Vlad Popescu

The decision addresses a motion by the defendants to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiff, Michael Vojvodic, on property owned by the defendants.

The court considers the relevant statutory and discretionary factors, including the uniqueness of the property, the existence of alternative claims for damages, the presence of a willing purchaser, and the relative harm to the parties.

The court finds that damages would be a satisfactory remedy, the property is not unique, and the harm to the defendants outweighs the harm to the plaintiff if the CPL is discharged.

The CPL is ordered discharged, vacant possession is to be provided by the plaintiff, and sale proceeds are to be held in trust pending further order.

This is a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff, Kathleen Joanne O’Brien, alleged negligent treatment by the defendant, Dr. Jasjit Lochab, an orthopaedic surgeon, following a hip fracture and subsequent surgery in December 2018.

The parties agreed on damages, leaving liability as the sole issue.

The court found that Dr. Lochab met the standard of care in his choice and use of implant, as well as in his post-operative instructions.

The action was dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff sued the defendant plastic surgeon for medical malpractice, alleging he breached the standard of care by failing to assess her and obtain x-rays within 7 to 10 days following surgery for a fractured finger.

The plaintiff claimed this delay prevented an immediate repeat surgery and necessitated a more complex corrective procedure months later.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding no established standard of care requiring a general plastic surgeon to conduct a post-operative assessment and x-rays within the 7 to 10-day window.

The plaintiff, Carolyn Rose Jaroli, sued Dr. Dorie-Anna Dueck, a medical oncologist, for negligence in recommending chemotherapy (specifically Taxol) for her breast cancer, alleging it caused her to develop peripheral neuropathy.

The court found that Dr. Dueck met the standard of care, noting the challenging circumstances due to a lost sentinel lymph node and the prevailing medical guidelines in 2014.

The court preferred the defendant's expert testimony, which supported Dr. Dueck's clinical judgment.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that her current, long-term peripheral neuropathy symptoms were caused by the Taxol treatment, as opposed to other pre-existing health conditions like diabetes and osteoarthritis.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for assault and battery against a dentist and vicarious liability against his professional corporation.

The defendants admitted liability for assault and vicarious liability but disputed battery and the quantum of damages.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish direct physical contact for battery, thus dismissing that claim.

However, the court granted summary judgment for assault and vicarious liability, awarding damages for the plaintiff's pain and suffering.

The plaintiffs, Daniele Marthe Hutterli and Charles Hutterli, brought a medical negligence action against Dr. Douglas Scott, alleging he failed to meet the standard of care in assessing Mrs. Hutterli's ankle injury.

Mrs. Hutterli sustained an ankle fracture but was misdiagnosed with a sprain, leading to delayed treatment.

The plaintiffs claimed increased cartilage damage and higher risk of osteoarthritis due to the delay.

The court found that Dr. Scott met the standard of care in applying the Ottawa Ankle Rules, despite the misdiagnosis, concluding it was an error in judgment, not negligence.

Furthermore, the court found the plaintiffs failed to prove causation or damages, as there was no evidence that the alleged harm (increased cartilage damage, osteoarthritis risk) was caused by the delay, rather than the original fracture, or that a better outcome would have resulted.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, David George Owen, brought a negligence claim against dentist Sukhjeevan Bains following a tooth extraction procedure during which Owen lost consciousness and later experienced a bradycardiac event at the hospital, leading to a "near death experience" and psychological injury.

The court dismissed the claim, finding that Owen failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that Dr. Bains's administration of nitroglycerin (NTG) caused the subsequent bradycardiac event at the hospital.

The court determined that Owen's underlying health conditions were the cause of the events, and Dr. Bains's actions were reasonable given the perceived emergency.

The appellant, a unionized employee of Lakehead District School Board, sought long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, which administered the benefits under contract with the school board, denied her claim.

The appellant commenced an action against Sun Life seeking a declaration of total disability and an order for payment of benefits.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the dispute arose from the interpretation and administration of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the dispute was arbitrable under the collective agreement and that Sun Life, as a mere agent of the school board, lacked standing to be sued directly.

The appellant's remedy lay in arbitration against the school board.

The plaintiff, a mechanical engineer with 12 years of service, was laid off by the defendant.

He sued for constructive dismissal, seeking 8 weeks' salary in lieu of notice as per his employment contract, which referenced the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The defendant argued that the lay-off was temporary under the ESA and did not trigger termination pay, and that the plaintiff failed to resign within a reasonable period after the constructive dismissal as required by the ESA.

The court found that the employment contract, containing an "entire agreement" clause, displaced the ESA's provisions regarding temporary lay-offs and resignation requirements for constructive dismissal, except for the expressly incorporated notice period.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for 8 weeks' salary in lieu of notice.

The defendant, Sun Life, moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and that the proper forum was arbitration under the collective agreement.

The court reviewed the collective agreement, administrative services contract, and benefit booklet, noting contradictory language.

Applying the "essential character" test from Weber v. Hydro, the court found that the dispute, concerning entitlement to LTD benefits, arose from the interpretation, application, or administration of the collective agreement, even though the benefit plan was not explicitly incorporated.

The court concluded that the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator and dismissed the action.

This medical malpractice action concerned whether Dr. Henry Fairley breached the standard of care by performing a hysterectomy on Francine Breton in 2010, five years after a previous subtotal hysterectomy by another doctor.

The plaintiff alleged the surgery was unnecessary and resulted in a bladder injury.

The court found that Dr. Fairley had a reasonable clinical basis to proceed with the surgery, based on the plaintiff's persistent symptoms, imaging reports suggesting residual uterine tissue, and the previous pathology report confirming adenomyosis.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, concluding that Dr. Fairley met the standard of care.

A dispute arose between brothers over long-term use of a family recreational property after the owner indicated an intention to sell despite earlier assurances that the property would be left to the claimant in a will.

The claimant had occupied the property for decades and made improvements, relying on those assurances.

The court found the elements of proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment established because the claimant acted to his detriment in reliance on the owner’s representations.

However, the court concluded that a proprietary remedy was unnecessary because the improvements were largely removable.

The appropriate remedy was monetary compensation and reimbursement for certain expenditures, with removal costs of the claimant’s structures to be paid by the owner.