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's calculation of delay, confirming that time runs from the date the information is sworn, not the arrest date, and that incomplete disclosure did not cause the delay.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's refusal to adjourn sentencing for an unperfected second delay application.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application following the offender's convictions for robbery with a firearm and related offences.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record and history of institutional violence, alongside diagnoses of complex PTSD and antisocial personality traits.

The court found that while the offender demonstrated a pattern of reactive violence and posed a high risk of violent recidivism, his conduct was not intractable given the possibility of change through long-term, intensive federal programming.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, designated the offender a long-term offender, and imposed a 4-year penitentiary sentence followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and exposing his genitals to a minor, challenging the trial judge's dismissal of his s. 11(b) Charter stay application and his s. 278 application for production of the complainant's counselling records.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's calculation of delay, including the finding that a judge's conflict of interest constituted an exceptional circumstance, and agreed the case did not warrant a stay below the Jordan ceiling.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's refusal to order production of the counselling records, as the appellant failed to establish likely relevance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was charged with abduction and violent sexual assault of two women in 1986.

He fled Canada in violation of bail conditions and assumed a false identity in the United States, where he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 52 years imprisonment.

Following his deportation to Canada in 2015, he was charged and sought a stay of proceedings alleging violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge granted the stay, characterizing the delay as Crown delay.

The Crown appealed, arguing that the delay caused by the respondent's flight should be treated as defence delay and deducted from the total delay calculation.

Five appellants convicted of drug-related offences appealed their convictions, challenging the application judge's admission of evidence obtained pursuant to wiretap authorizations under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants argued that the application judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by failing to adequately recognize the impact of prior police misconduct and by not giving appropriate effect to findings of serious carelessness in the affidavits.

Ba Tuan Tran also appealed his sentence of 15 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding the application judge's analysis fair, balanced, and correct.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual interference with an 11-year-old child.

The respondent, then 25 years old, had befriended the victim, engaged in grooming behaviour via text and telephone, and subsequently raped her.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment with 15 months credit for presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper effect to the principles of deterrence and denunciation, by failing to recognize that the respondent had sought out a young girl, and by failing to consider the significant impact of the offence on the victim as a separate aggravating circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and increased the sentence to 33 months' imprisonment (resulting in an effective sentence of 4 years after credit for presentence custody).

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

Brennan Nicholas, charged with first-degree murder, applied to vary a non-communication order made by a Justice of the Peace, which prohibited him from communicating with his mother and other family members.

The Crown consented to removing siblings and cousins but maintained the prohibition against the mother, Denise Desormeaux, citing past interference with justice.

The court found the original order was made without jurisdiction under s. 516(2) of the Criminal Code, and should have been made under s. 515(12), which is reviewable.

On the merits, the court found no compelling reason to maintain the non-communication order against the mother, noting her protective actions were understandable given the accused's youth, mental health issues, and Indigenous heritage, and that she posed no risk of interfering with the current proceedings.

The application to vary the order was granted, allowing communication with his mother.

The appellant and her boyfriend were charged jointly with importing cocaine after returning from St. Lucia with drugs hidden in their luggage.

The boyfriend pled guilty to importing the cocaine found in his bag.

At trial, the appellant claimed she was a blind courier set up by her boyfriend, and sought to introduce evidence of his guilty plea and its underlying facts.

The trial judge excluded the evidence as hearsay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that while the facts underlying the plea were inadmissible hearsay, the fact of the guilty plea itself, as recorded on the indictment, was admissible under the public documents exception and necessary for the appellant to make full answer and defence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The convictions rested primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to exercise necessary caution in accepting the accomplice's evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the accomplice's subsequent sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency, and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness and made no reversible error in assessing credibility.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, raising an argument of judicial bias.

The Court refused leave, finding that the bias argument was specific to the case, did not raise an issue of significance to the general administration of justice, and was not a strong argument, having already been rejected by the summary conviction appeal court judge.