w a r n i n g

An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (3), or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide the following:

486.4 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences;

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,

(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or

(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).

(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s.15; 2005, c. 43, s.8 (3) (b).

486.6 (1) Every person who fails to comply with an order under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

COURT FILE NO.: 12-40000475-0000

DATE: 20131105

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

A. H.

Anna Stanford

for the Crown

David Costa

for the Accused

HEARD: September 9, 12 and November 1, 2013

JANET WILSON J.:

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Introduction

[1] The defendant A.H. is convicted of sexual interference against his two youngest female grandchildren contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. He is also convicted of sexually assaulting his eldest granddaughter contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. At the time the complainants disclosed the alleged sexual abuse, the complainants Z.F., I.L., and D.G. were 13, 16, and 20 years old respectively.

[2] For reasons fully outlined in the reasons for judgment, I convicted A.H. on count 2, sexual assault upon D.G., and counts 4 and 6, sexual interference against I.L. and Z.F. I acquitted A.H. on count 1, sexual interference against D.G., as there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the events, which I accepted did take place, occurred in the time frame referred to in the indictment. During the trial, the Crown conceded that there was insufficient evidence of abuse during the time frames in counts 3 and 5. Therefore, the Crown withdrew these two counts.

[3] At the trial, I did not accept the Defense suggestion that the complainants fabricated their allegations under the influence of their mother and/or father. I also did not accept the Defense suggestion that there was conscious or unconscious influence on each complainant’s allegations. The aunt’s observations corroborated important aspects of the complainants’ evidence.

[4] The allegations of abuse surfaced after the middle child I.L. was hospitalized after a suicide attempt. I.L. first disclosed the abuse to her treating psychiatrist. D.G. and Z.F. disclosed the abuse to their mother after the mother became aware of the potential abuse against I.L. After a meeting at the hospital, the family reported the allegations to the police.

[5] The Defense counsel in both his oral and written submissions continues to contest my findings of fact fully outlined in my reasons for judgment. He has filed written submissions outlining once again his allegations of inconsistencies in the complainants’ various previous statements, and their victim impact statements. The sentencing phase of the trial is not an opportunity to reargue matters. I outline a very brief summary of my findings of fact for this sentencing hearing, but reiterate that the findings of fact outlined in my reasons for judgment underpin the convictions.

Findings with respect to sexual assault against D.G. (count 2)

[6] I found as fact that A.H. fondled D.G. while in their home and in the car. As well, A.H. requested that D.G. let him play with her, particularly her breasts, in exchange for a gift. On occasion, A.H. went into D.G.’s room at night and touched her genitals while she slept. He also kissed her on the lips while trying to force his tongue in her mouth. During the early periods of abuse, he would pull D.G. to his lap and make grinding motions.

[7] I concluded that the grandfather’s conduct was completely inconsistent with playful, innocent, or inadvertent touching as the grandfather suggested in his evidence. The aunt’s police statement corroborates aspects of D.G.’s testimony. The aunt observed an incident where the grandfather was trying to hug D.G. but D.G. pushed him away. She also observed the grandfather unlock D.G.’s bedroom door and enter uninvited. When the aunt questioned the appropriateness of her father’s conduct, he told her in Portuguese to shut up.

[8] I concluded that the unwanted sexual touching was sexual assault within the meaning of s. 271 of the Criminal Code. The abuse, including the grinding, unwanted touching, and fondling in the car, had been going on for years. D.G.’s specific memories of abuse, including A.H. going into her room and touching her genitals, occurred during the two years before disclosure in August 2011.

Findings with respect to sexual interference against Z.F. (count 4)

[9] I concluded that the grandfather was guilty of sexual interference against his 13-year-old granddaughter Z.F. He rubbed her vaginal area with his hand and said “it feels so good” (incident #1); grinded his groin area against her, and on one occasion put his fingers in her vagina and indicated that he didn’t want the grandmother to know (incident #2); he licked her thigh and ear while she was in bed (incident #3); and he tried to kiss her and touch her vagina (incident #4). Aspects of the unwanted touching were repetitive.

[10] Again, I found that the touching described by Z.F. was inconsistent with playful interactions between a grandfather and his granddaughter, as suggested by the defendant or the aunt. The defendant’s touching of Z.F. was clearly sexual in nature.

