Devon Michael Paul

The moving party sought an extension of time to apply for judicial review of a 2021 Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that dismissed his duty of fair representation complaint as premature.

The court initiated a process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to consider dismissing the proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Despite being granted multiple extensions and accommodations for medical issues, the moving party failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the three-year delay or demonstrate apparent grounds for relief.

The court found the proceeding met the test under Rule 2.1 and dismissed the motion.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision striking down the Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act, 2011, which eliminated TTC employees' right to strike and replaced it with binding interest arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complete ban on strikes violates the employees' right to meaningful collective bargaining under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court further found that the Crown failed to justify the infringement under s. 1, as it did not demonstrate that the complete ban was minimally impairing or that its salutary effects outweighed the deleterious effects on the workers' Charter rights.

The appellant, Ahmad Mohammad (also known as Ahmad Yousef), brought three appeals from Superior Court orders dismissing his actions under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal considered dismissing the appeals and revoking the appellant's fee waivers under the Administration of Justice Act.

The court found the proceedings to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, lacking intelligible grounds or causes of action.

The panel review motions for two appeals (McMaster University and Chaimowitz) were dismissed under r. 2.1.02, and the third appeal (Google) was dismissed under r. 2.1.01 for failure to perfect.

The court also revoked the appellant's fee waivers and prohibited further fee waiver requests without judicial permission.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant moved to strike out an affidavit delivered by the respondent in response to an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The applicant argued the affidavit did not fall within the narrow exceptions permitting a party to supplement the record of proceedings.

The court found that the bulk of the affidavit improperly appended and discussed documents already in the record.

However, the court noted that evidence regarding an unrecorded oral ruling could fall within the exception for procedural defects not apparent on the record.

The court struck the affidavit but granted leave for both parties to deliver new affidavit evidence strictly limited to their recollection of whether an oral ruling was made.

The Union filed a policy grievance alleging that the Employer modified the Senior Financial Accountant (SFA) position without notice and that the position should no longer be excluded from the bargaining unit.

The Arbitrator found that the Employer had significantly modified the SFA job content and authority between 1997 and 2014, removing managerial and confidential labour relations duties, and failed to notify the Union as required by the collective agreement.

Finding that the SFA position no longer met the statutory or collective agreement criteria for exclusion, the Arbitrator ordered the Employer to move the position into the bargaining unit and pay union dues retroactive to the adoption of the 2014 job description.

The applicant private lender brought an application seeking a declaration of an equitable mortgage or damages, alleging the respondent borrower breached a mortgage contract by not accepting funds.

The respondent argued the applicant breached the contract by failing to confirm funds were available.

The court found that material facts were in dispute and credibility issues could not be resolved on the paper record.

Pursuant to Rule 38.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered a trial to determine who breached the mortgage contract and converted the application into an action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a labour arbitration decision that upheld his termination for fabricating a workplace violence allegation.

The application was brought over two years after the arbitration award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application on two preliminary grounds: the applicant lacked standing to bring the application individually as the union had exclusive representation rights and no exceptional circumstances applied, and the application was barred by unreasonable and unexplained delay.

The applicant sought judicial review of three decisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissing his unfair labour practice and duty of fair representation complaints against his former employer and union.

The complaints arose after the applicant's employment was terminated following allegations of sexual harassment, which was subsequently resolved through Minutes of Settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's decisions were reasonable.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside a single judge's order dismissing their appeal for failure to perfect under Rule 61.09(1).

The Divisional Court panel found that the motion judge erred in law because the evidence had not yet been transcribed, meaning the 60-day period to perfect the appeal had not been triggered.

The panel set aside the order dismissing the appeal but denied costs to the appellant because their affidavit had not been properly served on the respondent.

The moving party school board brought a motion before a single judge of the Divisional Court to dismiss the responding party union's application for judicial review for delay.

The underlying application sought review of arbitration awards concerning a wrongful dismissal grievance.

The single judge held that unless the determination of a motion to dismiss for delay is so clear as to leave no doubt, it should be decided by the full panel hearing the application.

