Tanya M. Kranjc

The appellants, Joshua and Jordan Powell, appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm and mischief (Jordan only) stemming from a group altercation.

They raised five grounds of appeal, including unreasonable verdicts, misunderstanding of mens rea, deficient reasons, improper rejection of exculpatory police statements, and erroneous rejection of a witness's testimony based on unraised bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's verdicts were reasonable, the mens rea for assault causing bodily harm was correctly applied, the reasons were sufficient, and the handling of exculpatory statements and witness credibility did not infringe the appellants' rights or legal principles.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his wife and daughter.

At trial, the Crown introduced extensive evidence of the appellant's uncharged prior discreditable conduct, primarily occurring in China before the family immigrated to Canada.

The trial judge admitted the evidence to show animus and explain the lack of earlier reporting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly assess and balance the reasoning prejudice of this evidence against its probative value.

The volume and highly discreditable nature of the uncharged conduct created a real risk that the jury convicted the appellant for his prior bad acts rather than the charged offences.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for arson in 2007, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a mental health facility.

He argued the Board erred by failing to consider all relevant factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code and that a conditional discharge was the least onerous disposition necessary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that the appellant's risk of violent confrontations and inability to manage the stresses of community living required the supervision of a detention order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and impaired driving causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision where he struck a parked crash truck.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility based on his failure to mention an obstructing van during a 9-1-1 call and the development of his testimony, and that the finding of impairment was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 9-1-1 call was properly used as a prior inconsistent statement and that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to find impairment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and assault against his stepson, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his explanation for a Facebook apology, reversed the burden of proof, and failed to resolve inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's explanation for the apology.

The Court also held that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and was not required to resolve all peripheral inconsistencies in the evidence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of physical and sexual abuse against his spouse and two children.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury against cross-count reasoning and by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the extensive highly prejudicial bad character evidence presented at trial required specific instructions to prevent the jury from engaging in prohibited propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, incest, and sexual interference against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred by improperly relying on principles of delayed disclosure to excuse inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for his credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law, grappled with the inconsistencies, and provided reasons sufficient for appellate review.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial due to inadequate reasons.

The appellant, Aghayere Justin Omoragbon, sought leave to appeal a global sentence of seven years (net four years after pre-sentence custody credit) for 11 offences, including firearms and drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no demonstrable unfitness or error in principle in the trial judge's sentencing.

The court upheld the trial judge's diminished weight given to youth as a mitigating factor due to the appellant's lengthy record and escalating seriousness of offences, affirmed the application of the totality principle, and rejected the claim for enhanced credit for lockdown days without evidence of adverse effect.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Dhanbir Shergill, on a charge of careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act, following a fatal collision involving a TTC bus he was driving.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge, relying on an inapplicable legal principle and misapprehending critical evidence regarding pedestrian right-of-way and the bus's movement.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in relying on the Globocki principle and in failing to consider key evidence from witnesses and accident reconstruction.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the appellate court deemed it inappropriate to enter a conviction without a proper assessment of evidence by a trier of fact.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge and three years' probation imposed on the respondent following guilty pleas to domestic assault and breach of recognizance.

The respondent had served 276 days in pre-trial custody.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in granting the discharge and in refusing to make a DNA order.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the unique circumstances, including the minor nature of the assaults and the respondent's lack of a prior record.

The appellant, Mr. Liu, appealed his conviction for impaired driving by alcohol.

He argued that the trial judge erred in rejecting his defence of non-insane automatism and in finding that his impairment was due to alcohol rather than drugs.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that non-insane automatism is not a defence to impaired driving where drugs or alcohol are voluntarily consumed, regardless of the intent to drive.

The court also found that the trial judge correctly rejected the expert's opinion regarding drug-induced impairment due to a lack of factual basis for the amount of alcohol consumed by the appellant.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for multiple counts of assault and theft arising from an intimate relationship.

