Breese Davies

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges related to a fatal accident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in the objective portion of her section 8 Charter analysis by concluding that the only reasonable explanation for the accused going limp was medical, ignoring the evidence of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, attempt to obstruct justice, and failure to comply with an undertaking.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the investigating officer's testimony about why he did not charge the complainant after she recanted her allegations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the officer's testimony explained his investigative process and did not constitute improper oath-helping.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's ban on pit bulls under the Dog Owners' Liability Act, arguing the law was overbroad and vague under s. 7 of the Charter, and that a provision allowing a veterinarian's certificate as proof of breed violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d).

The application judge upheld the ban but struck down parts of the definition and the certificate provision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal and allowed the Attorney General's cross-appeal, restoring the struck provisions.

The Court held the ban was not grossly disproportionate to the risk posed by pit bulls, the definition was not unconstitutionally vague, and the certificate provision did not create a mandatory presumption of guilt.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting deaths of his parents.

At trial, the Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's exclusive insider opportunity and physical evidence, to prove he committed the murders and fabricated a story about an intruder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the defence theory, motive, post-offence conduct, and the burden of proof.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's rulings on the admissibility of expert evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The court held that the fresh evidence did not meet the due diligence criterion and would not have affected the verdict.

Furthermore, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, who were charged with first-degree murder in the death of their infant daughter.

The trial judge stayed the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, largely caused by the failings of the Crown's pathologist.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in including pre-charge delay in his calculation as a remedy for the cremation of the child's remains.

However, the Court upheld the stay, concluding that the post-charge delay of 55 months for one respondent and 42.5 months for the other was unreasonable and severely prejudiced their liberty and security interests.

The appellant was convicted of first and second-degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the principal Crown witness, an alleged accomplice who had originally been charged with the murders.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by failing to give the mandatory warning, the error was cured by the application of the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the jury was sufficiently alerted to the dangers of the witness's evidence.

The court also dismissed several other grounds of appeal relating to bad character evidence, criminal records, reply evidence, post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and self-defence.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with sexual offences arising from a large-scale police investigation.

During the trial, it emerged that the Crown had failed to disclose notes and a will-say statement of a former police officer who had contacted the mother of one of the complainants.

The trial judge recused himself from hearing a stay application due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and another judge heard the application.

The application judge found that Crown counsel had wilfully withheld the materials and ordered a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction to hear the matter, but erred in finding wilful non-disclosure.

The evidence showed the non-disclosure was inadvertent.

The Court held that a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown were not justified for inadvertent non-disclosure.

The stay and costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant requested access to personal information held by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

CSIS refused to disclose the information, claiming exemptions under the Privacy Act for national security and foreign confidences.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 51 of the Privacy Act, which mandates in camera and ex parte hearings when these exemptions are claimed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory ex parte provision did not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the mandatory in camera provision violated s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1 because it was overly broad.

The Court read down s. 51(2)(a) to apply only to the ex parte submissions.

On a cross-appeal, the Court held that the law enforcement exemption in s. 22(1)(b) is not limited to current investigations.

The appellants, parents of a three-month-old child who died from severe injuries, appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on charges of second degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence indicating which parent caused the fatal injuries or that they acted in concert, and thus they should be discharged or committed only for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inquiry judge correctly concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including exclusive opportunity, motive, and awareness of the child's deteriorating health—upon which a properly instructed jury could find either or both appellants guilty of second degree murder as principals or parties.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings after police negligently lost a five-minute videotaped statement from an eyewitness.

The trial judge found the loss breached the respondents' s. 7 Charter rights and prejudiced their ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed there was a s. 7 breach but held that a stay was inappropriate, as the lost evidence did not cause irreparable harm to the integrity of the justice system or such prejudice that no other remedy would suffice.

The Court noted other remedies, such as excluding the identification evidence, were available.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a finding that he was a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence.

He had pleaded guilty to twenty sexual offences against young boys.

Due to a procedural error, two informations covering the same conduct were before the court, and the trial judge mistakenly referred to '39 convictions'.

The Court of Appeal held that this procedural irregularity did not vitiate the process and that the trial judge's reference was an inadvertent error.

The court found that the dangerous offender designation and the indeterminate sentence were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appeal was allowed only to set aside the convictions on the first information, but the appeal regarding the dangerous offender application was dismissed.