Madison Robins

A medical malpractice action arising from the failure of three emergency physicians to diagnose previable, prelabour, preterm rupture of membranes (pPPROM) at 17 weeks gestation and to refer the plaintiff to an obstetrician.

The plaintiff presented to three different emergency departments over four days with a "gush of fluid" and other symptoms consistent with ruptured membranes.

All three physicians diagnosed threatened miscarriage or second trimester bleeding instead.

The failure to diagnose and refer resulted in a delay of approximately one day before the plaintiff reached a tertiary hospital.

During that delay, the plaintiff developed septic shock, leading to amputation of her left leg below the knee, partial amputation of her right foot, kidney failure requiring transplant, stroke, compromised right arm function, and seizures.

The trial judge found that all three defendants breached the standard of care by failing to diagnose the rupture of membranes and failing to immediately refer to an obstetrician.

However, only the first defendant (Dr. Cavanagh) was found liable for damages, as the evidence established that if the plaintiff had been referred on May 4, she would have been seen by an obstetrician, counselled regarding the grave risks, and would have elected to terminate the pregnancy.

Antibiotics and termination by May 5 would have prevented the septic shock and resulting injuries.

The subsequent physicians' breaches occurred too late to prevent the harm.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by Gurnam Multani and Surjit Multani from the orders of Justice William S. Chalmers.

The appellants had signed forbearance agreements acknowledging the amounts owing under several loans from Dramel Limited.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s reliance on the forbearance agreements to confirm the amounts outstanding and held that the fees charged did not contravene the Interest Act.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The court considered a motion by the defendants for production of video and audio recordings from the plaintiffs’ in-home camera system in a medical malpractice action.

The court found that while such recordings may be relevant to the issues in dispute, the plaintiffs’ privacy interests in their home are paramount and outweigh the need for production.

The motion for production was dismissed.

The case involves a dispute between two brothers, Nickolas and George Georghiades, co-founders of a real estate business (LP).

Nickolas brought a motion seeking the appointment of an auditor, inspector, and monitor, and direct access to business information, alleging oppression and misappropriation of funds by George.

The court found a prima facie case of oppression due to George's control over information and the brothers' dysfunctional relationship.

The court ordered the appointment of an independent Monitor with a prescribed mandate to observe and report on the business's financial activities, in addition to an agreed-upon audit.

The request for a separate inspector/investigator and direct access was declined at this stage, with the possibility of revisiting if the Monitor's reports indicate ongoing difficulties.

No costs were awarded.

This decision addresses an evidentiary dispute during a trial regarding the admissibility of post-assessment medical reports through a defendant fact witness, Dr. McPherson.

The defendants sought to introduce reports created after Dr. McPherson's last assessment of the plaintiff, Jeremy Veran, to demonstrate improvement in symptoms.

The plaintiffs objected, arguing Dr. McPherson had not seen these documents and was not an expert witness.

The court ruled that documents not seen or received by Dr. McPherson, and not directly relevant to his care of the plaintiff, could not be introduced through him as a fact witness, even if they were part of the joint book of documents.

The defendants brought a motion to address two issues: the admissibility of opinions in two plaintiff expert reports (Miyanji and Levin) and the admissibility of evidence from five lay witnesses.

The court ruled that portions of the Miyanji and Levin reports that did not respond to specific "Defence Expert Reports" or introduced new standard of care issues were inadmissible due to late service and lack of reasonable explanation.

The motion to exclude the lay witnesses was dismissed as premature, with the court stating that the admissibility of their evidence, particularly any opinion evidence, should be assessed at the time it is tendered at trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking several orders before trial, including dismissal of claims against certain defendants, leave to amend their statement of claim, preliminary determination of jury questions, and exclusion of expert evidence.

The court granted the dismissal of claims against the "Released Defendants" without costs, as it was previously agreed upon.

Leave was granted to file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, as the proposed amendments were extensive and did not remove admissions.

The court also determined the format for jury questions, largely adopting the plaintiffs' approach for damages and requiring explanations for answers, emphasizing standard of care and "but for" causation.

The issue of expert evidence was adjourned to a later date.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence from fifteen expert reports served late in a medical malpractice action.

The court considered the admissibility under Rule 53.08, assessing whether there was a reasonable explanation for the late service and if granting leave would cause irreparable prejudice or undue delay.

The court allowed some reports as supplementary or responding reports, finding a general reasonable explanation for delay due to discovery issues and prior party understanding.

However, it excluded a vocational report that introduced new scenarios without prior notice and a neuropsychological report, reiterating a previous ruling that no neuropsychological impairment issue was pleaded or supported by evidence, and its introduction would cause significant prejudice and necessitate trial adjournment.

The plaintiff sued the defendant plastic surgeon for medical malpractice, alleging he breached the standard of care by failing to assess her and obtain x-rays within 7 to 10 days following surgery for a fractured finger.

The plaintiff claimed this delay prevented an immediate repeat surgery and necessitated a more complex corrective procedure months later.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding no established standard of care requiring a general plastic surgeon to conduct a post-operative assessment and x-rays within the 7 to 10-day window.

