David Costa

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application to quash the suspension of his driver's licence.

The suspension was imposed under section 41(1)(d) of the Highway Traffic Act following the appellant's guilty plea to impaired driving in New York State, pursuant to a reciprocal agreement between Ontario and New York.

The central issue was whether the guilty plea and conditional discharge in New York constituted a conviction under Ontario law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the application judge correctly interpreted the statutory provision and properly disposed of all issues raised, including natural justice and Charter arguments.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the absence of a transcript of the oral hearing prejudiced his appeal rights.

This decision addresses the jurisdictional limits of the Ontario Court of Justice to appoint state-funded counsel for complainants/respondents in sexual offence proceedings under section 278 of the Criminal Code.

The court clarifies that while complainants/respondents have a statutory right to standing and to be represented by counsel, the Criminal Code does not authorize courts to appoint state-funded counsel for them.

The judge distinguishes this from appointments under section 486.3 and amicus curiae appointments, which have clear statutory or inherent jurisdictional bases.

The ruling emphasizes that state-funded counsel appointments require either explicit statutory authority or a Charter-based application following the Rowbotham procedure.

The court dismisses the application for an additional order appointing counsel, affirming the importance of counsel representation but underscoring the absence of jurisdiction to make such appointments automatically.

The applicant, convicted of impaired driving in New York, sought to quash the automatic one-year suspension of his Ontario driver's licence under section 41 of the Highway Traffic Act, arguing the Registrar erred by not considering equivalency to Ontario offences, breaching natural justice, and violating Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the suspension was automatic by operation of law, not discretionary, and did not engage Charter rights related to liberty, mobility, or cruel and unusual punishment, nor did it violate principles of natural justice or double criminality.

The applicant condominium corporation brought an application against a unit owner for harassing a neighbour and condominium staff over alleged second-hand smoke.

The respondent admitted to shouting insults, posting derogatory notices, and sending abusive emails, but argued her actions were justified by the health risk of the smoke.

The Condominium Authority Tribunal found that the respondent's conduct violated multiple condominium rules and constituted a nuisance, annoyance, and disruption under the Condominium Act.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to cease her harassing behaviour and pay $10,457.57 in costs and fees to the applicant.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order requiring the respondents to permanently remove their dog from the premises after it bit another resident's dog.

The condominium board had declared the dog a nuisance and ordered its removal.

The Tribunal found that the board did not conduct a reasonable investigation into the incident and relied on insufficient evidence.

The Tribunal noted the dog had since been muzzled, leashed, and trained, and there were no further incidents.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay $5,000 in costs to the respondents due to its failure to attempt pre-hearing resolution and its unreasonable conduct.

In a dispute over a condominium board's order to remove a dangerous dog, the respondents brought a motion to add the owner of the attacked dog as a party.

The respondents argued the owner's negligence caused the incident and she should be liable for costs.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding the core issue was the reasonableness of the board's decision, and the owner of the attacked dog had no direct interest or liability for costs that would justify adding her as a party.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge and three years' probation imposed on the respondent following guilty pleas to domestic assault and breach of recognizance.

The respondent had served 276 days in pre-trial custody.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred in granting the discharge and in refusing to make a DNA order.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court admitted fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no errors in principle and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the unique circumstances, including the minor nature of the assaults and the respondent's lack of a prior record.

The applicants were charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 42 months.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court deducted defence delay but found the net delay still exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that defence certiorari applications constituted discrete exceptional events and found no transitional exceptional circumstances justified the delay.

The applications were allowed and a stay of proceedings was granted.

Fernando Correia was found guilty by a jury of dangerous driving, but acquitted of aggravated assault and mischief to property.

The sentencing judge denied the defence's application for a judicial stay based on alleged inconsistent verdicts, affirming the finality of jury verdicts subject to appeal.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the intentional nature of the dangerous driving causing serious bodily harm, and mitigating factors such as the offender's age, lack of criminal record, strong work ethic, and family ties.

The judge imposed a 12-month custodial sentence, a one-year driving prohibition, and a no-contact order, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The applicant sought continuation of a temporary restraining order against a former common law spouse under s. 46 of the Family Law Act.

The court held that the applicant had reasonable grounds to fear for her physical and psychological safety, relying on evidence of past domestic assault, later threatening conduct, the respondent's alleged criminal associations, and the respondent's knowledge that the applicant had provided information to police.

The court found the applicant's fear was legitimate and had a current relationship to more recent events, notwithstanding the age of some earlier incidents.

The restraining order was continued and the applicant, being substantially successful on the only live issue, received partial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol on June 6, 2014, with trial scheduled for June 15, 2016.

The court conducted an attribution analysis of delay across multiple categories: neutral intake, trial readiness, institutional delay, and Crown delay.

The court found that the Crown was responsible for approximately 16 months of delay, primarily due to late disclosure of instrument calibration and maintenance records for the Intoxilyzer 8000C device.

This delay exceeded the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8-10 months.

Although the defendant suffered only modest prejudice, the court found that the defendant's interests and society's interest in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, particularly given the Crown's responsibility for the delay.

The charge was stayed.

The court sentenced an offender convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against three complainants, all his granddaughters, arising from repeated sexualized touching and grooming conduct over several years within a family setting.

The court held that denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society were the dominant sentencing objectives in child sexual abuse cases involving a profound breach of trust by a family member.

Although the offender was elderly, had no prior record, had health issues, and faced hardship in custody, those mitigating circumstances justified only a modest reduction below the usual appellate range.

A conditional sentence was unavailable, and a penitentiary sentence of two and a half years concurrent was imposed together with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving three grandchildren.

The court considered allegations that the complainants fabricated the allegations under parental influence and examined issues of similar fact evidence, prior inconsistent statements under the K.G.B. framework, and potential collusion or unconscious tainting between complainants.

After extensive credibility findings, the court accepted the complainants’ testimony as reliable and rejected the defence theory of fabrication.

The evidence established repeated unwanted sexual touching and sexually motivated conduct by the accused toward the complainants while they were minors.

The accused was acquitted on one count due to insufficient temporal precision regarding the complainant’s age but convicted on the remaining counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 offences.

He brought two Charter applications: one alleging arbitrary arrest and withheld fundamental disclosure (sections 7, 8, and 9), and another alleging unreasonable delay (section 11(b)).

The court dismissed both applications.

The disclosure application was partially dismissed at the pre-trial stage, with the court finding the Crown had met its threshold disclosure obligations.

The delay application was dismissed after the court calculated that only approximately eight months of the 27-month period constituted cognizable delay under section 11(b), with the remainder attributable to inherent time requirements and defence conduct.

The court found that while the accused suffered actual and inferred prejudice, the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed such prejudice.