David A. Morin

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought $3,000.22 for a physiotherapy treatment plan under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the benefit.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the treatment plan reasonable and necessary to assist in relieving the applicant's chronic pain, preferring the evidence of the applicant's treating family doctor and physiotherapist over the insurer's paper review.

The Tribunal ordered the insurer to pay the treatment plan amount plus interest.

The respondents purchased a property in 2021 and discovered significant foundation defects in a dwelling constructed between 1986 and 1987.

They sued the appellant municipality in 2022 for negligent supervision of the construction.

The motion judge dismissed the municipality's summary judgment motion, finding that the municipality had an ongoing duty to monitor the open building permit, which constituted a continuous omission tolling the 15-year ultimate limitation period under s. 15(6)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a continuous act or omission requires successive or repetitive actionable conduct, which was absent here.

The claim was therefore statute-barred by the ultimate limitation period.

The Court also noted the motion judge erred in recognizing a novel duty to monitor without conducting an Anns/Cooper analysis.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, commenced an action against his former landlord for the disposal of business assets and related mental distress.

The motion judge dismissed the action as a nullity, finding that only the trustee in bankruptcy had the capacity to sue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the assets were exempt 'tools of the trade' under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the exemption limit was only $11,300, the claim sought damages rather than the return of property, and the mental distress claim was inextricably linked to the property claim belonging to the bankrupt estate.

The respondents purchased a motel and gas station from the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the underground fuel tank system and breached the Agreement of Purchase and Sale by failing to provide a required safety compliance report.

The trial judge awarded damages based on the cost to replace the tank system.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by not granting an adjournment due to late disclosure of a Pierringer agreement, misapprehending evidence about compliance alternatives, and using the wrong measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants never requested an adjournment or stay at trial, and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of damages or contractual interpretation.

The Township of McMurrich Monteith brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a negligence claim by the plaintiffs, William and Emily Huether, on the grounds that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs alleged the Township was negligent for failing to continuously monitor an open building permit file and conduct necessary inspections for a house built in 1986, whose foundation was failing.

The Township argued its duty ended with construction or permit closure in 1988, making the claim statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the Township had a continuous duty to monitor its open permit file until the building was substantially complete and met occupancy conditions, which never occurred.

Therefore, the ultimate limitation period under s. 15(2) of the Limitations Act did not apply, and s. 15(6) for continuous omissions applied.

The Township's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(b) to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that the plaintiff, an undischarged bankrupt, lacked the legal capacity to commence the action.

The plaintiff contended this was a misnomer curable under Rule 5.

The court found that the property forming the basis of the claim vested in the trustee in bankruptcy upon the plaintiff's assignment into bankruptcy, and the plaintiff's failure to disclose these substantial assets to the trustee meant the action, commenced while he was an undischarged bankrupt, was a nullity.

The court distinguished the case from situations where a misnomer could be cured, noting the trustee was a distinct party and had not sought to be substituted.

The motion to dismiss was granted, and the action was deemed a nullity, having been commenced outside the limitation period if re-filed.

The plaintiffs sued their title insurer, FCT, after being denied coverage for alleged construction deficiencies.

FCT brought a third party claim against the tort defendants (the sellers/builders and municipality) for contribution and indemnity.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to strike FCT's third party claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the cross-motion, finding that FCT had not settled the plaintiffs' claim and therefore could not rely on the Negligence Act, common law, equity, or subrogation rights to claim contribution and indemnity.

The court also granted FCT's motion on consent to have the title insurance action and the tort action heard together or consecutively to avoid duplication.

The plaintiffs purchased a motel and gas station from the defendants.

Prior to the sale, the defendants represented that the fuel tank system was in good condition and only required routine testing, concealing outstanding TSSA orders and a history of non-compliance.

The Agreement of Purchase and Sale included a clause requiring the defendants to provide a report confirming the system was safe and compliant, which they failed to do.

The plaintiffs subsequently discovered the system was non-compliant and faced closure by the TSSA, forcing them to incur significant costs to install a new system.

The court found the defendants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract.

The court also found the plaintiffs' real estate lawyer negligent for failing to adequately protect them in the transaction.

Liability for the $635,189.12 in damages was apportioned 80% to the defendants and 20% to the lawyer.

The applicant sought payment for five OCF-6 claims for prescription medication, medical cannabis, and parking expenses following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent denied the claims and requested the applicant attend an insurer's examination (IE), which she refused.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was barred from proceeding with her application under s. 55(1) of the Schedule due to her failure to attend the IE.

Furthermore, the Tribunal held that the applicant failed to prove the expenses were reasonable and necessary, noting pre-existing pain issues that raised causation concerns.

