R. v. Ibrahim, 2026 ONSC 3504

CITATION: R. v. Ibrahim, 2026 ONSC 3504

COURT FILE NO.: CR-26-00000039-00M0

DATE: 20260522

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

QABIL IBRAHIM

Applicant

Ayushi Kiran, for the Crown

Arash Ghiassi, Shailaja Nadarajah for the Applicant

HEARD: May 22, 2026

JUSTICE S. NAKATSURU

REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT

1“Students Supporting Israel”, a university student group, organized a Jewish community event, “Combat on College Street”, at an off-campus location space in Toronto on November 5, 2025. As the event was about to start, it was met with protest. Several protestors supporting Palestine entered, chanted, shouted, and refused to leave. Jonathan Karten who was scheduled to talk about his history in the war in Israel, tried to barricade the door. The glass on the door shattered. The applicant, Qabil Ibrahim, is alleged to have broken the glass with a drill bit and to have struck the complainant. The applicant, along with others now face several charges in relation to that protest including forcible entry, assault, mischief, participating in a riot with a mask, and being a member of an unlawful assembly wearing a mask.

2The applicant seeks an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the warrant to search his cellphone held by the police because of three deficiencies: (1) the warrant is not supported by reasonable grounds to believe that a search of the phone would afford evidence of the alleged offences; (2) it is insufficiently particularized; and (3) it is overbroad in most of the categories of data files that can be searched.

3The exercise of this court’s inherent jurisdiction is not contested. Normally, when the only issue on such a challenge of a search warrant is the admissibility of evidence, a reviewing judge can exercise their discretion to defer the issue to the trial judge: R. v. Zevallos (1987), 1987 CanLII 169 (ON CA), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 79 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 84, 86-87. Here, the application seeks to prevent the search in order to protect solicitor-client privileged communications that are said to exist in the applicant’s cellphone. Therefore, the interests of justice support the matter being heard in advance of trial: R. v. Vijaya, 2014 ONSC 1653, 304 C.R.R. (2d) 328, at paras. 21-23.

4For the following reasons, the search warrant is quashed for the first two arguments raised by the applicant. It is unnecessary to deal with the overbreadth issue.

A. BACKGROUND

5I do not propose providing a detailed description of the grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for this search warrant. I will elaborate more when I address the issues. For the moment a summary will do.

6In the ITO, the informant, D.C. Greg Yan, outlined the police investigation to date. The event was organized at a private venue rented through the university at 49 Elm Street. Through witness statements, images provided by the witnesses, and surveillance video, D.C. Yan summarized that on November 5, 2025, as the event was about to begin, a protest occurred outside the venue. When Mr. Karten arrived and entered the building, six of the protestors walked in behind him. As they were chanting and screaming, those in attendance attempted to evict them. Mr. Karten shut an inner door. After breaking the door and headbutting or punching Mr. Karten, the applicant turned and fled. Those attendees inside the venue barricaded the door to prevent any further entry of protestors. The police arrived. The event was cancelled. Three women who are alleged to have gone inside, were arrested nearby.

7The ITO sets out a solid basis for the involvement of the applicant. Through fingerprints found on the broken glass door and images taken at the time, the ITO connects the applicant to the offences alleged to have taken place that day.

8The applicant was arrested at his home on November 12, 2025, when the police executed a search warrant there. The police seized clothing and some identification documents. The applicant entrusted his Samsung cellphone to the police for safekeeping as his lawyer’s contact was stored within. When the applicant was taken to a remand center because his bail hearing could not be reached, his phone accompanied him to the institution.

9On November 13, 2025, Justice of the Peace Aroda granted a search warrant to seize the cellphone located at the Toronto South Detention Center and to subject it for forensic analysis. A police officer seized it from the jail. On November 14, 2025, it was taken to the Technological Crime Unit for analysis by a technician. This technician advised that a new search warrant was required to remove the cellphone from the Technological Crime Unit vault before the contents of the cellphone could be analyzed.

10On November 14, 2025, Justice of the Peace Fernandez granted a search warrant to seize the cellphone from the Technological Crime Unit vault and to subject it to analysis. The ITO in support for this search warrant is essentially the same as the ITO used to obtain the search warrant issued by Justice of the Peace Aroda.

B. NO REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE EVIDENCE WOULD BE FOUND ON THE CELLPHONE

11I do not need to be reminded of the balance required between two highly important societal interests when it comes to the review of search warrants.

