Dr. Ian Swayze

The court sentenced Neng Jia Jin for the first degree murder of Vanessa Kurpiewska and the attempted murder of Sulakshana Srijeyarah, both committed on December 8, 2022, on Toronto public transit.

Jin pleaded guilty, avoiding a lengthy trial.

The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years was imposed for murder, and 20 years’ imprisonment (concurrent) for attempted murder.

The court reviewed the facts, victim impact, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant sentencing principles, emphasizing the gravity of the offences, the profound impact on victims and the community, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The applicant, who had been in custody for eight months on various assault charges, applied for a bail review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary ground due to the applicant's lengthy criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The court found that while there were secondary ground concerns, the applicant had already served the equivalent of 12 months, which approached the likely sentence of 12 to 15 months if convicted.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court held that the risk of the applicant serving a disproportionate sentence outweighed the secondary ground concerns, and ordered his release on a recognizance with his mother as a surety.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and uttering death threats, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board granting him a conditional discharge.

He sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly applied the significant threat standard and reasonably relied on expert evidence regarding the appellant's delusional disorder, refusal to take medication, and lack of insight.

The conditional discharge was upheld.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault and other charges.

The Ontario Review Board granted him an absolute discharge, finding he no longer posed a significant risk to public safety.

The hospital appealed, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent had rapidly decompensated, resumed substance abuse, and become aggressive shortly after his discharge.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the board's decision as it undermined the factual foundation of the absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the board for a rehearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal and appealed a summary conviction appeal decision upholding a finding that he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the record supported the order directing an NCR assessment under ss. 672.11(b) and 672.12(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, leave should not be granted on that issue.

Leave was granted on the issue of the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons for the NCR finding.

Applying the framework for adequacy of reasons in criminal cases, the court concluded the reasons did not disclose whether the trial judge found incapacity under the relevant branch of s. 16 or how the mental disorder rendered the appellant incapable of knowing the breach was wrong.

The NCR finding was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The defendant, age 63, was convicted after trial of two counts of sexual touching, one count of sexual assault, and one count of invitation to sexual touching involving two young male victims (ages 8 and 10) over a six-month period in early 2011.

The defendant was a tenant in the home of the boys' grandmother.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 5-6 years, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of 3 years custody concurrent, less pre-trial custody of 26 months on an enhanced 1.5:1 credit ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 10 months, followed by one year probation with conditions including no contact with the victims and their family members, DNA sampling, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and lifetime registration on the Sexual Offender Registry.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision finding him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault and uttering threats after spitting on and threatening a bus driver.

The trial judge had accepted psychiatric evidence diagnosing schizophrenia and concluding that delusional beliefs rendered the appellant incapable of knowing his actions were wrong under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the NCR finding was unreasonable because the expert did not explicitly ask whether he knew his actions were wrong and because he testified that he did.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge reasonably relied on the psychiatric evidence and the appellant’s disorganized testimony to conclude that his delusions prevented him from knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The evidentiary record supported the NCR finding on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant was charged with two counts of being a party to unregistered real estate trading under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

Following the prosecution case, the defence raised the issue of the defendant's capacity to conduct his defence due to alleged mental disorder.

The court was required to determine whether the defendant was, on a balance of probabilities, unable to conduct his defence due to mental disorder.

The court found that the defendant was capable of conducting his defence and ordered the suspended proceeding to continue.

The Crown applied during a murder trial for a psychiatric assessment and a further fitness hearing after concerns arose about the accused’s ability to participate meaningfully in the proceedings.

Evidence from a psychiatrist indicated that although the accused had a rudimentary understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings, severe psychosis and delusional beliefs impaired his ability to communicate with counsel or defend himself.

The court reviewed the statutory test for fitness under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and the governing “limited cognitive capacity” test from appellate jurisprudence.

Considering the accused’s conduct in court and expert evidence, the judge concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the accused could not meaningfully participate in his defence.

An assessment order was granted and the issue of fitness was directed to be determined again by a jury.

The accused applied for a declaration that he was unfit to stand trial on three counts of dangerous driving causing death following a high-speed motor vehicle accident that resulted in the deaths of three passengers and caused him a traumatic brain injury.

The defence relied on expert evidence asserting that the accused suffered from frontal lobe dementia and severe cognitive impairment rendering him unable to participate meaningfully in the trial process.

Crown experts concluded that the accused retained sufficient cognitive capacity and that test results suggested malingering.

Applying the “limited cognitive capacity” test from R. v. Taylor, as affirmed in R. v. Whittle and R. v. Morrissey, the court held that the defence failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the accused was unfit.

The presumption of fitness therefore remained and the application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after a sudden and unprovoked knife attack on a stranger at a public gym.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the victim impact, and the offender’s personal circumstances including a history of depression, substance abuse, and psychological stressors.

Psychiatric evidence indicated that while the offender had a major depressive disorder, it was likely in remission and did not significantly mitigate moral blameworthiness.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a vicious public attack with a weapon, the court determined that a fit sentence would have been 4½ years’ imprisonment.

After granting limited enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 36 months.