Sarah Leece

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code for a bail review, seeking to vacate a judicial interim release order and substitute a detention order for the accused, who was charged with aggravated assault against his domestic partner.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law and principle by failing to properly assess secondary ground concerns and imposing woefully inadequate release conditions, which were even less stringent than those proposed by the defence.

The reviewing judge found the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to choose between the counsel's propositions and by providing conclusory and inadequate reasons that did not permit meaningful review, particularly regarding the secondary ground concerns related to public safety and potential re-offence.

The court intervened, granted the Crown's application, and ordered the accused's detention.

A youth, L.L., charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its onus, emphasizing the strong presumption of release for youth and the requirement of exceptional circumstances for tertiary ground detention.

The proposed plan of release with residential and community sureties was deemed adequate, and L.L. was released on house arrest with conditions.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder in a drive-by shooting, sought to limit the proposed testimony of the lead police investigator regarding video surveillance.

The Crown intended to have the officer testify that he identified the suspect vehicle following the victims' vehicle on the video.

Applying the principles from Walizadah, the court ruled that the officer could not testify that the vehicles on the video were similar or consistent with the vehicles involved in the shooting.

The officer was permitted only to place the videos in context regarding time and location and direct the jury's attention to specific times and vehicles, leaving the ultimate finding of fact to the jury.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown applied to admit a photograph of the deceased victim in the vehicle.

The defence objected on the basis that the photograph was inflammatory and lacked probative value.

The court ruled the photograph was of little to no probative value and excluded it, instead permitting the Crown to use leading questions to establish the non-contentious facts regarding the victim's position and gunshot wounds.

The accused and a co-accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder following a drive-by shooting.

During a pretrial motion, the Crown sought to admit a photograph of a handgun found on the accused's cell phone.

The court ruled the photograph admissible as circumstantial evidence of the accused's access to the type of weapon used in the shooting.

The court also addressed the admissibility of bad character evidence elicited by the co-accused in a cut-throat defence, noting it was admissible but required careful limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, brought a Corbett application to excise portions of his criminal record before testifying in his own defence.

The Crown agreed to exclude a prior sexual assault conviction but opposed excluding youth convictions for weapons offences.

The court allowed the application in part, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the accused on two of the four weapons-related convictions, finding that willful breaches of prior court orders are highly relevant to assessing credibility.

At his new trial for manslaughter, the accused sought to adduce evidence of two prior violent attacks by the deceased against him to support his claim of self-defence.

The Crown did not oppose this but sought to adduce reply evidence of the accused's prior convictions for violence.

The court ruled that the accused could adduce the evidence of the deceased's prior violence, but doing so would open the door for the Crown to adduce evidence of the accused's disposition for violence to ensure the jury had a balanced picture of the parties' respective dispositions for aggression.