12One is privacy. As Tulloch C.J.O. held in R. v. Pike, 2024 ONCA 608, 171 O.R. (3d) 241, at paras. 1, 2, 32, the contents of cellphones “attract some of the strongest privacy interests known to law because they are a window into their users’ lifestyles, beliefs, interests, desires, relationships, finances, health, and much more.” These “repositor[ies] for an almost limitless universe of information” include “sensitive and confidential information” about their users. See also R. v. Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, at paras. 38-44; R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, at paras. 51-53.

13The other is public safety. That is the goal of effective law enforcement. Safety, security and the suppression of crime are legitimate countervailing concerns to privacy interests: R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 17; R. v. Singh, 2024 ONCA 66, 432 C.C.C. (3d) 527, at para. 63.

14In the context of this application, the law has resolved this tension between these interests by requiring due attention be paid to the constitutional threshold of ensuring reasonable and probable grounds for the search as provided for in s. 487 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

1. The Test To Be Applied On Review

15The search warrant is presumed valid: R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at para. 83.

16The test on a certiorari application for the judicial review of a search warrant is whether there was evidence upon which the authorizing justice could determine that a search warrant could be issued. The scope of the review is limited. It is not the task of the reviewing judge to weigh the evidence or to determine whether the authorizing justice should have been satisfied by the sworn information. The reviewing judge does not substitute their view for that of the authorizing justice. If, based on the record which was before the authorizing justice, the reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing justice could have granted the search warrant, then they should not interfere: Re Church of Scientology et al. and the Queen (No. 6) (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (C.A.), at p. 494; R. v. Budd (2000), 2000 CanLII 17014 (ON CA), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 108 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 14-16.

17In performing the task of review, it is recognized that the authorizing justice makes their decision about whether to issue the warrant from the evidence included in the ITO, approaching the assessment on a common sense, practical, and non-technical basis. The authorizing justice is also entitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the facts disclosed in the ITO which must be viewed expansively: Sadikov, at paras. 83-84; R. v. Hamouth, 2023 ONCA 518, 167 O.R. (3d) 682, at para. 20.

2. Analysis of the ITO

18A precondition for the issuance of a search warrant under section 487(1)(b) of the Criminal Code are reasonable grounds to believe the things to be seized either will afford evidence with respect to the commission of the offence or will reveal the whereabouts of the person believed to have committed the offence. The material in support of the warrant must raise a credibly-based probability of discovering evidence of the crime at the place of the proposed search: Hamouth, at para. 20. Therefore, the police must satisfy the authorizing justice that they had reasonable and probable grounds to believe what they were looking for would be found on the applicant’s cellphone: Vu, at para. 48.

19Unquestionably, cellphones, whether they belong to a suspect or others, are often resorted to before, during, and after the commission of crimes and the search of their contents may well provide police investigators with relevant if not invaluable evidence: Fearon, at paras. 48-49.

20That acknowledged, the analysis on review must still focus on the ITO in question used to support the issuance of the material search warrant. Other cases involving ITO’s authorizing a search of a cellphone that have survived judicial scrutiny on review depend very much upon what was contained in the particular ITO used to secure the search. Given that, other authorities dealing with the search of cellphones are somewhat limited in their assistance to me. ¹

21The respondent relies on the following facts contained in the ITO in their argument for the dismissal of the application: the applicant is observed leaving his residence using his cellphone an hour and 45 minutes before the offences are committed; the applicant (now masked), along with five other suspects, is observed entering 49 Elm Street, by following the victims of the offence; the applicant is then observed smashing the glass door of the premises with a drill bit, injuring an attendee, and fleeing the scene, and; two suspects remain unidentified and at large.

22The respondent submits that based on the collective actions of the group of protestors and the use of a cellphone shortly before and during the commission of the offence, there was an adequate basis upon which the justice of the peace could have issued the search warrant. This basis was founded on the informant’s belief that the group of accused conspired to commit an indictable offence and used their cellphones to communicate amongst themselves.

23I disagree. Even assessing the whole of the circumstances set out in the ITO, using common sense, making reasonable inferences from the information set out, and bearing in mind the police were still in the investigative phase, no issuing justice could have concluded that the search of the applicant’s cellphone would afford evidence of the offences being investigated. I conclude this for the following reasons.

