Kenneth A. Langdon

A former employee and founding member of a coffee company and its related worker co‑operative sought damages for failure to redeem “sweat equity” credits earned through reduced cash wages.

The plaintiff alleged entitlement to redemption of Class B shares and pursued an oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, as well as relief under the Co‑operative Corporations Act.

The court held that the plaintiff’s sweat equity constituted an option or warrant to acquire shares rather than an existing shareholding, and that he had standing as a complainant but no entitlement to redemption.

The court found no oppressive conduct because the internal pay scale and resulting reduction of sweat equity value were adopted through a fair process in which the plaintiff participated.

The action was dismissed and the corporations were not required to redeem the sweat equity credits.

The applicant brought a motion to change a divorce judgment that required payment of a global indexed amount covering both child and spousal support.

The motion sought termination of support for an independent adult child, adjustment of ongoing child support for the remaining child, termination of spousal support based on remarriage, and elimination of arrears.

The court found material changes in circumstances but declined to terminate spousal support, holding that the original agreement contemplated indefinite support indexed for inflation.

Retroactive adjustments were assessed using the principles from D.B.S. v. S.R.G., and the court declined to impose large retroactive child support or spousal support obligations due to delay, lack of misconduct, and the payor’s reliance on the existing order.

The court fixed arrears of spousal and child support at zero, set ongoing indexed spousal support, and established a structured regime for child support and post-secondary education expenses.

The plaintiff brought an action to recover payment for work performed under an informal oral contract.

The court permitted amendments to the pleadings to correct the plaintiff’s capacity and to add a corporate defendant allegedly involved in the contract.

The defendant asserted he acted solely as an agent for the corporation, but the court held that a party claiming to have acted as an agent bears the onus of proving the other party knew of that capacity.

Finding the evidence evenly balanced on that issue, the court concluded the defendant failed to discharge the onus.

Judgment was awarded against the individual defendant for $50,000, with the claim against the corporate defendant dismissed without costs.

The applicant sought an order under s. 100 of the Courts of Justice Act to vest an easement benefiting the respondents’ property so that a right-of-way could be registered in connection with a municipal site plan agreement and development project.

The respondents refused to execute the authorization required under the Land Titles Act to register the easement.

The court held that s. 100 does not confer standalone jurisdiction to vest property interests and can only be used where the applicant has an independent legal entitlement to the property interest.

Because the applicant had no claim to ownership or possession of the respondents’ lands and was effectively attempting to impose a benefit on an unwilling landowner, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the order.

The application was dismissed with costs.