Breese Davies

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his girlfriend's two daughters over a three-year period ending in 2004.

The complainants, now adults, testified that the accused entered their bedrooms at night while they slept and engaged in inappropriate sexual touching.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainants credible and reliable witnesses, rejected the accused's minimization of his presence in the home, and found him guilty on all four counts.

The court also addressed the admissibility of similar fact evidence and found no collusion between the complainants despite the opportunity for communication.

Two separate appeals concerning the entrapment defence in dial-a-dope drug trafficking investigations.

In Williams' case, the trial judge found entrapment and stayed drug trafficking charges, but the Crown appealed.

In Ahmad's case, the trial judge rejected an entrapment application and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that police may provide opportunities to sell drugs to persons associated with phone lines reasonably suspected of being used in dial-a-dope operations, even without reasonable suspicion that those individuals are engaged in criminal activity, provided the police are conducting a bona fide inquiry.

The majority found no entrapment in either case.

The concurrence reached the same result but on the basis that police had reasonable suspicion that both accused were engaged in criminal activity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his step-daughter.

The sole ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that his trial counsel filed a false affidavit in support of a bail review application, failed to prepare him for trial, made incorrect legal arguments, and failed to effectively cross-examine Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown presented an overwhelming case with strong corroborating evidence, including the appellant's confessions to family members, possession of condoms, and his flight from the country.

The court concluded that even without the alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance, the verdict would not have been different and the trial was not rendered unfair.

The accused, a nurse, was charged with sexual assault against a complainant who was brought to a hospital emergency room in a highly intoxicated and unresponsive state.

The complainant alleged that the accused engaged in multiple instances of inappropriate touching, including fondling her breasts and placing her hand on his genitals while inserting an intravenous line.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her impaired cognitive state, internal inconsistencies, and demonstrated motive to tailor her testimony.

A credible eyewitness who observed the relevant portion of the alleged assault testified that he did not see any of the alleged inappropriate conduct.

The accused's evidence was consistent with the eyewitness account and video evidence.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown sought to adduce similar act evidence based on video surveillance footage showing the defendant standing in close proximity to two unknown women in a grocery store, allegedly engaging in conduct similar to the charged sexual assault of the complainant.

The defendant was charged with sexually assaulting a woman at a checkout counter by touching her buttocks three times in a deliberate manner.

The Crown argued that two other incidents captured on video—one occurring minutes before and one after the alleged assault—demonstrated a pattern of similar groping conduct.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the evidence was insufficiently similar and that the video footage was ambiguous and incapable of proving the alleged similar acts.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that neither incident shown on video demonstrated striking similarity to the charged conduct and that the evidence was not capable of proving the alleged similar acts to the requisite degree of certainty.

The applicant sought judicial review of a procedural ruling made by its Discipline Committee mid-hearing.

The Committee had ruled that the applicant must comply with the notice and consent requirements of s. 35 of the Mental Health Act before tendering psychiatric records as evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the ongoing administrative proceeding.

The hospital appealed a mandatory order from the Ontario Review Board requiring it to provide up to two escorted visits per year for a forensic patient to his mother's home for dinner.

The patient had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for sexual assault offences and had been detained in maximum security since 1989.

The Review Board initially made the visits discretionary but amended its disposition to make them mandatory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal, finding that the board erred in law and acted unreasonably by imposing a mandatory order without discretion.

The court held that while the board may encourage the hospital to create community visit programs, the terms must remain discretionary to allow the hospital to consider staff availability, patient stability, and the consent of the person to be visited.

The accused, a teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of a nine-year-old student in a school portable.

The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of the child complainant's evidence, noting several inconsistencies and a fabricated sighting of the accused after his arrest.

Applying the principles for assessing children's evidence, the court found the complainant's testimony unreliable and the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and breach of a court order.

He was unaware that his guilty plea to dangerous driving would result in an automatic, indefinite suspension of his driver's licence under the Highway Traffic Act due to his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal held that the collateral consequence of an indefinite licence suspension was legally relevant and significant to the appellant, a truck driver.

Because he was uninformed of this consequence, his plea was invalid.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea and conviction for dangerous driving were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that charge.

The applicant was convicted of a terrorism offence in 2010 and received a sentence functionally equivalent to over six years.