24First, under the heading “Grounds to believe an offence has been committed”, reiterated in his conclusion to the ITO, D.C. Yan’s belief that the “six people conspired together to attend this event” and “they used their cellphones to communicate amongst themselves” is conclusory. Additionally, he also sets out his belief in paragraph 70 that the cellphone “will be very strong evidence in relation to the investigation” and in paragraph 88 his view that the evidence will give “a full and all-encompassing view of the crime”. Averments of this nature do not materially add to the reasonable grounds required for its issuance.

25Second, under the heading “Ground (sic) to believe that items are at the place to be searched”, D.C. Yan does not set out any grounds for why he believed searching the applicant’s cellphone would afford evidence of the offence. Rather, he merely itemizes the history of how the cellphone led to being found at the Technological Crime Unit vault at the Intelligence Services of the Toronto Police Service. This history simply misses the point of the exercise under this heading. The judicial task is focused on the question of whether relevant evidence will be found in what is being searched (in this case the cell phone). As a result, the history of how the cell phone arrived at its current location does not assist with this assessment.

26All this said, the justice of the peace was entitled to look at the entire ITO to make the determination whether a basis existed for the reasonable grounds regardless of the conclusory nature or irrelevance of the reasons for D.C. Yan’s expressed beliefs.

27Third, I appreciate that the nature of the offences investigated include unlawful assembly and conspiracy, offences targeting a common venture or agreement. As well, the police were looking for two unidentified perpetrators involved in those offences. Nevertheless, the ITO must establish an objective basis for the police to believe that the subjects of their investigation were involved in such crimes and the cellphone would contain evidence of it. Merely to assert these were the offences being investigated is insufficient.

28Fourth, the overall circumstances in which the offences were said to have taken place must be considered. In this ITO, the context of the investigation must be distinguished from cases that are centered around a small group of suspects who were involved in the commission of a crime such as drug trafficking. In the overview of the ITO, the synopsis of the police general occurrence states that 15 to 20 pro-Palestinian protestors had forced entry into the premises. When the first police officers attended on scene, there was a “large crowd of approximately 50-70 individuals gathered outside the location, chanting and yelling.” This was a student event hosted by a university group. The overview goes on to state that the door had been barricaded by those within, but six protestors inside were then forcibly removed from the premises. Event attendees were escorted safely into the building from the protest crowd. Additional police units came on scene and the crowd of protestors moved northbound on Bay Street and continued their protest.

29Thus, this ITO provides the context of a fairly large political demonstration in which the facts as found in the ITO must be viewed. Although it was at a private venue, clearly it was a public protest about a global issue that has attracted widespread attention with significant differences of opinion.

30The following information must be placed in that context. At 1:11 p.m. Mr. Karten and other members of the event arrived and walked in. Following them, six people, faces hidden by scarves or masks, entered the building from the outside. Contrary to the Crown submission, the ITO does not reveal the applicant leading the group inside; rather he follows four others. They all appear to have entered one after another. They were screaming things like “Free Palestine” and refusing to leave. It appears that Mr. Karten closed an inner door to keep the protestors from entering the meeting room though two suspects, Nichole Baiton and Fatimah Mugni got inside and were chanting. Then the applicant, acting alone, pushed the door, broke the glass in the door with a drill bit, and struck Mr. Karten who in turn tried to grab the applicant. The applicant immediately ran away exiting the building by himself. No one else did the same. This all occurred within 16 seconds of the applicant’s arrival.

31There is nothing in the ITO that states or from which one could reasonably infer given the whole of the circumstances, that the group of six were acting in concert except for a photo of Ms. Baiton and Ms. Mugni standing next to each other within the meeting room. They may have all attended the event to protest together but given the context, the information does not set out a reasonable basis to infer a conspiracy or an unlawful common purpose. This is accentuated by the fact that once the applicant broke the glass door and assaulted Mr. Karten, he fled alone without any interaction with other protestors. All of this is to say, while attendance at the protest may have been a group activity, the lack of a connection between those who were at the protest, whether those outside or those who managed to get inside, does not support a reasonable inference that evidence connecting the individuals would be found within the cellphone.

32In my opinion, if this was sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to search the applicant’s cellphone, by extension, anyone who attended this protest would be subject to a search of their cellphone.

