Trevor Lucas Shaw

The appellant Crown challenged a declaration that the emergency wiretap power in s. 184.4 of the Criminal Code violated section 8 of the Charter.

The Court held that warrantless interception in exigent circumstances can be constitutionally permissible where strict urgency conditions are met.

However, the provision lacked an adequate accountability mechanism, particularly after-the-fact notice to affected persons, and therefore failed constitutional minimum standards.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 because a notice requirement would not impair emergency police action while materially protecting privacy rights.

The appeal was dismissed and invalidity was suspended for 12 months to permit legislative revision.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after killing a victim during a marijuana robbery.

The Crown argued the murder was elevated to first degree under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code because it occurred during an unlawful confinement.

The appellant appealed, arguing that confinement incidental to a robbery should not trigger s. 231(5) since robbery is not an enumerated predicate offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that as long as the unlawful confinement is distinct from the act of killing and forms a single transaction with the murder, the fact that it was committed for the purpose of a robbery does not bar the application of s. 231(5).

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from a Master's order dismissing their action for delay, the successful respondents sought costs on a partial or substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the claimed amounts to be excessive and applied the principles from Boucher to fix costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court awarded total costs of $59,852.03 across the four groups of respondents.

The plaintiffs appealed a case management Master's decision dismissing their action for delay.

The action, commenced in 1998, arose from a television news broadcast.

The Master found the plaintiffs' delay to be intentional, inordinate, and inexcusable, and their conduct contumelious, noting repeated failures to comply with court orders and timetables.

On appeal, the plaintiffs sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the principal plaintiff's incarceration, which the court rejected for lack of due diligence.

The Divisional Court held that the appropriate standard of review for a case management Master's dismissal for delay is one of deference, requiring palpable or overriding error.

Finding no such error and no denial of natural justice in the Master's refusal to grant an adjournment, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to the complainant's injuries, after the fact conduct, and alleged prior employment at the complainant's convenience store.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, noting the trial judge's analysis was comprehensive and supported by the record.

Both the appeal against conviction and the duelling sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant brought an application to reopen his appeal from a 1999 sentence.

The appellant did not appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to reopen the appeal.

The appellant, a native Cree, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, assault, and extortion against two mentally challenged victims, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to order production of a support worker's records, admitting bad character evidence, making unsupported factual findings, failing to consider Aboriginal sentencing principles under s. 718.2(e), and that s. 761 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings on production or evidence, and holding that the indeterminate sentence was overwhelmingly supported by the expert evidence despite the failure to expressly consider s. 718.2(e).

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six years' imprisonment after punching the deceased once outside a bar, causing the deceased to fall and suffer fatal head injuries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, provocation, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and applying the curative proviso regarding the omission of a section 37 self-defence instruction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the six-year term was within the appropriate range.

The Crown appealed sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in his factual findings and imposed an unfit sentence for very serious sexual offences involving brutal and degrading conduct.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the respondent was not a sexual psychopath and that substance abuse was the root cause of the offending behaviour.

Although the effective four-year sentence was at the very low end of the range, the court was not persuaded it was manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for five offences arising from a single incident involving the respondent's estranged spouse and children.

The court held that a 12-month sentence, in addition to pre-trial custody, was manifestly unfit given the night-time armed break-in, death threats, aggravated assault on the spouse in the children's presence, and assault on a child who intervened.

While noting the respondent was a 53-year-old first offender, the court concluded a substantial penitentiary term was required and substituted a sentence of 3.5 years after applying the same pre-trial custody credit.

The court also held that the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose the mandatory s. 109 prohibition order and added a 10-year prohibition.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction and advanced, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel and improper use of evidence connected to a bail hearing.

Applying the governing two-part framework, the court held the proposed fresh evidence established neither incompetence nor a miscarriage of justice, and found the suggested alternative trial strategy would have exposed the appellant to highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court also held that the impugned questioning did not engage s. 13 of the Charter and did not violate s. 7 because the appellant was not confronted with his prior bail testimony and the reply evidence regarding the bail document was inconsequential.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed.

In advance of a criminal conviction appeal, the appellant brought motions to compel attendance and production from an alleged alternate suspect and treating physicians to support a proposed fresh evidence application grounded in ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court held that the alternate suspect was compellable because the defence sought exculpatory, not predominantly incriminating, evidence.

Production of one physician's records was granted on consent, but the application concerning a psychiatrist's records was dismissed without prejudice for failure to proceed within the Criminal Code records regime.

On the Crown's responding motion, production and examination were granted for one psychologist where threshold relevance was established, but denied for a correctional risk assessment for lack of sufficient evidentiary foundation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and related offences following a jury trial, and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court accepted that the line-up procedure was flawed and that the trial judge omitted the second step of the W.D. instruction, but held the identification evidence was collateral and the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming hot-pursuit evidence.

The allegation of bias or improper judicial interference was rejected.

The court found the 15-year sentence offended the parity principle and reduced it to eight years concurrent on the robbery counts plus one year consecutive for the weapons conviction.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching on five grounds, including unreasonable verdict, improper reliance on demeanour, reversal of the burden of proof through motive-to-fabricate reasoning, improper use of prior consistent statements, and refusal of a further sentencing adjournment.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, properly assessed them, and did not improperly rely on demeanour or prior statements.

It further found no reversal of the burden of proof and no basis to interfere with the refusal of an additional adjournment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences arising from allegations by his stepdaughter following a judge-and-jury trial.

The Court of Appeal held that Crown counsel repeatedly breached the duty of fairness by personalizing the prosecution, misstating the appellant's evidence, engaging in improper and sarcastic cross-examination, and reading a misleading excerpt from Supreme Court of Canada authority to the jury.

The trial judge compounded the unfairness by repeating an inaccurate version of the appellant's evidence and failing to correct the improprieties.

The cumulative prejudice deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based largely on circumstantial evidence, including post-offence conduct such as flight and concealment.

The trial judge delivered jury instructions in segments throughout the trial and provided written transcripts to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard specifically to the post-offence conduct, and that the piecemeal jury charge format was a reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the final evaluation of guilt, not to individual pieces of evidence, and that while the format of the jury charge was unorthodox and risky, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case.