The application was dismissed.

The municipality appealed a judgment finding it liable for negligence in granting a building permit and conducting inspections of the Breens' cottage, which resulted in significant structural and code deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on duty of care and causation, affirming that the municipality owed a duty to inspect even without a builder's request and was liable for major deficiencies (crawl space, roof ventilation, structural issues) due to its unreasonable conduct.

However, the Court found the trial judge applied an excessively strict standard of care regarding minor deficiencies (stair headroom, insulation gaps), reducing the damages awarded.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of an affidavit filed by the plaintiffs in support of an upcoming summary judgment motion regarding an insurance coverage dispute.

The defendants argued the subjective extrinsic evidence was irrelevant and would needlessly complicate the summary judgment hearing.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that under the expanded powers of Rule 20, issues of admissibility and relevancy are best left to the judge hearing the summary judgment motion to avoid bifurcating the process and wasting judicial resources.

The appellant Township appealed a trial decision finding it 45% liable for damages resulting from a negligently installed solar panel array on the respondents' barn.

The Township admitted negligence in failing to have an engineer inspect the installation before closing the building permit, but argued its liability should be lower and challenged the quantum of damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 45% apportionment of liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the quantum of damages, finding the trial judge made material errors in adopting the respondents' expert's estimate, including double-counting truss repair costs.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a reassessment of damages.

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination that she sustained a catastrophic impairment due to a mental or behavioural disorder.

The respondent denied the claim, arguing her impairments were mild to moderate and complicated by other factors.

The Tribunal applied Chapter 14 of the AMA Guides and preferred the evidence of the applicant's experts, finding that the applicant's psychological and cognitive symptoms significantly impeded her useful functioning.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant sustained a marked (Class 4) impairment in the domains of Concentration, Persistence and Pace, and Adaptation, thereby meeting the threshold for catastrophic impairment.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As neither party uploaded costs outlines as directed, the court ordered no costs on the motion for leave to appeal, leaving the costs of the motion below to be decided by the motion judge.

The Plaintiff brought a motion to provisionally strike the Defendant's jury notice, citing significant delays in civil jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the prioritization of criminal jury trials following R. v. Jordan.

The Plaintiff argued that further delay would cause irredeemable prejudice, including increasing statutory deductibles, reduced income recovery, and the need to update expert reports.

The court granted the motion, provisionally striking the jury notice to allow the matter to proceed as a judge-alone trial in the upcoming sittings, finding that justice to the parties would be better served by an expeditious resolution.

The Defendant was granted liberty to move to restore the jury notice if the trial was not reached by a specified date.

This decision addresses costs and prejudgment interest following a seven-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $361,875.33 in damages.

The plaintiffs sought $220,915.33 in partial indemnity costs, while the defendant proposed $154,697.70.

The court, applying the modern costs rules, awarded the plaintiffs $130,000 in fees and $50,809.21 in disbursements, totaling $197,709.21 in costs, plus $1,698.90 in prejudgment interest.

The court emphasized proportionality, the non-applicability of the old cost grid, and the need for detailed information for claimed disbursements.

The plaintiffs purchased a cottage and later discovered significant structural issues and Building Code violations during renovations.

They sued the Township for negligent building inspections and failure to enforce the Building Code Act.

The court found that the Township owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs and breached that duty by granting a building permit without proper plans and failing to identify structural deficiencies during inspections.

The Township was held liable for the costs to remedy the Code violations and for the plaintiffs' mental distress, resulting in a total damages award of $361,875.33.

The appellant was electrocuted by stray voltage from a light pole at a municipally-owned soccer field.

The damage to the pole was caused by a lightning strike.

The appellants sued under the Occupiers' Liability Act, but the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality met the standard of care.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his factual findings regarding the timing of the lightning strike and in admitting and relying on the respondent's expert evidence regarding the inefficacy of pen testers to detect stray voltage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's factual findings or evidentiary rulings.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident claim moved to strike the defendant's jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic created uncertainty about when in-person jury trials could proceed.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed it as premature.

The court noted that the case was not yet trial-ready, having not been pre-tried and with a recent medical report served.

Following a wait-and-see approach preferred in the Central East Region, the court held that the motion could be renewed if in-person hearings were suspended again or if the action was not scheduled for trial by April 1, 2021.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant insurer's jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause indefinite delays for a civil jury trial.

The action arose from a 2014 motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured motorist.

The court granted leave to bring the motion under Rule 48.04(1), finding the pandemic constituted a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach.

The court noted that the Central East Region had established a running civil trial list and was making efforts to accommodate in-person jury trials, making it premature to conclude that retaining the jury would cause disproportionate delay.