[11] I concluded that the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the grandfather intentionally touched Z.F. for a sexual purpose when she was under the age of 16. The abuse of Z.F. took place over a lengthy period of time. The abuse began in the old house where the complainants and their parents resided with the grandparents. The most serious incident of digital penetration occurred when Z.F. lived in her old home in June 2010. A.H.’s abuse of Z.F. continued after the family moved to the new house in June 2010, until disclosure in August 2011.

Findings with respect to sexual interference against I.L. (count 6)

[12] I.L. was 15 years old at the time of disclosure. I accepted I.L.’s description of her grandfather’s repeated inappropriate sexual conduct towards her, beginning at about age 12 or 13. Her first memory of abuse was A.H. groping her in the car on the way to a therapy session. The abuse escalated in intensity after the move to the new house in June 2010.

[13] Based on all the evidence, I found that the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that A.H. on many occasions intentionally touched I.L. for a sexual purpose when she was under the age of 16. This activity included kissing on the lips, putting his tongue in her mouth, pulling I.L. to his body when he was seated or lying down and grinding and thrusting his genital area against her body, holding her breasts and buttocks while hugging her, holding her hand to touch his penis over his clothes, touching her vaginal area and groping in the car, licking her ear, and placing his tongue in her ear.

[14] Again, I found that the behaviour described by I.L. was inconsistent with playful, innocent, or affectionate conduct as suggested by the grandfather. Rather, it was aggressive, unwanted, sexualized behaviour by A.H. toward I.L. that went on for years.

The Position of the Crown

[15] It is the Crown’s position that the appropriate sentence in all of the circumstances is three to four years’ incarceration. The Crown asserts that the Defence suggestion of a conditional sentence is totally inappropriate, and in any event is not permitted in law with respect to the sexual interference convictions contained in counts 4 and 6. It is the Crown’s position that the minimum sentence of 45 days under s. 151 of the Criminal Code for a sexual interference conviction is wholly inadequate.

The Position of the Defence

[16] The Defence initially requested a conditional sentence with perhaps some short-term intermittent periods of incarceration. As the parties did not agree in law whether a conditional sentence was a legally available option, I agreed to adjourn to allow counsel to address this issue.

[17] Counsel addressed the issue of the availability of a conditional sentence in their written submissions. They are now in agreement on this issue. After reviewing the applicable legislation, Defence counsel now agrees with Crown counsel that a conditional sentence is not available with respect to the two charges of sexual interference in counts 4 and 6. Defence counsel agrees that there is a minimum sentence of 45 days’ incarceration.

[18] The sexual interference offences occurred between May 1, 2008 and August 18, 2011. During this time period, s. 151(a) of the Criminal Code provided a minimum punishment of 45 days’ incarceration. Parliament amended s. 151(a) of the Criminal Code effective August 9, 2012 to provide a minimum term of one year’s incarceration. Nevertheless, A.H. is entitled to the lesser minimum punishment of 45 days’ incarceration: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 11(i).

[19] Defence counsel argues that the appropriate sentence in this case is between 45 days and one year’s imprisonment, followed by a period of probation.

Issue of admissibility of factual assertions contained in the complainants’ victim impact statements

[20] The complainants filed victim impact statements on September 12, 2013. I.L. read her statement to the court.

[21] Defence counsel argued that I should not consider aspects of the victim impact statements, such as factual assertions about the long-term psychiatric consequences of the abuse. I agreed that I should not consider aspects of the victim impact statements in this sentencing, particularly I.L.’s statement as to the causes of any psychiatric condition, unless a treating professional corroborated the facts in the victim impact statements.

[22] Crown counsel filed doctor reports as exhibits in this sentencing with respect to all three complainants and the mother. The reports confirm that A.H.’s sexual abuse contributed to each complainant’s suffering and psychiatric diagnosis. D.G. is diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Z.F. is diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. The report also confirms that Z.F. had significant difficulties surrounding this trial, requiring a period of hospitalization. The mother has the same diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder. A report by I.L.’s treating resident psychiatrist outlines what occurred from August 11 to August 25, 2011. This discharge summary from 2011 confirms the history of disclosure of the sexual abuse and its link to I.L.’s psychiatric difficulties and symptoms. Although I.L. was diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder when admitted to the hospital in 2011, her obsessive symptoms disappeared after she disclosed the sexual abuse. That report says, “[a]s a matter of fact [I.L.’s] clinical presentation altogether and since a young age as documented above is the product of her abuse.”

