Shelina Ali

The defendants in a libel action brought a motion for security for costs under section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act after the trial judge passed away before rendering a decision.

The court held that the test under section 12 is conjunctive, requiring the defendants to prove that the plaintiff lacks sufficient assets, that the defendants have a good defence on the merits, and that the statements were made in good faith.

Although the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets, the defendants failed to establish that their defences of justification, fair comment, or responsible journalism were more likely than not to succeed, or that the statements were made in good faith.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed.

In a defamation trial concerning an allegedly defamatory newspaper article also posted online, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of republication on third‑party websites based on Internet search results.

The court considered the rule that each republication of a libel is a separate publication and that the original publisher is not liable for subsequent republications unless an exception is pleaded, such as where repetition is the natural and probable consequence of the original publication.

The court reviewed authorities confirming that pleadings in defamation actions must specifically allege such exceptions.

Because the statement of claim did not plead the republication exception and no amendment had been sought despite notice from the defendants, the court held the plaintiff could not introduce evidence of republication by other Internet sites.

The evidentiary request was therefore refused.

A former employee and founding member of a coffee company and its related worker co‑operative sought damages for failure to redeem “sweat equity” credits earned through reduced cash wages.

The plaintiff alleged entitlement to redemption of Class B shares and pursued an oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, as well as relief under the Co‑operative Corporations Act.

The court held that the plaintiff’s sweat equity constituted an option or warrant to acquire shares rather than an existing shareholding, and that he had standing as a complainant but no entitlement to redemption.

The court found no oppressive conduct because the internal pay scale and resulting reduction of sweat equity value were adopted through a fair process in which the plaintiff participated.

The action was dismissed and the corporations were not required to redeem the sweat equity credits.