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Criminal Code provisions granting complainants participation rights in admissibility hearings are constitutional.
The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of sections 278.93 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code, arguing they violate sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter by infringing his right to a fair trial, particularly concerning the admissibility of a complainant's prior sexual activity.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the amendments, which grant complainants rights to notice and participation in admissibility hearings, do not diminish the Crown's role or infringe the accused's fair trial rights, and are consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Principal offender sentenced to 7 years and aiders to 4 years for kidnapping and sexual assault.
The three offenders were convicted of kidnapping, unlawful confinement, break and enter, and sexual assault after breaking into the victim's apartment, confining her, and sexually assaulting her with hair removal cream.
The principal offender, who orchestrated the attack out of revenge and distributed intimate images of the victim online, was sentenced to 7 years in prison.
The two co-offenders, who acted as aiders and did not participate in distributing the images, were each sentenced to 4 years in prison.
All offenders received credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.
The court upheld a child pornography conviction, finding no error in the evidentiary rulings.
The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography.
The Crown's case relied on evidence obtained when police reviewed a mirror copy of the appellant's work computer hard drive without a warrant.
The trial judge found a Charter breach under s. 8 but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).
The appellant also challenged the trial judge's conclusion that possession had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis or his conclusion regarding possession based on the totality of the evidence.
The court dismissed the Crown's certiorari applications, upholding orders that require the disclosure of DRE rolling logs as relevant third-party records.
The Crown and Ottawa Police Service brought certiorari applications to quash disclosure orders made by three application judges.
These orders required the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs and face sheets to the respondents, who were charged with drug-impaired driving.
The Crown argued that disclosure was prohibited by s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code or, alternatively, that the records were third-party records and not relevant.
The court dismissed the certiorari applications, finding that the application judges did not exceed their jurisdiction, s. 258.1 of the Code did not bar disclosure, and the rolling logs and face sheets were relevant third-party records.
The court also declined to order a new hearing for one respondent despite an error in denying standing to the Ottawa Police Service, citing judicial efficiency and the respondents' s. 11(b) rights.
Forensic evidence and folder deletion proved knowing possession of child pornography.
The accused was tried on a charge of possession of child pornography found on a work computer assigned to him.
The only live issue was possession, as the nature of the images and other foundational facts were admitted.
Relying on forensic evidence about exclusive user access, creation of the folder structure, transfer and organization of the files, and the accused's targeted deletion of the relevant folder immediately after learning of a workplace sexualized-incident investigation, the court inferred knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court held that actual viewing of the images was not necessary to prove knowledge where circumstantial evidence established knowing possession.
Conviction for indecent act quashed due to trial judge's failure to properly assess accused's testimony.
The appellant appealed his conviction for committing an indecent act in a public place.
The appellant had masturbated in his workplace after hours, believing he was alone.
The trial judge convicted him on the basis of wilful blindness, finding he had a positive obligation to verify no one was present.
The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the W.D. framework to assess the appellant's testimony, which negated a finding of wilful blindness.
The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.
Summary conviction appeal dismissed; impaired driving and refusal convictions upheld.
The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample following a trial in which he was acquitted of leaving the scene of an accident.
He argued that the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) credibility test, provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and demonstrated bias.
The court held that the trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant’s testimony as unreliable and that ample evidence supported findings of impairment and refusal.
Minor misapprehensions of evidence were found to be immaterial and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
The appellate court concluded that the verdicts were reasonable and supported by the evidence.
Appeal from contempt conviction and sentence for refusing to testify dismissed; duress defence rejected.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for contempt of court, which arose from his refusal to testify at a first-degree murder trial.
He argued that the trial judge erred in the procedure followed and in rejecting his defence of duress.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the procedure was fair, the duress defence lacked merit because the appellant failed to pursue a safe avenue of escape by going to the police, and the sentence was fit given the impact of his refusal on the murder trial.
Appeal from criminal harassment conviction dismissed as trial judge made no errors in assessing evidence.
The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, which arose from his repeated calls, texts, and visits to the complainant's workplace after she assisted him with his cell phone.
The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding the elements of the offence proven and in assessing the complainant's credibility.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the trial judge's factual findings and that his credibility assessment was entitled to deference.