Finding the issues were not clear enough for a single judge to determine, the court adjourned the motion to the full panel.

The applicant private lender brought a motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against two properties owned by the respondent, claiming an equitable mortgage after a mortgage transaction failed to close.

Although the court found a triable issue regarding the equitable mortgage claim, it dismissed the motion on equitable grounds.

The court reasoned that the applicant had no intended use for the properties, the properties were not unique, and the alternative claim for damages would be an adequate and easily calculable remedy.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging reprisal and discrimination based on disability more than two years after the last alleged incident.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed for delay.

The applicant argued that her PTSD prevented her from filing on time and that she was unaware of her legal rights.

The Tribunal found that the medical evidence did not establish a substantial inability to pursue her rights and that ignorance of the law is not a good faith explanation for delay.

The application was dismissed as out of time.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging wrongful termination due to a work-related illness and workplace complaints.

The applicant's union had previously filed a grievance on similar grounds, which was settled for a lump sum payment equal to 28 weeks of pay.

Although the applicant did not sign the Minutes of Settlement, he cashed the settlement cheque.

The Tribunal held that cashing the cheque constituted implicit acceptance of the settlement.

The application was dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code as its substance had been appropriately dealt with in the grievance proceeding.

The proposed interveners, two unions, brought motions for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review concerning the payment of post-retirement benefits by a school board.

The judicial review was scheduled to be heard immediately after a related Stated Case in which both proposed interveners were already participating.

The court dismissed one union's motion to intervene, finding it could efficiently make its arguments in the Stated Case proceeding without prolonging the judicial review.

However, the court added the other union as a responding party because it was a joint signatory to the collective agreement at issue in the underlying arbitration.

The applicant sought to withdraw her human rights application on the morning of the first scheduled day of hearing.

The respondent requested costs and a declaration that the applicant was a vexatious litigant.

The Tribunal found insufficient grounds for a vexatious litigant declaration but noted the significant wasted resources and prejudice to the respondent.

The Tribunal granted permission to withdraw the application on the terms that the applicant is barred from filing future related applications against the respondent and that the allegations are declared unsubstantiated.

The applicant filed a human rights application against his former employer and union almost 18 months after the last alleged incident of discrimination.

The respondents sought to dismiss the application for delay.

The applicant argued the delay was incurred in good faith because he was ignorant of the limitation period, was pursuing a duty of fair representation complaint at the OLRB, and was acting on his lawyer's strategic advice.

The Tribunal found the applicant was aware of the limitation period and made an informed choice to pursue his claims at the OLRB instead of filing a timely human rights application.

The Tribunal held that relying on a lawyer's litigation strategy to pursue rights in another forum does not constitute a good faith reason for delay under section 34(2) of the Code.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability (alcohol addiction).

The respondent requested the application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matter was previously settled during a grievance mediation/arbitration.

The applicant claimed he did not understand the settlement due to intoxication.

The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence unreliable, concluded he understood and accepted the settlement terms, and dismissed the application as the substance had been appropriately dealt with in the prior proceeding.

The applicant, a steamfitter with a back injury, alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The Tribunal found that the respondent employer failed to provide appropriate modified work to accommodate the applicant's medical restrictions, breaching both the procedural and substantive components of the duty to accommodate.

Furthermore, the respondent terminated the applicant's employment for alleged time theft after conducting video surveillance while he was off sick.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's disability-related absence was a factor in his termination and that the surveillance did not establish a reasonable non-discriminatory explanation.

The Tribunal awarded $15,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The applicant, an employee of the respondent's Water Division, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal after sustaining a knee injury at work.

He claimed the respondent failed to accommodate his medical restrictions and subjected him to reprisal for asserting his rights under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found the respondent's witnesses more credible and concluded that the respondent had accommodated the applicant's disability-related needs up to the point of undue hardship by offering modified duties, office work, and assistance from other employees.

The Tribunal also found the applicant stymied the accommodation process by refusing to sign a medical consent form.

The reprisal allegation was dismissed for lack of evidence.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.