Eliyahu Yoel Smolarcik

This endorsement addresses the allocation of costs following the granting of default judgment and summary judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs.

The court reviews a revised Costs Outline and orders specific costs to be paid by each Defendant, with payment due within 30 days of April 29, 2025.

The plaintiffs, Albert Carbone and Cathy Horvath, sought default and summary judgment against several defendants for misappropriating their life savings through a fraudulent investment scheme involving a non-existent cannabis business.

The court granted default judgment against Salvatore Boccia, David Shpilt, and 215 Holding Corp. for fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment, and summary judgment against Rosanna Boccia for fraud, conversion, and oppression.

Punitive damages were awarded against Salvatore Boccia, David Shpilt, and 215 Holding Corp. The court found the conduct to be brazen, intentional, and a marked departure from ordinary standards of behaviour, and held the defendants jointly and severally liable for the losses.

The moving parties sought an interim stay of enforcement proceedings, specifically a notice to vacate their residence, pending the outcome of their appeal.

The responding party held a second mortgage on the residence that had been in default for years, and had obtained a default judgment and a lifting of previous stays.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Court of Appeal found there was a serious question to be adjudicated, but the moving parties failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant moved to strike out an affidavit delivered by the respondent in response to an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The applicant argued the affidavit did not fall within the narrow exceptions permitting a party to supplement the record of proceedings.

The court found that the bulk of the affidavit improperly appended and discussed documents already in the record.

However, the court noted that evidence regarding an unrecorded oral ruling could fall within the exception for procedural defects not apparent on the record.

The court struck the affidavit but granted leave for both parties to deliver new affidavit evidence strictly limited to their recollection of whether an oral ruling was made.

Maria Amorim appealed a judgment that declared her ineligible for survivor pension benefits under the Pension Benefits Act, based on a finding that she and Daniel Carvalho were living "separate and apart" when he began receiving disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's factual finding that the parties were living separate and apart, which was entitled to deference.

The court found no reviewable error in the application judge's holistic consideration of the indicia for "separate and apart" status.

The applicant sought to schedule an urgent application for relief from orders closing its Toronto and Peel stores under the Reopening Ontario (A Flexible Response to Covid-19) Act.

The matter was referred to the judge as a delegate of the Regional Senior Justice.

The court convened a case conference by videoconference and directed the applicant to notify the respondents.

The court also set out terms for the service and filing of materials for the urgent hearing.

The appellant husband appealed an order for the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The property was sold prior to the hearing of the appeal.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was moot and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it.

The court awarded the respondent wife full indemnity costs of $20,000, finding the husband's conduct in pursuing the appeal and opposing the sale amounted to bad faith litigation.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The respondent denied the claims, arguing the injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) and its $3,500 limit.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's pre-existing psychological issues were exacerbated by the accident, resulting in diagnoses of depression and anxiety that removed her from the MIG.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the applicant's psychologist over the respondent's insurer examination psychologist.

Consequently, the Tribunal ordered the respondent to pay for the disputed physical treatment, psychological assessment, and psychological treatment, finding them all to be reasonable and necessary, along with interest on overdue payments.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought medical and rehabilitation benefits.

The respondent insurer denied the claims on the basis that the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant argued that she suffered from cervical radiculopathy and chronic pain, which would remove her from the MIG.

The Tribunal found insufficient evidence to support a diagnosis of cervical radiculopathy, noting the absence of a Nerve Conduction Test or Spurling's Test.

The Tribunal also found that the applicant failed to prove her ongoing pain was accompanied by functional impairment, and thus did not meet the threshold for chronic pain.

As the applicant's injuries were predominantly minor and the $3,500 MIG limit was exhausted, the application for dispute resolution was dismissed.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits (IRB) and medical benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the applicant was not entitled to IRB as she failed to provide medical evidence demonstrating a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of her employment.

The Tribunal also determined the applicant's injuries fell within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG), as she provided no medical diagnosis of chronic pain or psychological impairment to remove her from the MIG cap.

Because the $3,500 MIG limit was already exhausted, the disputed treatment plans were not payable.

Finally, the Tribunal awarded $250 in costs to the respondent because the applicant and her counsel failed to attend the teleconference hearing without providing reasonable notice, which constituted bad faith.