Elizabeth Bennett-Martin

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a summary judgment motion.

The appellant, an insurer, sought to dismiss a long-term disability claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found the claim was not discovered until the insurer unequivocally denied it.

The Court of Appeal reversed this, holding that a clear and unequivocal denial is not required to trigger the limitation period.

The court found the claim was statute-barred as the plaintiff ought to have known of the loss and the appropriateness of litigation much earlier, specifically when benefits were due, or when the insurer closed the file, or when lawyers received notice of the closure.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for long-term disability benefits, arguing it was statute-barred and that the plaintiff failed to submit a timely notice of claim.

The court found that the limitation period did not begin to run until the insurer issued a clear and unequivocal denial letter, making the action timely.

The court also granted the plaintiff relief from forfeiture for the late notice of claim, finding the breach caused minimal prejudice to the insurer compared to the significant harm the plaintiff would suffer if denied coverage.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Voula Kardaras, sought long-term disability benefits from Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada due to major depressive disorder.

Sun Life discontinued benefits after Kardaras began a gradual return to work, asserting she was capable of full-time employment.

The court found Kardaras was entitled to "own occupation" benefits for approximately one year after discontinuation, as she was incapable of performing the essential duties of her occupation more than three days per week.

However, she was not entitled to "any occupation" benefits as her part-time work was reasonably commensurate in status and reward.

The court also awarded Kardaras $10,000 in mental distress damages due to Sun Life's breach of the duty of good faith in its handling of her claim.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the commencement of a limitation period for a long-term disability benefits claim.

The respondent claimant's benefits were terminated on November 1, 2007, at which point he had a fully ripened cause of action.

The respondent retained litigation counsel in early January 2008 but did not commence proceedings within the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the limitation period commenced on November 1, 2007, when the claim became fully ripened, and that the motion judge erred in applying an evaluative gloss to the word "appropriate" in the limitation statute.

The appeal was allowed, the action was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant, a unionized employee of Lakehead District School Board, sought long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, which administered the benefits under contract with the school board, denied her claim.

The appellant commenced an action against Sun Life seeking a declaration of total disability and an order for payment of benefits.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the dispute arose from the interpretation and administration of the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the dispute was arbitrable under the collective agreement and that Sun Life, as a mere agent of the school board, lacked standing to be sued directly.

The appellant's remedy lay in arbitration against the school board.

Kevin Pepper sued The Standard Life Assurance Company of Canada ("Standard Life") for long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

Standard Life brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Pepper brought a cross-motion for a declaration that his action was not statute-barred.

The court dismissed Standard Life's motion and granted Pepper's cross-motion, finding that the limitation period for Pepper's claim was delayed.

The delay was attributed to the complex history of benefits denials, appeals, and Standard Life's continued invitations for further information, which led Pepper to reasonably believe that litigation was not yet an "appropriate" means to seek a remedy.

The plaintiff, Gemcorp International Limited, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal order for delay, pursuant to Rule 48.14.

The defendant, Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, opposed the motion.

The court applied the four-part test from Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., contextualized by Scani v. Prochnicki, requiring an explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing deadlines, promptness in bringing the motion, and no prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the plaintiff failed to provide a credible explanation for the litigation delay, failed to establish inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant, particularly concerning faded memories and the need for broader medical evidence.

Consequently, the motion to set aside the dismissal order was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion for default judgment and injunctive relief enforcing a restrictive covenant preventing a former employee from working for a competing medical spa or weight loss centre within a specified geographic radius for two years.

The court held that the non‑competition clause was unreasonable due to its excessive temporal restriction and ambiguity in its geographic scope.

The plaintiff also failed to establish irreparable harm and provided only speculative evidence of client or employee solicitation.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendant because enforcing the covenant would effectively prevent the defendant from working in her field.

The motion for injunctive relief was denied.