[23] The Defence counsel confirms that the newly filed reports confirm the contents of the victim impact statements. However, Defence counsel challenges the adequacy of the reports, suggesting that the clinical notes and files should have been disclosed; I disagree with this submission.

[24] The victim impact statements speak to the depth of each complainant’s personal hurt, sense of betrayal, and emotional damage that has followed. The evidence from the complainants’ treating physicians corroborates that the sexual abuse is causally linked to their present psychiatric difficulties. Clearly, the complainants and the mother have suffered profoundly as a result of the defendant’s conduct, his lack of remorse, his breach of trust and love, and his failure to accept responsibility for his actions.

Circumstances of the Offender

[25] There are mitigating and aggravating factors relevant to assessing the appropriate sentence in this case. The mitigating factors are outlined as follows:

1. A.H. has no prior criminal record.

2. A.H. has a stable work history for over 21 years. He has essentially worked one full-time job as a maintenance person since he came to Canada many years ago to date. A.H. generously provided for the family for many years when the complainants’ mother or father was out of work.

3. A.H. is socially isolated. The complainants referred at times to their grandfather as a “caveman.” He has no friends or outside contacts except his family. The Crown concedes that his isolation diminishes the likelihood that he will reoffend as his social life and contact with others is so impoverished.

4. There is family support available to A.H. According to the aunt, A.H.’s wife has Alzheimer’s disease and a host of medical problems, and it is not clear what meaningful support she can offer him. However, according to the pre-sentence report, the wife is a source of support to A.H. The complainants’ aunt has clearly sided with her father and supports him. A.H. also continues to see his nephew.

5. A.H. is now 70 years old, speaks Portuguese and almost no English, and has a variety of health issues. A.H. testified at this sentencing hearing that he has asthma, high blood pressure, angina, heart pain, and stomach ulcers. I note that notwithstanding these health problems he continues to work full time, and has not required hospitalization for these conditions.

6. After the disclosure and A.H.’s arrest, he was required as a condition of bail to leave his home for a period of one and a half years until the complainants and their parents were able to find alternative accommodation. During this period, A.H. lived at Seaton house in Toronto, which he found to be very difficult.

7. A.H. has a dependant wife who is 72 years of age and has health problems, including heart problems, sleep issues, lupus, bone problems, and cognitive problems. She filed an affidavit outlining her various difficulties and her dependency upon the defendant. At the time of trial, the aunt was living with her grandparents and her son. Presumably she can continue to do so.

[26] There are serious aggravating factors in this case including the following:

1. Z.F. testified that the unwanted episodes of sexual touching took place when A.H. was inebriated. The aunt confirmed that A.H. has problems with alcohol. A.H. clearly has a problem with alcohol that affects his behaviour and requires treatment. A.H. has no insight into the gravity of his problem with alcohol as evidenced by his statement in the pre-sentence report at page 4:

When questioned as to whether alcohol was a factor in the offences, the offender indicated that “alcohol exaggerated the play” he would engage in with his granddaughters but also indicated that “my excitability during play was not sexual.” He then indicated that the offences could not have occurred when he was drinking because “I don’t lose myself and there is no way I could do this. I would become more affectionate but in a familial way.”

2. A.H. accepts no responsibility for his actions and has no insight into the damage he has done. At the trial, he continually advocated that the complainants were pressured into fabricating the allegations of abuse. There was no merit whatsoever to A.H.’s assertions. He reiterated this unfounded belief at page 5 of the pre-sentence report:

The offender denies responsibility for the offences and blames his son-in-law for influencing the victims into making the allegations. The offender repeatedly noted that the allegations against him were exaggerated. He stated “everything is exaggerated, manipulated by my son-in-law” and “it was his way of getting back to me because I withdrew financial support.”

When questioned about the risk of his reoffending in the future, the offender states that he does not believe that a risk exists. He indicated that he now avoids any type of play with children in order to minimize the chance of further accusations. He then went on to offer that “this is a cultural misunderstanding. The touching of genitals of children was misunderstood in this situation.”

3. A.H.’s conduct is a gross breach of trust that continued over a number of years. A.H. manipulated his family, preyed on their love for him, and justified his conduct based on his generosity in providing financial support. The complainants felt trapped in their silence. Both D.G. and Z.F. testified that they had to endure the abuse; they could not disclose the abuse as the rest of the family would be negatively affected, including possibly losing their home.

