Tanya M. Kranjc

During a criminal prosecution involving firearms offences, the accused brought a voir dire application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter following a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The court had previously found a breach of s. 8 because the search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura but police searched a green Honda Accord.

The Information to Obtain contained misleading information, relied on an untested confidential informant whose information was not corroborated, and resulted in a warrant that could not have properly issued.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court found the police conduct fell on the serious end of the spectrum despite the reliability of the evidence.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court concluded that admission of the firearms evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from searches conducted pursuant to warrants for a residence and vehicle during a firearms investigation.

The reviewing court excised misleading portions of the Information to Obtain after finding that certain statements about a vehicle and police observations were inaccurate or reckless.

Applying the principles governing warrant review and the Debot criteria for confidential informant information, the court found that although the tip was detailed and compelling, the source was untested and the alleged criminal activity was not sufficiently corroborated by police investigation.

After excision, the remaining record did not provide reasonable and probable grounds for the issuance of the search warrant.

The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s s. 8 Charter rights were infringed.

During a criminal trial arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the defence challenged the admissibility of expert accident reconstruction evidence tendered by the Crown.

The proposed expert, a police collision reconstruction officer, was questioned on both his qualifications and whether his speed‑calculation methodology constituted novel scientific evidence.

Applying the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan, the court held the witness possessed sufficient specialized knowledge through training and extensive investigative experience.

The court further held that the use of an “in‑line momentum” formula for speed calculation was an accepted technique within accident reconstruction and not novel science requiring special scrutiny.

The expert evidence was therefore admitted, with any methodological concerns affecting weight rather than admissibility.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging his section 8 rights were violated by a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura, but the police searched a dark green Honda Accord bearing the same license plate.

The court found that the make and model of the vehicle were relevant identifiers, especially since license plates are easily transferable.

The court concluded that the failure to search the vehicle specified in the warrant was a substantive defect, rendering the search warrantless.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 8 arising from the execution of a search warrant that authorized the search of a black Acura but resulted in the search of a Honda bearing the same licence plate.

The accused sought leave to cross‑examine the affiant on several issues relating to the confidential informant and the basis for the warrant.

Applying the principles from R. v. Garofoli, the court held that cross‑examination should be permitted only where necessary to enable full answer and defence and where a basis exists to believe it may discredit a precondition for the authorization.

Leave was granted only on the issue of reasonable and probable grounds relating to the discrepancy between the vehicle described in the warrant and the vehicle searched.

Cross‑examination on the informant’s past performance, the identity linkage between the accused and a nickname, and alleged drug trafficking information was refused due to lack of necessity and risk to informant privilege.

During a lengthy criminal trial involving charges arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the Crown sought to call an additional accident reconstruction expert after the trial had already commenced and after the Crown’s primary reconstruction witness had testified.

The defence objected, arguing that the late disclosure of the expert report caused significant prejudice and that the court should exclude the evidence in the interests of trial fairness.

The court considered s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code and authorities addressing remedies for late expert disclosure.

It held that exclusion of relevant evidence is an exceptional remedy and that the prejudice to the accused could be addressed through a brief adjournment allowing the defence to consult its own expert.

The court therefore permitted the Crown to call the additional expert subject to an adjournment for the defence.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings—that the appellant undertook to protect the complainant and that her dependence on him for necessities made her particularly vulnerable to his influence—were supported by the evidence and warranted a conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in preferring the opinion evidence of five Crown witnesses based on their past experience with impaired drivers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice because all opinion and observational evidence, along with the appellant's admission of drinking, supported a conclusion of impairment, and there was no defence evidence to the contrary.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to conclude the appellant's statement was an admission of guilt and to accept the complainant's evidence on the issue of lack of consent despite inconsistencies.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The court found no error in principle in the sentence, granting leave to appeal but dismissing the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his two-year sentence.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification, circumstantial evidence, the theory of the defence, and motive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict was reasonable and the jury instructions were adequate, noting that trial counsel had approved the charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the two-year sentence for robbery with a weapon on a vulnerable victim was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a domestic assault that resulted in the victim suffering a broken jaw.

At trial, the victim's out-of-court statements to an emergency room doctor and a police officer were admitted for the truth of their contents, despite her stated inability to recall the events at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statements, finding they met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Crown brought ex parte applications under s. 487.055(1) of the Criminal Code for DNA databank orders against two repeat sexual offenders on parole.

The issuing judge granted the orders ex parte.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provision and the ex parte procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the provision but found that the issuing judge lost jurisdiction by proceeding ex parte without any evidence justifying the need to do so.

The appeals were allowed and the authorizations quashed.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for theft under $5,000 and assault with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to reopen proceedings to hear fresh evidence, that the identification evidence for the assault charge was unreasonable, and that the trial judge erred on the issue of mens rea for the theft charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence lacked proof of truth of contents, the identification evidence was sufficient, and there was no evidence of colour of right for the theft.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice, seeking a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal considered the fresh evidence but found it unpersuasive for imposing a conditional sentence.

Finding no error in the sentencing judge's reasons, the court granted leave to appeal but dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed her sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentencing judge's discretion.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed her conviction and sentence for social assistance fraud.

She argued that the trial judge's excessive intervention during her testimony prevented her from presenting her case, amounted to cross-examination creating an apprehension of bias, and that he failed to provide adequate assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice or apprehension of bias, and noting the trial judge went to great lengths to assist her.

The sentence appeal, challenging a restitution order of $25,281 at a minimum of $100 per month, was also dismissed as the appellant had full-time employment, home equity, and the quantum of loss was supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the summary conviction appeal judge's reference to unadmitted fresh DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed the judge erred in considering the fresh evidence, but proceeded to assess the merits without it.

The Court found the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the intoxicated complainant's evidence and correctly relied on DNA evidence as corroboration.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence in accordance with the W.(D.) framework was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately warn the jury against propensity reasoning and using evidence from one count to evaluate another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was adequate given the circumstances.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted solely to reduce the global sentence by one month to credit the appellant for post-conviction, pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The lower court had ordered a new trial based on inconsistencies between a police officer's notes and the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that mere differences between the notes and testimony did not automatically warrant a new trial without further exploration of the inconsistencies.

The Court also rejected the respondent's fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for a sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and kidnapping and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment.

At trial, the defence argued the complainant was a willing participant in an insurance fraud scheme, relying on the appellant's statement to police.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, motive, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 5-year sentence was not manifestly unreasonable despite the appellant being a first offender.