At trial, the judge engaged in a vetting procedure that excluded approximately 45 photographs the defence intended to use during cross-examination of the complainant to challenge her credibility and narrative of the relationship.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the vetting process was flawed, applied the wrong legal test for excluding defence evidence, and improperly curtailed the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

Because the case turned almost entirely on the complainant's credibility, the error was deemed serious and the curative proviso was not applied.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant, Akeem Bailey, sought to quash his committal for trial on five counts of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application for certiorari argued that the preliminary inquiry judge erred in finding sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, particularly concerning the applicant's role as a getaway driver and the probative value of post-offence conduct.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's assessment of circumstantial evidence, including the applicant's vehicle positioning for a quick getaway and his awareness of the shooting.

The court concluded that there was evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict the applicant of attempted murder, and therefore, the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error.

The application was dismissed.

A 17-year-old young person pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a loaded handgun discharged while being handled in the presence of friends, fatally striking a 15-year-old victim.

The Crown declined to seek an adult sentence.

The court imposed an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order totaling 1015 days, comprising 407 days of open custody followed by 608 days of conditional supervision in the community.

The sentencing decision addresses the proper application of youth sentencing principles under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, including the balance between accountability and rehabilitation, the appropriate use of open versus secure custody, and the consideration of the young person's significant mental health needs and rehabilitative prospects.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following a violent altercation in which he struck the victim multiple times with a homemade axe, causing compound fractures to both arms and multiple lacerations.

The sentencing judge imposed a custodial sentence of 33 months after considering the severity of injuries, the nature of the attack, the accused's criminal history including prior alcohol-related offences, and mitigating factors including family support and work history.

The court rejected the Crown's submission for 4 years and the defence submission for 18 months to 2 years less a day, finding that a penitentiary-length sentence was necessary to adequately denounce the offender's moral blameworthiness and address principles of deterrence.

During a s. 8 Charter voir dire in a firearms prosecution, the Crown sought to qualify a forensic document chemist as an expert in ink dating using the solvent loss ratio method to analyze a police officer’s note allegedly documenting information from a confidential informant.

The defence opposed the admission of the proposed expert evidence.

Applying the framework for novel scientific evidence, the court considered whether the technique had been tested, peer reviewed, subject to standards or known error rates, and generally accepted.

The court found the methodology lacked peer review, established standards, demonstrated testing, and general acceptance in the relevant forensic community.

The proposed evidence was therefore inadmissible and, in any event, had little probative value because the analysis could not determine the age of the ink.

During a criminal prosecution involving firearms offences, the accused brought a voir dire application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The court had previously found a breach of s. 8 because the search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura but police searched a green Honda Accord.

The Information to Obtain contained misleading information, relied on an untested confidential informant whose information was not corroborated, and resulted in a warrant that could not have properly issued.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court found the police conduct fell on the serious end of the spectrum despite the reliability of the evidence.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court concluded that admission of the firearms evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from searches conducted pursuant to warrants for a residence and vehicle during a firearms investigation.

The reviewing court excised misleading portions of the Information to Obtain after finding that certain statements about a vehicle and police observations were inaccurate or reckless.

Applying the principles governing warrant review and the Debot criteria for confidential informant information, the court found that although the tip was detailed and compelling, the source was untested and the alleged criminal activity was not sufficiently corroborated by police investigation.

After excision, the remaining record did not provide reasonable and probable grounds for the issuance of the search warrant.

The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s s. 8 Charter rights were infringed.

During a criminal trial arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the defence challenged the admissibility of expert accident reconstruction evidence tendered by the Crown.

The proposed expert, a police collision reconstruction officer, was questioned on both his qualifications and whether his speed‑calculation methodology constituted novel scientific evidence.

Applying the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan, the court held the witness possessed sufficient specialized knowledge through training and extensive investigative experience.

The court further held that the use of an “in‑line momentum” formula for speed calculation was an accepted technique within accident reconstruction and not novel science requiring special scrutiny.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted, with any methodological concerns affecting weight rather than admissibility.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging his section 8 rights were violated by a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura, but the police searched a dark green Honda Accord bearing the same license plate.

The court found that the make and model of the vehicle were relevant identifiers, especially since license plates are easily transferable.

The court concluded that the failure to search the vehicle specified in the warrant was a substantive defect, rendering the search warrantless.