Years later, legislative amendments allowed the government to revoke the citizenship of individuals with terrorism sentences of five years or more.

Facing citizenship revocation, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that the severe collateral consequences and the retrospective nature of the legislation meant the interests of justice favoured allowing the applicant to seek a sentence reduction.

The accused, Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, were convicted by a jury of multiple terrorism offences, including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

The offences involved a plot to derail a VIA passenger train and discussions of a sniper plot to assassinate prominent individuals.

At sentencing, Jaser argued for a reduced sentence based on alleged entrapment, drug addiction, and insincere religious beliefs, relying on expert psychological evidence.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the expert evidence inadmissible and contrary to the jury's verdicts.

For Esseghaier, who was self-represented, amicus curiae raised issues of fitness and mental illness.

The court found Esseghaier fit to be sentenced and concluded that any present mental illness was not causally linked to the offences committed in 2012.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for terrorism offences designed to cause indiscriminate killing, the court sentenced both accused to life imprisonment for the murder conspiracy, with concurrent determinate sentences for the other offences, and ordered a 10-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant was convicted of participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group after attending a training camp and providing computer assistance to the group's leaders.

On appeal, he challenged the admission of intercepted private communications obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter, undated departure letters found in his bedroom, and cross-examination on religious and ideological materials.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the actus reus of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding the jury instructions substantially complied with the law.

During the sentencing hearing for two accused convicted of terrorism offences, amicus and the Crown sought a psychiatric assessment of one of the accused to determine his fitness.

The court held that there is no jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order a fitness assessment after a verdict has been rendered.

However, the court found reasonable grounds to order a further psychiatric assessment under s. 21 of the Ontario Mental Health Act, noting flaws in a previous psychiatric report that had improperly modified the legal test for fitness.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for threatening death and assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at CAMH with a condition allowing him to live in approved community accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not ordering a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly considered the relevant criteria, including the appellant's liberty interest, and reasonably concluded that a detention order was necessary to ensure CAMH could approve his housing as the safest first step for reintegration.

The appellant appealed her sentence and dangerous offender designation, arguing that the public could be adequately protected by a determinate sentence made consecutive to her lengthy remanet.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant's violent behaviour could not be controlled in the community was supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

In advance of a high‑profile terrorism prosecution, the court determined several issues concerning jury selection.

The Crown and defence jointly sought rulings regarding the appointment of additional jurors under s. 631(2.2) of the Criminal Code, the scope of challenge for cause based on pre‑trial publicity and racial or religious prejudice, and the procedure for determining those challenges.

The court held that the anticipated length and complexity of the trial justified appointing two additional jurors to minimize the risk of mistrial.

It permitted challenge for cause using six structured questions addressing exposure to publicity and potential bias relating to visible minority status and religion.

The court also ordered the exclusion of all jurors during the challenge process under s. 640(2.1) and directed that challenges be decided by static triers pursuant to s. 640(2.2) to preserve juror impartiality.

Pre‑trial evidentiary motion concerning proposed redactions to intercepted wiretap conversations in a terrorism prosecution.

Defence counsel sought editing of eight passages on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value under the common law exclusionary discretion.

The court applied the probative‑value versus prejudice balancing analysis and concluded that certain passages referencing derogatory comments about Jews, references to Osama bin Laden, and discussions of adultery punishments should be edited because they were minimally probative and risked inflammatory jury prejudice.

However, proposed edits relating to references to bombs and bomb‑making were refused because they were relevant to the alleged conspiracies and the relationship between participants.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

The appellant applied to rescind an order dismissing his appeal of a dangerous driving conviction as abandoned, and to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that he was misinformed by trial counsel regarding the length of his licence suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that the guilty plea was part of a broader plea bargain involving other charges.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant applying to set aside all of his convictions, as the interests of justice require a full consideration of the entire plea bargain.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to bring a section 11(b) Charter application for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Court also held that the appellant failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, as a section 11(b) application would not have had a reasonable chance of success given the periods of defence delay.

The appellant was convicted of fraud, uttering a forged document, and breach of recognizance after amassing a large hotel bill and paying with a forged cheque.

Police conducted a warrantless search of his hotel room, which the trial judge found violated his s. 8 Charter rights, but the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his convictions and his consecutive four-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors and upholding the sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record and the lack of a factual nexus between his various frauds.