Dr. MacDonald

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery while armed with a knife, assault with a weapon, and failing to comply with a recognizance following a violent home invasion.

The court considered the offender's youthful age, mental health issues, and background of systemic racism and abuse as mitigating factors, balanced against the severe aggravating factors of the planned, violent group attack on a vulnerable family.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, granting 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and an additional 7 months credit for harsh lockdown conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in 5 years left to serve.

The plaintiff was injured when a snow thrower tire rim exploded, causing a laceration to his shin.

The defendants admitted liability for the laceration but disputed the plaintiff's claim that he subsequently developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS).

The court found that the plaintiff did develop CRPS as a result of the incident, which permanently impacted his ability to work full-time.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff's damages should be reduced due to pre-existing conditions, a subsequent motor vehicle accident, or a failure to mitigate.

The court awarded damages for non-pecuniary loss, past and future loss of income, future care costs, and Family Law Act claims, and declined to deduct disability benefits received by the plaintiff.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term following his guilty plea to aggravated assault for an unprovoked stabbing of a stranger.

The court considered extensive psychiatric evidence and a Gladue report detailing the offender's traumatic childhood, substance abuse, and mental health issues.

The court found that while the offender posed a high risk of violent re-offending, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his violent conduct was intractable, noting his recent improvements and the impact of Gladue factors.

The court dismissed the dangerous offender application, designated the offender as a long term offender, and sentenced him to 7.5 years in prison followed by a 10-year Long Term Supervision Order.

This is a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning four young children who were apprehended due to severe neglect and developmental delays.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for crown wardship without access.

The father sought return of the children to his care, either pursuant to a section 57.1 order or with supervision.

The mother sought access.

The court found that the children continued to be in need of protection due to risks of physical and emotional harm and developmental delays.

The court determined that the father lacked the insight, judgment, and capacity to meet the complex medical and developmental needs of the children, despite community supports.

The court ordered that all four children be made crown wards for the purpose of adoption with no access to either parent.

An Aboriginal offender with a lengthy history of property crimes and breaches of court orders was sentenced in the Gladue court.

The offender had demonstrated a pattern of minor criminality spanning several months, committing thefts from businesses and repeatedly breaching probation and bail conditions.

Despite previous sentences including jail time, probation, and conditional sentences, the offender showed no signs of rehabilitation or deterrence.

The court imposed a 14-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, emphasizing the application of Gladue principles while balancing public protection and the need for accountability.

The offender subsequently breached the conditional sentence but later voluntarily requested incarceration to access mental health treatment at a specialized facility.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a stabbing during a fight.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds, including an improper closing address by the Crown, misleading jury instructions regarding expert pathology evidence, an unreasonable verdict, and systemic underrepresentation of aboriginal on-reserve residents in the jury roll.

The Court of Appeal split the appeal into two parts.

The Court dismissed the first three grounds, finding the trial was fair, the jury instructions were adequate, and the verdict was reasonable.

The Court adjourned the appeal to hear submissions on the discrete issue of the jury roll composition.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought post-104 week income replacement benefits.

The insurer terminated benefits, arguing the applicant continued to operate his horse farm.

The arbitrator found that the applicant suffered from severe chronic pain and depression, rendering him completely unable to engage in any employment for which he was reasonably suited, including his pre-accident work as a truck driver and farmer.

The arbitrator awarded income replacement benefits at $400 per week, interest on overdue payments, and a $25,000 special award against the insurer for unreasonably terminating benefits without sufficient medical or vocational investigation.

The applicant was completely successful in her arbitration for statutory accident benefits and sought an assessment of her arbitration expenses.

The insurer disputed the hourly rates for senior counsel and a law clerk, the number of preparation hours, the use of junior counsel, and certain disbursements.

The arbitrator allowed the maximum hourly rate of $150 for senior counsel due to the complexity of the case and the applicant's success.

The arbitrator also allowed the use of junior counsel and a senior law clerk, and approved most of the claimed disbursements, including accounting reports used to calculate interest.

The applicant's expenses were assessed at a total of $56,592.95.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and sexual interference, as well as his 12-year net sentence and increased parole ineligibility.

The convictions arose from the death of a 13-year-old girl who overdosed on drugs supplied by the appellant at his home, where he also sexually assaulted her while she was comatose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant's actions in supplying and encouraging the use of lethal drugs substantially contributed to the death, and that his conduct constituted criminal negligence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year sentence for manslaughter and the order for increased parole ineligibility due to the egregious circumstances and the appellant's diagnosis of psychopathy.

The appellant, a native Cree, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, assault, and extortion against two mentally challenged victims, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to order production of a support worker's records, admitting bad character evidence, making unsupported factual findings, failing to consider Aboriginal sentencing principles under s. 718.2(e), and that s. 761 of the Criminal Code is unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings on production or evidence, and holding that the indeterminate sentence was overwhelmingly supported by the expert evidence despite the failure to expressly consider s. 718.2(e).

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's decision awarding the insured weekly income benefits beyond the 156-week mark and a $20,000 special award.

The insured had suffered physical and psychological injuries in a severe motor vehicle accident and was unable to continue working.

The Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's finding that the insured was continuously prevented from engaging in suitable employment, noting the insurer failed to provide evidence of alternative suitable jobs while the insured adduced substantial medical evidence of disability.

The special award was also confirmed because the insurer unreasonably terminated benefits and disregarded the recommendations of its own medical experts.