L. Matthews

This is a sentencing decision for O.S., a youth offender who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and attempted murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that O.S.'s actions, motivated by incel ideology and deemed terrorism, demonstrated a level of maturity and sophistication rebutting the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

The defence argued for a youth sentence, citing O.S.'s age and mental health challenges.

The court found that O.S.'s meticulously planned and deliberate attack, his deep research into extremist ideology, and his lack of genuine insight or responsibility (blaming the incel culture) rebutted the presumption.

Furthermore, O.S.'s refusal to participate in rehabilitative programs rendered a youth sentence insufficient for accountability and public protection.

Consequently, the court imposed an adult sentence.

The Crown sought a declaration that the respondent's admitted offences of first-degree murder and attempted murder, committed in the name of involuntary celibate ("incel") ideology, constituted terrorist activity under s. 83.01 of the Criminal Code.

The court examined the statutory definition of terrorism, specifically the "ideological purpose" and "intention to intimidate" clauses.

The court found that incel culture is an ideology and that the respondent's actions were motivated by this ideology and intended to intimidate the public, particularly women.

Consequently, the court granted the Crown's application, ruling that the offences met the definition of terrorism.

The parties attended a hearing to settle the terms of an order directing that several related actions, arising from a motor vehicle accident and subsequent obstetrical care, be tried together.

The plaintiffs sought to bifurcate discoveries, proposing to proceed with liability first and defer damages until the minor plaintiff's prognosis crystallized.

The defendant physicians and hospital opposed and sought a comprehensive timetable.

The court denied the request for bifurcation, noting the high onus to divide discoveries and the intertwined nature of the claims.

The court imposed the defendants' proposed timetable, requiring the actions to be set down for trial by December 2024.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the jury due to the suspension of civil jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.

After being advised by the court that a non-jury trial could proceed in March 2022 while a jury trial would be scheduled for June 2022, the plaintiff withdrew the motion.

No costs were ordered.

The plaintiff, who suffered catastrophic injuries in an automobile accident, sought a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendant's residence to secure potential future damages exceeding the defendant's limited insurance coverage.

The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff did not establish a reasonable claim to an interest in the land, a prerequisite for a CPL.

The court distinguished the case from situations involving fraudulent conveyance and noted the plaintiff had already received substantial accident benefits.

Following a jury trial arising from a motorcycle accident, the defendant brought a post‑verdict threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act seeking to bar recovery of non‑pecuniary damages.

The moving party argued the plaintiff failed to establish a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court reviewed the statutory definitions under Regulation 381/03 (Bill 198) and considered extensive medical and lay evidence regarding chronic pain, knee injury, psychological effects, and functional limitations.

The court held the plaintiff established a permanent and serious impairment affecting important functions, including employment capacity and activities of daily living.

The threshold was met and the defendant’s motion was dismissed.