Brian A. Pickard

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action against the driver and owner, which was administratively dismissed for delay.

The plaintiff later commenced a second action against the lessee of the vehicle.

The lessee moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the administrative dismissal of the first action.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding the lessee's identity was not reasonably discoverable until the plaintiff received correspondence from the insurer.

However, the court also dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the administrative dismissal, finding an inordinate and unexplained delay that prejudiced the defendants.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle for a dismissal without costs.

The court found it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to refuse the tactical offer, as their discoverability arguments were reasonably arguable.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs fixed at $12,500.

The plaintiffs were injured in a dog attack in a condominium in 2012.

They sued the dog owner, condominium corporation, and property manager in 2013.

In 2019, they commenced a new action against the security company that provided concierge services.

The security company brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known they had an occupier's liability claim against the security company in 2012, or at the latest by 2016, well before the two-year limitation period expired.

The action against the security company was dismissed.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the defendant in Michigan.

The plaintiff commenced an action in Ontario against the Michigan defendant in tort and his own insurer for underinsured coverage.

The Michigan defendant moved to stay the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The court applied the real and substantial connection test and found no presumptive connecting factors linking the tort claim to Ontario.

The court also declined to apply the forum of necessity doctrine, holding that the plaintiff's failure to commence an action in Michigan before the expiry of its limitation period did not create an exceptional circumstance justifying jurisdiction.

The action against the Michigan defendant was stayed.

This is a costs endorsement for three inter-related appeals (C66633, C64430, and C64479).

The parties resolved costs for appeal C64479.

For appeals C64430 and C66633, the Court found that success was mixed, and therefore, there would be no order as to costs for those appeals.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of their action for damages arising from a residential oil spill.

The action was dismissed by the registrar in 2019 for not being set down for trial within five years.

The defendants conceded that the delay was explained and the deadline was missed by inadvertence, leaving prejudice as the only issue.

The court found that the defendants had early notice of the claim, evidence was preserved, and any prejudice from reviving the action was minimal.

The motion was granted and the dismissal was set aside.

This is an appeal from a jury trial in a personal injury case arising from a single-vehicle crash.

The plaintiffs (Tuffnail family) were injured, and liability was apportioned among the driver (Meekes), the host (Bolton), the bartender (Coulthard), and the plaintiff (Tuffnail).

Multiple parties appealed the post-verdict rulings.

The Court of Appeal found that Coulthard was "jointly liable" with Meekes for the purposes of OPCF 44R, allowing State Farm to deduct Coulthard's insurance limits, thereby reducing State Farm's payout to the Tuffnails.

The court clarified that State Farm must share subrogation recoveries with the Tuffnails on a pro rata basis until the Tuffnails receive full indemnification under the judgment, correcting the trial judge's order that limited it to the OPCF 44R endorsement.

The court upheld the trial judge's decision on Coulthard's several liability to Bolton, rejecting the argument for reapportionment of fault without Meekes.

The court found the trial judge erred in awarding prejudgment interest higher than the bank rate, reducing it to 1.3% as market rates did not justify a higher rate and the "expectation" factor was inappropriate.

Finally, the court upheld the denial of Coulthard's request to amend pleadings to add a limitation defence post-verdict due to non-compensable prejudice.

The appellant sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing her motion to set aside the administrative dismissal of her appeal.

The appeal had been administratively dismissed twice due to the appellant's repeated failure to meet perfection deadlines, despite extensions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's motion, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretion, noting the extensive delay, the unconvincing justification for non-perfection, and the lack of proof for the appellant's claims of material tampering or respondent non-cooperation.

The plaintiff, who suffered a perforated duodenum during an ERCP procedure, brought a motion to substitute the names of six specific physicians for the pseudonym 'Dr. Doe' in her statement of claim.

The court allowed the motion for five of the physicians, finding that the original pleading sufficiently pointed the 'litigation finger' at them based on the specific roles and acts of negligence described.

The motion was denied for the emergency room physician, as the original claim lacked specific allegations directing the litigation finger at him.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against several physicians and a hospital following the plaintiff's development of compartment syndrome after hand surgery.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to substitute the name of one anesthesiologist for another, claiming misnomer.

The proposed defendant anesthesiologist brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the separate action against him as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding the plaintiffs made a strategic decision rather than a true naming error.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts to discover her claim against the anesthesiologist more than two years before commencing the action.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their summary judgment motions seeking to bar the respondent's claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the respondent did not discover her claim until September 28, 2011, when the Canada Revenue Agency confirmed that her Independent Pension Plan did not comply with the Income Tax Regulations.

The respondent had established the IPP on the appellants' advice and transferred her commuted pension value to it.

