Anthony La Bar

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in the treatment of pre-sentence custody.

The Crown conceded the appeal based on a companion case.

The Court of Appeal accepted the concession and varied the sentence from 46 months to 36 months imprisonment by increasing the pre-sentence custody credit from 20 months to 30 months.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that a 26‑month delay from arrest to trial on a charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The delay included institutional delay in both the Ontario Court of Justice and the Superior Court of Justice, including a nine‑month adjournment due to the unavailability of a judge.

Applying the guidelines from R. v. Morin, the court found that although the delay warranted scrutiny and some prejudice could be inferred, the accused’s evidence of actual prejudice was limited and not significant.

The court also considered that the accused’s election for a jury trial and Charter applications increased scheduling complexity and contributed to the length of the delay.

Balancing the modest prejudice against the strong public interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges on their merits, the court declined to grant a stay.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death and nearly decapitating her.

The court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The court rejected the accused's claims of profound depression and PTSD, finding him manipulative and lacking remorse.

Considering the brutal nature of the domestic homicide, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court set parole ineligibility at 15 years.

The offender pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud over $5,000 arising from a scheme in which he falsely held himself out as a sophisticated investment professional and induced vulnerable investors to entrust him with funds.

The frauds targeted elderly and financially unsophisticated victims and resulted in losses exceeding $1.1 million.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as the dominant sentencing objectives in large-scale commercial fraud, noting the offender’s manipulative conduct, breach of trust, and devastating impact on victims.

Although the offender had no prior criminal record and entered a guilty plea, the court found a penitentiary sentence necessary.

The court also ordered restitution in the full amount of the victims’ losses despite limited prospects of repayment, emphasizing the seriousness of the breach of trust and the victims’ interests.

During a murder trial, the court was required to determine the admissibility of a statement made by the accused to police after earlier statements had been excluded due to a breach of s. 10(a) of the Charter.

The defence argued the later statement was tainted by the earlier constitutional breach and was not voluntary.

Applying the analytical framework for tainted statements and the common law confessions rule, the court held that the earlier breach had been cured by intervening events, including the accused’s arrest for murder and multiple opportunities to consult counsel.

The court further found the police interview tactics did not constitute inducements or oppression and did not overbear the accused’s will.

The statement was proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and was admissible.

The accused, charged with second degree murder of his wife, sought to exclude statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The accused argued that the police failed to provide a Dari interpreter promptly, delaying his ability to consult counsel.

The court found the statements voluntary despite a recording failure, as the officers' notes and an interpreter's statement provided a sufficient record.

The court also dismissed the Charter applications, finding the accused understood the reason for his arrest and his right to counsel in Hindi, and that the delay in securing a Dari interpreter was reasonable in the circumstances.

The statements were ruled admissible.

In a murder trial where the accused admitted to cutting his wife's throat, the Crown sought to adduce a graphic autopsy photograph of the wound to assist the jury in determining the accused's intent.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the photograph was highly prejudicial and had minimal probative value.

The court found that the photograph had considerable probative value in illustrating the force required to inflict the injury, which was central to the issue of intent.

The court concluded that the probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect and ruled the photograph admissible.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit videotaped out‑of‑court statements made by a witness to undercover officers in a “Mr. Big” operation as substantive evidence under the principled hearsay exception.

The witness recanted or professed lack of memory during cross‑examination under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that although necessity was established, the Crown failed to demonstrate threshold reliability on a balance of probabilities.

The witness’s repeated claims of memory loss prevented meaningful cross‑examination and undermined the jury’s ability to assess reliability.

Additionally, the inducements and incentives inherent in the “Mr. Big” scenario raised serious concerns about the trustworthiness of the statements.

The videotaped statements were therefore ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence.

In a voir dire during a murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude three police statements on the basis of Charter violations.

Police had told the accused he was being questioned in relation to a missing persons investigation when they in fact believed the investigation concerned homicides.

The court found this mischaracterization violated s. 10(a) of the Charter by failing to properly inform the accused of the reason for his detention.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the breach was serious, significantly affected the accused’s Charter-protected interests, and that exclusion would not undermine adjudication on the merits.

Statements given during the July 2008 interviews were excluded, while a later statement given after arrest for murder was ruled admissible.