Brian Grant

The plaintiff pedestrian was struck and severely injured by a stolen motor vehicle.

Her spouse was employed as a delivery driver and had a company van available for his regular use during business hours.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to determine whether the employer's automobile insurance policy, which included an OPCF 44R Family Protection Change Form, provided excess coverage for the injuries.

The court found that because the employer's shop was open and the van was available for the spouse's use at the time of the accident, the policy provided coverage, even though the spouse was not yet at work or using the vehicle when the accident occurred.

Following the successful summary dismissal of the plaintiffs' action due to the expiry of the limitation period, the successful defendants sought costs of $15,000 each.

The plaintiffs argued for a reduced amount of $10,000 each, noting the lack of settlement offers and the principle of proportionality.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57 and the principles from Boucher and Davies, concluding that the defendants' requested amount was fair and reasonable.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $15,000 in costs to each defendant.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for negligent construction of a cottage and retaining wall, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs experienced slope failure and retaining wall movement in 2009 and received an engineering report identifying the issue, but did not commence their action until 2013.

The court found that the plaintiffs knew the basic essential facts giving rise to a claim upon receiving the 2009 engineering report.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking court approval of a settlement in a personal injury action involving a minor plaintiff arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The settlement resolved claims against several municipal defendants responsible for roadway maintenance and resulted in dismissal of the action, including related third party claims.

Third parties opposed the settlement on the basis that they wished the municipality to remain in the litigation, but the court held they had previously chosen not to advance a third party claim and had provided no sufficient basis to reject the settlement.

After reviewing the supporting materials and affidavits, the court concluded the settlement was reasonable and in the best interests of the minor plaintiff.

The settlement was therefore approved and the action dismissed as against the settling parties.

During a jury trial for damages arising from a police dog bite, the plaintiff brought a supplementary motion to admit photographs of his injuries and medical records.

The plaintiff argued the evidence was relevant to the issue of excessive force and to challenge the credibility of the police officers regarding the number of times he was bitten.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the photographs required expert interpretation to be probative and that the medical records contained hearsay regarding the circumstances of the incident.

In a civil jury trial arising from injuries suffered when a police canine apprehended the plaintiff, the moving party sought to admit photographs of his injuries, medical records, and medical testimony describing the nature and severity of the injuries.

The parties had already settled the quantum of damages, leaving only liability and contributory negligence to be determined.

The court held that the severity of the injuries was not relevant to whether the police acted reasonably in deploying the canine or whether the officers could rely on s. 25 of the Criminal Code.

Even if marginally relevant, the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect and the risk of distracting the jury.

The court therefore excluded the photographs, medical records, and medical evidence but permitted a brief general description of the injuries to avoid speculation by the jury.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of a police officer defendant’s Crown brief relating to later criminal charges and the officer’s full personnel file in a civil action alleging negligent deployment of a police canine.

The court held that documentary production under the Rules of Civil Procedure requires relevance to matters pleaded in the action.

The criminal charges arose after the incident and were unrelated to the officer’s duties as a police canine handler, rendering the Crown brief irrelevant.

The court further held that disciplinary materials under the Police Services Act were protected by statutory privilege and that the plaintiff had not established grounds for additional production after the action had been set down for trial.

The motion for production and leave for further production were denied.

The defendant municipality sought leave to appeal a motions judge's refusal to grant summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff sued for damages after slipping and falling in a pothole while crossing a roadway.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusion that genuine issues of material fact required a trial, particularly regarding the state of repair of the roadway and the municipality's duty of care to pedestrians crossing outside of designated crosswalks.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement, arguing in part that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias because of comments made by the motion judge at a previous adjournment hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's comments were merely efforts to assist an unrepresented litigant and did not meet the test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also found no reason to interfere with the order enforcing the settlement, noting that a rehearing would yield the same result.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their action against a police officer and the Police Services Board as statute-barred by a six-month limitation period.

The central issue was whether the appellants' solicitor ought to have discovered the officer's identity on March 10, when a junior secretary picked up a letter identifying him, or on March 11, when the solicitor actually read it.

The Court of Appeal held that reasonable diligence did not require the solicitor to read the letter on March 10.

The appeal was allowed with respect to the officer, permitting the action against him to continue, but the dismissal against the Board was upheld on consent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim against the municipality for a pedestrian accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that on the uncontested facts, there was no basis to extend the municipality's statutory duty to repair under s. 284 of the Municipal Act to pedestrian traffic at the specific location of the accident.

The court noted, however, that the duty to repair is not strictly limited to areas specifically designated for pedestrian traffic.

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following an alleged motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the claim, and the applicant commenced arbitration.

However, the applicant subsequently moved without notifying his counsel or the Commission, failed to attend the pre-hearing, and failed to attend the arbitration hearing.

The arbitrator dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's conduct amounted to a constructive withdrawal and an abuse of process.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's $3,000 assessment fee and its expenses of the arbitration.