33Fifth, it is in this context that the information from surveillance video of the applicant showing him leaving his apartment building located some distance away, using his cellphone must be assessed. There is no other disclosed fact that the applicant used or even had a cellphone on him at the event.² This specific use of the cell phone set out in the ITO was nearly two hours before the incident and in different circumstances. While some of his dress is similar, by the time he arrived at the Elm Street address, he no longer has the Keffiyeh scarf that had been wrapped around his neck nor is he carrying the backpack he had leaving his apartment building. Moreover, the applicant was not observed in the company of any of his alleged co-conspirators or co-venturers when leaving his home. Thus, the remoteness in time and difference in circumstance from the offences attenuates the connection to any evidence that could be expected to be found in his cellphone based upon that single use of his phone leaving his apartment. Put differently, this isolated use in these circumstances does not add to the grounds required.³

34Lastly, the informant does not offer anything based upon his experience investigating this crime or similar offences that support the likelihood of finding relevant evidence on the applicant’s cellphone.⁴ Some of the Crown’s submissions regarding what might be found on the phone are based on either ex post facto justifications that are not found in and cannot be reasonably inferred from the ITO or are just speculative. I observe that in other ITO’s, such as ones targeting the cellphones of alleged drug traffickers, it is not uncommon for informants to rely on their or other police officers’ experience in conveying to the issuing justice that the nature of the drug trafficking trade often depends upon the use of such devices to facilitate the crime. Additionally, D.C. Yan offers no information based upon his experience or technical expertise that could provide a basis to support the conclusion that the search of this cellphone could reveal data that could track and reveal the applicant’s whereabouts on the day in question.

35In sum, after considering the totality of the circumstances in the ITO, I find the applicant has established that there was no basis for the search warrant’s authorization. There is merit to the applicant’s position that this ITO essentially supports a fishing expedition for evidence on the cellphone. For these reasons, the search warrant must be quashed.

C. INSUFFICIENT PARTICULARS

36Search warrants must describe the things to be seized in sufficient detail and precision to permit the issuing justice to properly exercise their judgment as to whether the items will or will not afford evidence and to allow the police officers executing the search warrant to identify the items they are authorized to seize. It must not be so broad or vague that it would allow the officers to indiscriminately search a place for things of potential interest to them. The description is legally adequate if the person charged with executing the search warrant can, by referring to the warrant, ascertain with accuracy what is to be seized: R. v. Trottier, 1965 CanLII 718 (QC QBA), [1966] 4 C.C.C. 321 (Que. C.A.), at p. 324; Re Print Three Inc. and the Queen (1985), 1985 CanLII 2073 (ON CA), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 392 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 397.

37In Church of Scientology of Toronto (No. 6), it was held that the degree of the required specificity of the description of things to be searched for depended on the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the investigation. Peace officers should be given some latitude in describing things as they are still at the investigative stage. General descriptions may be allowed where it is otherwise impossible to define the item with exact precision if it is sufficiently limited to the crime for which they are alleged to afford evidence. However, the description should be as specific as the informant's knowledge will permit, and the items should be identified by class, type, or time frame, and be such as to inform the executing officer's discretion and not permit an overly broad selective discretion. The information and resulting warrant should be viewed as a whole and should not fall as a result of some relatively minor defects that may be found on microscopic examination. Each case must be decided on its own facts. See pp. 504-515.

38The description of the things to be searched for operates as a guide for the officers conducting the search. A jurisdictional error is made where the description is either so broad or so vague so as to essentially allow the officers conducting the search carte blanche to search for any evidence wherever it may be found within a place: Church of Scientology of Toronto (No. 6), at pp. 511, 516; Re: Lubell and The Queen (1973), 1973 CanLII 1488 (ON HCJ), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 188 (Ont. H.C.J.), at p. 189; R. v. Khan (2005), 2005 CanLII 63749 (ON SC), 133 C.R.R. (2d) 29 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 40, 44.

39On review, the “clear directions of the court’s order are to be drawn from the face of the order itself – not from an executing party interpreting the order based on extraneous information” and “extrinsic information cannot be used to prop up an impermissibly vague search warrant”: R. v. Persaud, 2016 ONSC 8110, at paras. 165-168.

40In my view, the search warrant is invalid due to insufficient particularity for three cumulative reasons.

