Joseph A. Bisceglia

During a jury trial for damages arising from a police dog bite, the plaintiff brought a supplementary motion to admit photographs of his injuries and medical records.

The plaintiff argued the evidence was relevant to the issue of excessive force and to challenge the credibility of the police officers regarding the number of times he was bitten.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the photographs required expert interpretation to be probative and that the medical records contained hearsay regarding the circumstances of the incident.

In a civil jury trial arising from injuries suffered when a police canine apprehended the plaintiff, the moving party sought to admit photographs of his injuries, medical records, and medical testimony describing the nature and severity of the injuries.

The parties had already settled the quantum of damages, leaving only liability and contributory negligence to be determined.

The court held that the severity of the injuries was not relevant to whether the police acted reasonably in deploying the canine or whether the officers could rely on s. 25 of the Criminal Code.

Even if marginally relevant, the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect and the risk of distracting the jury.

The court therefore excluded the photographs, medical records, and medical evidence but permitted a brief general description of the injuries to avoid speculation by the jury.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of a police officer defendant’s Crown brief relating to later criminal charges and the officer’s full personnel file in a civil action alleging negligent deployment of a police canine.

The court held that documentary production under the Rules of Civil Procedure requires relevance to matters pleaded in the action.

The criminal charges arose after the incident and were unrelated to the officer’s duties as a police canine handler, rendering the Crown brief irrelevant.

The court further held that disciplinary materials under the Police Services Act were protected by statutory privilege and that the plaintiff had not established grounds for additional production after the action had been set down for trial.

The motion for production and leave for further production were denied.

The applicant, a First Nations Constable with the Anishinabek Police Service (APS), was terminated by the Chief of Police following allegations of sexual misconduct.

The termination occurred without a hearing, contrary to the APS Code of Conduct.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court held that although the APS was created by a tripartite agreement and not by statute, it is a public body fulfilling a governmental function and is therefore subject to judicial review.

The court found that the applicant was a public office holder entitled to procedural fairness, which he was denied.

The decision to terminate was quashed.

The appellant attempted to repossess his vehicles while armed with a rifle, which he loaded and pointed at the victim.

He was convicted of attempted armed robbery, using a firearm while attempting to commit an indictable offence, possession of a weapon, and pointing a firearm.

The trial judge stayed the possession charge but entered convictions on the others.

On appeal, the appellant argued the multiple convictions violated the common law Kienapple principle and sections 7 and 11(h) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Kienapple principle did not prevent convictions for both armed robbery and using a firearm, as the latter requires the additional element of 'use'.

The Court also found no breach of fundamental justice under the Charter.

However, the Court quashed the conviction for pointing a firearm, finding that it offended the Kienapple principle when combined with the conviction for using a firearm.