The appellants argued the claim was discoverable by August 2009 when financial advisors and accountants opined the IPP would likely be revoked.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the respondent's claim was essentially a tax case hinged on the CRA's determination, and it was legally appropriate to wait for the CRA's confirmation before commencing proceedings.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing his solicitor negligence action for delay.

The action was commenced in August 2009 and related to the dismissal of a motor vehicle accident action arising from two accidents that occurred in 2001.

The motion judge found inordinate and inexcusable delay, including that the appellant took more than five years to answer undertakings.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, concluding that actual prejudice resulted from the delay, making a trial within a trial impossible.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from two summary judgment motions.

The Plaintiff successfully defended Halton's motion to dismiss claims against it, and also successfully defended against Mervyn White and Carters PC's motion to dismiss claims against them, though White and Carters PC obtained a declaration regarding the limitation period.

The court found the Plaintiff entirely successful in defending both motions and entitled to costs.

It also found it reasonable to join the defendants and applied the Moore v. Wienecke framework for a Bullock order, requiring Halton to pay a majority of White and Carters PC's costs due to Halton's motion effectively shifting responsibility and prompting White and Carters PC's companion motion.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the granting of State Farm's motion for summary judgment, which dismissed the action.

State Farm sought $16,830.23 in costs, while the plaintiffs proposed $10,000.00.

The court considered the factors outlined in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the result, counsel's experience, expected costs, amount claimed, complexity, importance of issues, and party conduct.

The court noted concerns with State Farm's Bill of Costs, specifically the involvement of multiple lawyers and potential duplication of work, but also considered the plaintiffs' rejection of a $1,000 settlement offer.

Ultimately, the court fixed costs at $15,000.00, payable by the plaintiffs to State Farm.

The defendants, The Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Halton and the plaintiff's former lawyers (Mervyn F. White and Carters Professional Corporation), brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for long-term disability (LTD) benefits.

Halton argued the LTD application was late, the plaintiff's employment was terminated, and the claim was statute-barred.

The former lawyers sought dismissal if the claims against Halton were time-barred.

The court granted the plaintiff relief from forfeiture for the late LTD application, finding Halton's misleading information and failure to assist contributed to the delay.

It also determined that the termination of employment did not preclude the claim and that the two-year statutory limitation period applied, which had not expired.

Both defendants' motions for summary judgment were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her action on the basis of a limitation period and denying relief from forfeiture regarding her late filing of a long-term disability (LTD) claim with the insurer.

Although the respondent conceded that the application judge erred in finding the action was barred by a limitation period, the Court of Appeal found that the relief from forfeiture analysis stood independently and was not tainted by this error.

The Court upheld the application judge's discretionary decision to deny relief from forfeiture.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's claim for negligent financial advice and misrepresentation was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

They contended the plaintiff discovered her claim by August 2009 when she had concerns about her Individual Pension Plan (IPP) and sought legal advice.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period did not begin until September 28, 2011, when the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) officially deregistered her IPP, as she could not have known of her loss or that a legal proceeding was appropriate before this final determination, especially given the defendants' prior reassurances.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding the claim was timely.

The defendant solicitor brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's solicitor negligence action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The underlying action related to a motor vehicle accident claim that was previously dismissed.

The court found the plaintiff's delay of nearly nine years to be inordinate and inexcusable, noting significant periods of inactivity and failure to answer undertakings.

The court also found actual prejudice to the defendant due to the loss of critical evidence, including the destruction of the underlying defence file, the death of a key medical expert, and the inability to locate the plaintiff's purported employer.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued numerous lawyers, insurers, medical assessors, experts, and court reporting parties arising from the handling of underlying motor vehicle accident tort and accident benefits litigation.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and held that the claims were either statute-barred, defeated by the absence of any duty of care, barred by expert witness immunity, unsupported by admissible evidence, or lacking any proof of compensable damage.

Claims against former counsel failed for limitation and lack of expert support and causation; claims against opposing counsel and insurers failed because no duty was owed to an adverse party; claims against expert assessors failed because their litigation-related reports were immune from suit.

Allegations that discovery transcripts had been doctored were unsupported and did not disclose any triable issue.

Summary judgment was granted to all defendants and the action was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the commencement of a limitation period for a long-term disability benefits claim.

The respondent claimant's benefits were terminated on November 1, 2007, at which point he had a fully ripened cause of action.

The respondent retained litigation counsel in early January 2008 but did not commence proceedings within the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the limitation period commenced on November 1, 2007, when the claim became fully ripened, and that the motion judge erred in applying an evaluative gloss to the word "appropriate" in the limitation statute.

The appeal was allowed, the action was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the appellant.