4. The complainants and their parents have been profoundly negatively impacted by these proceedings. The victim impact statements speak of the tragedy that has befallen this family as a result of A.H.’s conduct and his continued claims that the complainants fabricated the allegations of abuse. The medical reports filed link their present ongoing symptoms to the abuse.

Principles of Sentencing

[27] I must consider the purposes and principles of sentencing enunciated in s. 718 of the Criminal Code. I must consider the objectives of sentencing, namely denunciation, deterrence, separation from society, rehabilitation, reparation, and promotion of responsibility and acknowledgement of harm. I must consider the fundamental principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[28] The complainants were subjected to repetitive, secret fondling and unwanted sexual touching that was degrading, confusing, and demoralizing. The abuse went on for years. There was the most serious single incident of digital penetration against Z.F.

The Case law

[29] Case law suggests that the main principles in this case must be denunciation, deterrence, and separation of the offender from society: R. v. D.D. (2002), 2002 44915 (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 788 (C.A.) and R. v. R.T.M., 2008 ONCA 47, [2008] O.J. No. 229, at para. 2. In R. v. Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610, 107 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 72, the Court of Appeal states that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, in the case of adult predators, the objectives of sentencing commonly referred to as denunciation, general and specific deterrence and the need to separate offenders from society must take precedence over the other recognized objectives of sentencing.” These principles apply “even for a first-time offender”: R.T.M, at para. 2.

[30] In R. v. D.D., the Court of Appeal states the following at para. 44:

To summarize, I am of the view that as a general rule, when adult offenders, in a position of trust, sexually abuse innocent young children on a regular and persistent basis over substantial periods of time, they can expect to receive mid to upper single digit penitentiary terms. When the abuse involves full intercourse, anal or vaginal, and it is accompanied by other acts of physical violence, threats of physical violence, or other forms of extortion, upper single digit to low double digit penitentiary terms will generally be appropriate. Finally, in cases where these elements are accompanied by a pattern of severe psychological, emotional and physical brutalization, still higher penalties will be warranted. (See, for example, R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 in which the Supreme Court restored the 25-year sentence imposed at trial and R. v. W.(L.K.) (1999), 1999 3791 (ON CA), 138 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.) in which this court upheld a sentence of 18 and a half years imposed at trial.)

[31] The Court of Appeal has “repeatedly emphasized that family members who perpetrate intrusive acts of sexual abuse against children to whom they stand in a position of trust should receive penitentiary terms beyond the minimum”: R. v. W.C.C., [2009] O.J. No. 4705 (S.C.), at para. 28. In R. v. G.C.F. (2004), 2004 4771 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 771, at para. 14, the Court of Appeal states, “cases that involve multiple sexual activity over an extended period of time and escalating in obtrusiveness generally warrant a severe sentence.”

[32] In R. v. C.B., 2008 ONCA 486, 237 O.A.C. 387, the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of three years’ imprisonment where the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted his niece between the ages of 12 and 16 years. They lived in the same condominium unit. The conduct involved repeated touching of the complainant’s breasts and digital penetration.

[33] In R. v. E.T., 2011 ONCA 86, [2011] O.J. No. 374, the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of three years’ imprisonment. The accused sexually assaulted the child of his spouse’s cousin. The abuse began with kissing when she was eight years old and progressed to sexual touching and oral sex when she was 17 and 18 years old. The trial judge stated that a conditional sentence was unavailable. He stated that three years was at the low end of the appropriate range. The trial judge noted mitigating factors such as the accused’s age of 68 years old, his lack of criminal record, his strong community ties, his business, and his new wife and young daughter.

[34] The Defence in the September 12, 2013 case brief refers to cases that have limited utility. Four of the five cases referred to by the Defence (G.C.F.; R. v. L.F.W., 2000 SCC 6, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 132; R. v. F.G.F., 2002 ABQB 869, [2002] A.J. No. 942; and R. v. H.A.H, 2001 BCSC, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2584) pre-date the Ontario Court of Appeal’s shift in emphasis to the need for denunciation and deterrence in cases of sexual abuse against children by people in a position of trust. This shift in focus is also reflected by the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences as of November 2005.

