Louise Tansey-Miller

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of assault causing bodily harm against a seven-year-old adopted daughter contrary to Section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 45 to 60 days imprisonment plus 12 months probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 15 months probation, finding that while a discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the serious nature of the assault and the victim's age, imprisonment was not necessary given the accused's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, and positive community standing.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in law regarding the statutory requirement under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code that a roadside breath demand be made “forthwith” after the officer forms reasonable suspicion of alcohol in the body.

Crown counsel at trial conceded that the roadside demand had not been made forthwith.

The trial judge nevertheless admitted subsequent breathalyzer results after conducting a Charter s. 24(2) analysis and convicted the accused.

The appeal court held that once the Crown conceded the statutory precondition was not met, the roadside screening results and the subsequent breathalyzer results were inadmissible.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

The Crown brought an application to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of the video recording, an unrecorded cell block visit, and a failure to comply with a remand warrant.

The accused also argued that a previous ruling in a separate proceeding excluding the same statement should bar its admission based on issue estoppel.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply to voluntariness rulings.

The court further found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, as the missing recording and technical warrant violation did not overbear the accused's will.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The statement had previously been ruled inadmissible in a separate proceeding before a different judge.

The court held that issue estoppel did not apply to voluntariness rulings and permitted the voir dire.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of video recording, an unrecorded interaction in the holding cells, and a failure to transport him directly to the remand centre after bail court.

The court found the police explanations reasonable, no evidence of improper conduct, and concluded the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to one complainant from a multi-count indictment involving seven complainants alleging sexual offences and attempted murder arising from nondisclosure of HIV-positive status.

The accused argued he intended to testify regarding the severed complainant’s allegations, which included disputed non-consensual conduct, but not regarding the other complainants whose sexual encounters were admitted to be consensual at the time.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting a strong factual nexus among the counts and a viable similar fact evidence application based on an alleged pattern of behaviour and extensive chat log evidence demonstrating intent.

The court held that the accused established an objectively justifiable basis for testifying on the severed counts but not the others, and that forcing a joint trial would prejudice the accused’s right to choose whether to testify.

Severance of the counts relating to the particular complainant was therefore granted in the interests of justice.

The accused was charged with breaking and entering into a residential unit and committing assault therein.

The Crown sought a conviction for mischief as an included offence after the accused was acquitted of the primary charges.

The court examined whether mischief constitutes an included offence within a break and enter charge under section 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the strict test from R. v. G.R., finding that mischief is not necessarily committed every time a break and enter occurs, and therefore cannot qualify as an included offence.

The accused was acquitted of mischief.

A youth was charged with robbery while using a firearm following a bank robbery on December 29, 2010.

The Crown's case rested primarily on fingerprint evidence found on the interior exit door of the bank and eyewitness testimony.

The accused was not the actual robber but the second youth who entered and exited the bank with the robber.

The court found serious deficiencies in the expert fingerprint evidence, including failure to provide a proper expert report, disclosure violations, documentary errors, and use of prints from a different arrest date without disclosure.

The court also found insufficient evidence of the use of a firearm and no evidence of the accused's knowledge or participation in the robbery beyond mere presence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The young person was charged with armed robbery of a bank based on video surveillance and a palm print found on the exit door.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a fingerprint expert testifying for the first time, whose evidence was marred by late disclosure, documentary errors, and reliance on unfiled known prints.

The court rejected the expert's opinion as unreliable and denied the Crown's late application to call a verification officer.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that the young person, who merely entered and left the bank with the actual robber, had the requisite knowledge or intent to be a party to the offence, nor was there reliable evidence a firearm was used.

The young person was acquitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal harassment and breach of probation.

At sentencing, the Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from Detective Sergeant Kelly Grubb regarding a threat assessment report.

The defence objected to admissibility.

The court conducted a voir dire and ultimately dismissed the Crown's application to admit the expert evidence, finding that it failed to meet the necessity requirement under the Mohan test and that the reliability of the threat assessment based on the SARA was insufficient to justify admission.