Janet Gallin

The appellant was convicted at trial of speeding 100 km/h in a 60 km/h zone contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The officer used a BEE III mobile radar device to measure the appellant's speed.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the officer failed to follow the device manual, specifically the requirement to use tuning forks for calibration.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the officer was qualified to operate the device, the device was properly tested before and after use, and the failure to follow an outdated calibration procedure that no longer applied to the current model of the device did not create a reasonable doubt about the accuracy of the speed measurement.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding 135 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone.

At trial, the appellant claimed he did not know he was speeding due to vision problems, which did not constitute a valid defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the officer's notes contained an incorrect vehicle model description (Mercedes 2 CL instead of Mercedes 250 CLA) and that this error should result in the conviction being overturned.

The court found that the officer properly identified the vehicle by colour, make, model number, and license plate at trial, and directly identified the appellant as the driver through a valid Ontario driver's license photo card.

The court held that any discrepancy in the model description would have made no difference to the verdict, as the evidence clearly established that the appellant was driving his Mercedes at the alleged speed.

The Crown appealed a youth justice court decision declaring sections 487.051(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as they apply to young offenders.

The sentencing judge had refused to make mandatory and presumptive DNA collection orders for three young offenders who pled guilty to designated offences, finding the provisions violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for two of the youths (quashing the third for jurisdictional reasons), holding that the provisions are reasonable and constitutional.

The Court found that the legislative safeguards protecting the privacy of young offenders, including the mandatory destruction of DNA records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, appropriately balance the state's interest in law enforcement with the youths' privacy interests.

The Crown brought ex parte applications under s. 487.055(1) of the Criminal Code for DNA databank orders against two repeat sexual offenders on parole.

The issuing judge granted the orders ex parte.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the provision and the ex parte procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the provision but found that the issuing judge lost jurisdiction by proceeding ex parte without any evidence justifying the need to do so.

The appeals were allowed and the authorizations quashed.

The Crown appealed the refusal of trial judges to make DNA data bank orders for five adult offenders.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal route follows the general scheme of the Criminal Code and that the standard of review is one of deference absent an error in principle.

The Court found that the DNA data bank provisions apply retrospectively to offenders still before the court after the legislation came into force.

The Court allowed the appeals, finding that the trial judges misapprehended the broad purposes of the DNA data bank, placed unreasonable emphasis on the offenders' privacy, and failed to properly weigh the offenders' criminal records and the nature of their offences.

DNA data bank orders were issued for all five offenders.

The appellant appealed her conviction for sexual assault, arguing the defence of duress.

The appellant's common law spouse had ordered her pre-teen son to have intercourse with her, and she was a co-perpetrator of the assaults.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the defence of duress was not applicable because it is only relevant where an accused is liable as a party, not as a co-perpetrator.