[35] The decision relied upon by the Defence R. v. Furia, 2010 ONCJ 394, [2010] O.J. No. 3790 is distinguishable on its facts. The court confirmed that the abuse had not occurred over a lengthy period of time. There was no evidence that the abuse significantly affected the victim. The court noted that the victim was “functional and productive”: at para. 22.

[36] The Defence filed further cases in a supplementary book of authorities. In R. v. S.C., 2012 NLTD(G) 186, [2012] N.J. No. 432, the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court, Trial Division, ordered a 30-month sentence for six acts of sexual abuse against the defendant’s granddaughter that occurred over a lengthy period of time. R. v. S.C. if anything is supportive of the Crown’s position in this case, although R. v. S.C. involved a more serious incident of attempted penile penetration.

[37] The Defence also refers to cases that are out of province: R. v. G.B., 2012 ABPC 214, [2012] A.J. No. 854 and R. v. S.G.T., 2011 SKCA 4, 265 C.C.C. (3d) 550. I do not find these cases helpful in light of the clear statements from our Court of Appeal.

[38] In R. v. D.T., 2011 ONCJ 545, [2011] O.J. No. 4962, the court adopted the Crown’s submission on a sentence of 18 months’ incarceration for the sexual assault of a handicapped niece. That case is not particularly helpful in assessing the appropriate sentence in this case as the Crown sought a sentence outside the range of suggested sentences for abuse of children by family members. Similarly, R. v. A.C., 2012 ONCA 608, [2012] O.J. No. 4293 is very fact-specific and not helpful in assessing the appropriate sentence in this case. R. v. A.C. endorsed a two year less a day conditional sentence for historic sexual assault against one victim that occurred during a few months. In this case, A.H. abused three victims over a period of years.

Conclusions about the appropriate sentence

[39] I agree with the Crown’s submission that the Court of Appeal has confirmed that the usual appropriate sentence range is three to four years’ incarceration in cases of prolonged sexual abuse of children involving a breach of trust by a family member, but not involving full sexual intercourse or collateral threats of violence. For the reasons that I have outlined, the cases presented by the Defence provide limited assistance.

[40] A.H.’s attitude and potential treatment are relevant in assessing the appropriate sentence, even if deterrence is the overriding, governing principle in this case.

[41] On September 12, 2013, I asked counsel whether the public would best be served if A.H. served a reformatory sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years probation. Such a sentence would impose conditions on A.H. for a longer period of time than the penitentiary term proposed by the Crown. The Crown filed supplementary materials that confirm that the Ontario Correctional Institute treatment programme for sexual offenders requires individuals attending the programme to accept responsibility for their actions and be motivated for treatment. Clearly A.H. fails both criteria. A.H. has not accepted any responsibility for his actions. He completely lacks insight into the need for treatment or motivation for treatment. It appears that he has little or no chance of obtaining meaningful treatment in the provincial system. Further, the reformatory term appears to be too far below the Court of Appeal’s suggested range of sentences in cases such as this. It appears that A.H. will receive needed treatment in the federal system for his alcohol problems and his sexual abuse problems.

[42] There is no doubt that any period of incarceration will impose disproportionate hardship on A.H. due to his age (70 years), his very limited English language skills, his social isolation, his health issues, and his wife’s dependency.

[43] Considering all of the evidence and sentencing principles, I find that the appropriate sentence in this case is two and a half years of incarceration in the penitentiary, concurrent on all charges. I acknowledge that this sentence is slightly below the Court of Appeal’s suggested range. In my view this is a fit and just sentence due to the A.H.’s extenuating circumstances.

[44] The Crown suggested terms that should provide structure to protect children when A.H. is released. These terms include the following:

• A D.N.A. order shall be provided.

• A.H. shall register with the sex offender registry pursuant to s. 490.012 of the Criminal Code for a period of 20 years.

• Upon discharge, A.H. is prohibited from attending parks, swimming pools, daycare centres, school grounds, or other places where children are expected to be present. A.H. shall have circumscribed contact with any individuals under the age of 16 years for a period of ten years pursuant to s. 161 of the Criminal Code.

JANET WILSON J.

Released: November 5, 2013

COURT FILE NO.: 12-40000475-0000

DATE: 20131105

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

– and –

A.H.

Applicant/Accused

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

JANET WILSON J.

Released: November 5, 2013