Carillion Canada Inc. brought a motion within its CCAA proceedings for an order directing HSBC Bank Canada to return $6.8 million that HSBC had unilaterally debited from Carillion's operating account to set off obligations under letters of credit.

The court found that while HSBC breached the initial stay order by exercising self-help without seeking leave, the funds were legally available for set-off.

Applying the Supreme Court's guidance in Montréal, the court held that HSBC's claim was a valid 'pre-pre' set-off preserved under section 21 of the CCAA.

The motion was dismissed, but HSBC was ordered to pay $50,000 in costs due to its conduct in breaching the stay.

The plaintiffs, minority shareholders, brought a motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction seeking reinstatement to the board of directors and an order compelling the corporation to declare dividends.

The plaintiffs had previously sued the corporation and majority shareholders for $7.5 million for conspiracy, fraud, and oppression.

The court dismissed the request for mandatory injunctions, finding the plaintiffs did not establish a strong prima facie case for reinstatement due to their conflict of interest, nor for an immediate dividend distribution while the corporation's liability in the lawsuit remained undetermined.

However, the court granted a non-mandatory injunction preserving the status quo by prohibiting the corporation from expending funds outside the ordinary course of business.

This proposed class action sought an ex parte Mareva injunction to freeze assets, including cryptocurrency, of organizers and participants in the 'Freedom Convoy' protest in downtown Ottawa.

The plaintiffs, residents, businesses, and employees, alleged damages from private and public nuisance.

The court found an apparently strong case for tort liability and a serious risk of asset dissipation, particularly with funds purposely moved to avoid seizure.

The injunction was granted, freezing funds controlled by the defendants, and the requirement for an undertaking for damages was waived due to the public interest and class action nature of the case.

The court also approved an amendment to the statement of claim to expand plaintiff classes and add defendants.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision declining to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay under Rule 48.14 and instead imposing a timetable.

The underlying action involved a claim for indemnification from escrow funds following a share purchase agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master applied the correct two-part test from Kara v. Arnold, properly considered the contextual factors including the defendants' own delay in filing a statement of defence, and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the plaintiff had an adequate explanation for delay and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The plaintiff was successful on a status hearing motion to prevent the dismissal of its action for delay.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought $35,000, while the unsuccessful defendants sought $30,225.24, arguing the motion was only necessary due to the plaintiff's inaction.

The court awarded costs of $20,000 to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, finding it was reasonable for them to compel the plaintiff to show cause and noting the plaintiff's primary explanation for the delay was inaccurate.

The plaintiffs commenced two actions arising from the purchase of a property with structural issues: one against Stewart Title for breach of title insurance contract and a "tort action" against multiple parties (vendors, home inspector, township, contractors) for property defects.

Stewart Title moved to consolidate the two actions.

The plaintiffs and two defendants from the tort action (the vendors) opposed consolidation, preferring the actions be heard together or one after the other.

The court, applying Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, conducted a costs/benefits analysis.

It rejected the notion of an elevated onus for consolidation and found that ordering the actions to be heard together, with common discoveries and pre-trial, best served efficiency and fairness.

This decision was primarily to avoid significant costs and delays associated with potential crossclaims and pleadings disputes that full consolidation would trigger, particularly regarding Stewart Title's potential subrogation claims.

The motion for consolidation was dismissed, and an order for the actions to be tried together was granted with specific directions for common pre-trial and discoveries.

The appellant, an investor, sought damages from specific-project corporations on the basis of knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty arising from a complex multi-million dollar real estate fraud perpetrated by a married couple.

The couple convinced investors to invest in specific-project corporations to acquire and hold commercial real estate, but instead diverted the funds for personal use.

The application judge dismissed the knowing assistance claim, finding the fraudulent wife's knowledge could not be imputed to the specific-project corporations.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge below that the knowing assistance claim must fail.

The Court clarified that while Livent permits courts to decline to apply corporate attribution where the public interest so requires, the minimal criteria from Canadian Dredge must always first be satisfied.

The plaintiff, 1085372 Ontario Limited, brought an action under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and the Fraudulent Conveyances Act (FCA) to set aside a transfer of shares in Linus Entertainment Inc. from Michael Shumak to Geoff Kulawick.

The plaintiff alleged the transfer was at undervalue or a fraudulent conveyance.

The court found that the parties dealt at arm's length, the transaction occurred outside the one-year clawback period under the BIA, and the transfer was not at undervalue.

Furthermore, the court found no fraudulent intent on the part of Shumak and that Kulawick acted in good faith and paid good consideration.

The action was dismissed.

Datawind Inc. appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice registering a costs order from the United Kingdom High Court of Justice under the Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.

Datawind argued that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction over it as a third party to the original proceeding, that the costs order was not for a definite sum, and that it was denied natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the foreign court had jurisdiction, that the interim payment on account of costs constituted a registrable judgment for a definite sum, and that no denial of natural justice occurred.