Robert Kenny

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder in 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in her parole ineligibility period.

The court had previously determined there was a reasonable prospect the application would proceed and empanelled a jury.

After hearing evidence over twelve days, the jury reduced the applicant's parole eligibility date from May 16, 2032 to May 16, 2029, granting a three-year reduction in parole ineligibility.

The 17-year-old offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder and aggravated assault following a series of gang-related shootings.

The Crown applied to have the young person sentenced as an adult.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, noting the youth's cognitive limitations, mental health issues, substance abuse, and vulnerability to older criminal peers.

The court also found that a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold the offender accountable.

The young person was sentenced to the maximum youth sentence of seven years for second degree murder, comprising four years in secure custody and three years of community supervision.

A youth, L.L., charged with second-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the Crown did not meet its onus, emphasizing the strong presumption of release for youth and the requirement of exceptional circumstances for tertiary ground detention.

The proposed plan of release with residential and community sureties was deemed adequate, and L.L. was released on house arrest with conditions.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death and nearly decapitating her.

The court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The court rejected the accused's claims of profound depression and PTSD, finding him manipulative and lacking remorse.

Considering the brutal nature of the domestic homicide, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court set parole ineligibility at 15 years.

In a murder trial, the accused sought a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address allegedly contained argument, rhetorical flourishes, and repetitive descriptions of the deceased’s injuries that were said to be inflammatory and prejudicial.

The court acknowledged that portions of the Crown’s opening exceeded the proper limits of a neutral overview and included some inappropriate commentary.

However, applying established principles governing mistrials, the court held that the improprieties were not so prejudicial that a jury would be incapable of disregarding them.

The court emphasized that mistrials are remedies of last resort and that juries are presumed to follow judicial instructions.

A corrective instruction to the jury was therefore sufficient to cure any potential prejudice.

The accused, charged with second degree murder of his wife, sought to exclude statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The accused argued that the police failed to provide a Dari interpreter promptly, delaying his ability to consult counsel.

The court found the statements voluntary despite a recording failure, as the officers' notes and an interpreter's statement provided a sufficient record.

The court also dismissed the Charter applications, finding the accused understood the reason for his arrest and his right to counsel in Hindi, and that the delay in securing a Dari interpreter was reasonable in the circumstances.

The statements were ruled admissible.

In a murder trial where the accused admitted to cutting his wife's throat, the Crown sought to adduce a graphic autopsy photograph of the wound to assist the jury in determining the accused's intent.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the photograph was highly prejudicial and had minimal probative value.

The court found that the photograph had considerable probative value in illustrating the force required to inflict the injury, which was central to the issue of intent.

The court concluded that the probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect and ruled the photograph admissible.