Tanya M. Kranjc

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from the execution of a search warrant that authorized the search of a black Acura but resulted in the search of a Honda bearing the same licence plate.

The accused sought leave to cross‑examine the affiant on several issues relating to the confidential informant and the basis for the warrant.

Applying the principles from R. v. Garofoli, the court held that cross‑examination should be permitted only where necessary to enable full answer and defence and where a basis exists to believe it may discredit a precondition for the authorization.

Leave was granted only on the issue of reasonable and probable grounds relating to the discrepancy between the vehicle described in the warrant and the vehicle searched.

Cross‑examination on the informant’s past performance, the identity linkage between the accused and a nickname, and alleged drug trafficking information was refused due to lack of necessity and risk to informant privilege.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings—that the appellant undertook to protect the complainant and that her dependence on him for necessities made her particularly vulnerable to his influence—were supported by the evidence and warranted a conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to conclude the appellant's statement was an admission of guilt and to accept the complainant's evidence on the issue of lack of consent despite inconsistencies.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The court found no error in principle in the sentence, granting leave to appeal but dismissing the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his two-year sentence.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, circumstantial evidence, the theory of the defence, and motive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate, noting that trial counsel had approved the charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the two-year sentence for robbery with a weapon on a vulnerable victim was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a domestic assault that resulted in the victim suffering a broken jaw.

At trial, the victim's out-of-court statements to an emergency room doctor and a police officer were admitted for the truth of their contents, despite her stated inability to recall the events at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statements, finding they met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown brought ex parte applications under s. 487.055(1) of the Criminal Code for DNA databank orders against two repeat sexual offenders on parole.

The issuing judge granted the orders ex parte.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provision and the ex parte procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the provision but found that the issuing judge lost jurisdiction by proceeding ex parte without any evidence justifying the need to do so.

The appeals were allowed and the authorizations quashed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for theft under $5,000 and assault with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to reopen proceedings to hear fresh evidence, that the identification evidence for the assault charge was unreasonable, and that the trial judge erred on the issue of mens rea for the theft charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence lacked proof of truth of contents, the identification evidence was sufficient, and there was no evidence of colour of right for the theft.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice, seeking a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal considered the fresh evidence but found it unpersuasive for imposing a conditional sentence.

Finding no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed her sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed her conviction and sentence for social assistance fraud.

She argued that the trial judge's excessive intervention during her testimony prevented her from presenting her case, amounted to cross-examination creating an apprehension of bias, and that he failed to provide adequate assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice or apprehension of bias, and noting the trial judge went to great lengths to assist her.

The sentence appeal, challenging a restitution order of $25,281 at a minimum of $100 per month, was also dismissed as the appellant had full-time employment, home equity, and the quantum of loss was supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the summary conviction appeal judge's reference to unadmitted fresh DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed the judge erred in considering the fresh evidence, but proceeded to assess the merits without it.

The Court found the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the intoxicated complainant's evidence and correctly relied on DNA evidence as corroboration.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence in accordance with the W.(D.) framework was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately warn the jury against propensity reasoning and using evidence from one count to evaluate another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate given the circumstances.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted solely to reduce the global sentence by one month to credit the appellant for post-conviction, pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The lower court had ordered a new trial based on inconsistencies between a police officer's notes and the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that mere differences between the notes and testimony did not automatically warrant a new trial without further exploration of the inconsistencies.

The Court also rejected the respondent's fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for a sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to correct a mathematical error in its previous endorsement on a sentence appeal.

The court amended the sentence for breaking and entering and committing a sexual assault to 36 months, clarifying that the intended total sentence for all offences, taking into account time served and the principle of totality, is 62 months.

The respondent was convicted of possessing instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery under s. 369(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'adapted' meant 'suitable for'.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding the word ambiguous and interpreting it in favour of the accused to mean 'altered or modified'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the French version of the statute clearly resolves any ambiguity, confirming that 'adapted' in s. 369(b) means 'suitable for'.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, failing to comply with an undertaking, and threatening to damage property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by assessing the complainant's credibility based solely on demeanour, failing to analyze significant inconsistencies in her evidence, and inappropriately considering the evidence globally across all counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged his convictions on the basis that the trial judge failed to give a Vetrovec warning and provided inadequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and rejecting his testimony.

The court held that no Vetrovec warning was essential on the facts, and although fuller reasons would have been preferable, the reasons were adequate in the circumstances and did not occasion a miscarriage of justice.

The court accepted the Crown's concession that the Kienapple principle required a stay of the breaking and entering and committing theft charge in favour of a theft under $5,000 conviction, and a stay of the weapon dangerous charge.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, the component sentences were varied accordingly, but the total sentence of five years and two months was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction and advanced, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel and improper use of evidence connected to a bail hearing.

Applying the governing two-part framework, the court held the proposed fresh evidence established neither incompetence nor a miscarriage of justice, and found the suggested alternative trial strategy would have exposed the appellant to highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court also held that the impugned questioning did not engage s. 13 of the Charter and did not violate s. 7 because the appellant was not confronted with his prior bail testimony and the reply evidence regarding the bail document was inconsequential.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed sentence from a three-year penitentiary term.

The court agreed that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the nature of the offence, but held that the circumstances of the offence and the offender did not justify a penitentiary term.

Significant weight was given to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, the immediate context of the offence, genuine remorse, and fresh evidence showing meaningful rehabilitative progress.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day followed by 18 months' probation, together with a 10-year weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.