41First, and perhaps the most important one. Under “Terms and Conditions” of the search, the search warrant states:

Once secured, the seized item(s) will be examined and analyzed by police personnel. This process will be based upon the offence(s) set out in this warrant. [emphasis added]

42Even read in context, this fails to provide intelligible parameters to the search. An examination and analysis “based upon” the offence(s) is not just the use of loose language (the Crown conceded it was not a great choice of wording), it opens the search to include a whole host of other potential offences than the ones set out specifically in the search warrant. Simply, the search is not “limited to” the offences in the warrant. Rather, if there is a connection, even a remote one, to that type of offence(s), the police officers could reasonably understand the warrant to permit the search of the cellphone for this evidence.

43This is not just an abstract or amorphous objection. For example, although the offences are about an incident occurring at 49 Elm Street, Toronto, on November 5, 2025, they relate to anti-Israeli or anti-Jewish protest or sentiment. A search “based upon” that aspect of the offence(s) would permit the police to investigate the contents of the phone for any offence that could involve this consideration. Another example. The offence(s) of November 5, 2025, include offences related to property. The police could engage in the search of the phone for other property-related offences no matter how motivated. Yet a third. A conspiracy amongst the applicant and others, both identified and unidentified, is alleged. Based upon this offence, the police could inquire into evidence relating to other individuals who may have been involved in other offences with the named or unnamed persons.

44Second, there is the breadth of what can be searched for. The warrant to search lists 14 different categories of data within the cellphone that the police could search. The Crown concedes that a few, like mobile payment data and user health data, were overly broad. However, when looked at as a whole, the police were permitted to essentially search the entire contents of the cellphone. In this warrant, there is nothing to restrict the search parameters by reference to the category of data that can be searched.

45Third, there is no time limitation to the type of data the search permitted. In and of itself, this is not significant. In R. v. Jones, 2011 ONCA 632, 107 O.R. (3d) 241, during a fraud investigation, the police obtained a search warrant permitting the search of a computer. The warrant had no conditions and contained no restrictions on the types of computer files that could be searched or a relevant time frame within which police were entitled to examine the dated files on the computer. That shortcoming, however, was not fatal as the police were only allowed to search for evidence related to the offence for which the warrant was issued.

46In Jones, at para. 40, the Court recognized that there may be reasons "why the language used to authorize computer searches may need to be relatively broad in order to cope with the practical realities of an ever-changing and developing age of technology." That said, the Court emphasized that the right to examine the computer did not include the untrammeled right to rummage through the entire computer contents in search of evidence of another crime: at para. 42.

47In sum, for this search warrant, I find that when the lack of any time limitation is looked at in conjunction with the previously mentioned two factors, this search warrant allowed for the scouring of the cellphone with little limitation or guidance provided to the police in their search.

48In R. v. Du, 2004 ABQB 849, at paras. 20-22, the absence of any time restriction in combination with the broad category of items being searched for (personal documents), led the application judge hearing the certiorari application to find the search warrant was too broad as it gave the police carte blanche to search for such items in a marijuana grow-up investigation. The search warrant was quashed.

49Similarly, I conclude that this search warrant must be quashed.

D. DISPOSITION

50Although the applicant initially only targeted Justice of the Peace Fernandez’s search warrant, at the hearing they also requested Justice of the Peace Aroda’s search warrant be quashed. As it is essentially the same ITO backing both warrants and there being no prejudice to the respondent, both search warrants will be quashed.

51I will permit the respondent to have to June 30, 2026, to schedule an application for a stay should they choose to request one.

Justice S. Nakatsuru

Released: June 19, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Ibrahim, 2026 ONSC 3504

COURT FILE NO.: CR-26-00000039-00M0

Footnotes

1. 1The authorities relied on by the Crown are largely distinguishable. In R. v. Ryn and Vandelinder, 2020 ONSC 1574, at para. 116, an arrangement to purchase and have delivered from an overseas supplier a significant quantity of fentanyl led readily to a reasonable inference that the search of the arrestee’s cellphone would afford evidence. As the application justice astutely reasoned, the arrangement would not have all happened in person at a coffeeshop. In R. v. Yabarow, 2019 ONSC 3669, at paras. 16-18, the accused was using his phone before the murder texting with the deceased, during his time with the deceased in his apartment, and discussing with an acquaintance his desire to escape post-offence. The informant specifically swore to the type of relevant evidence that could be found on the cellphone including internet searches in his attempts to flee post-offence. In HMQ v. Lamar Skeete, 2012 ONSC 2633, the brief oral reasons of Nordheimer J. (as he then was) do not outline the contents of the ITO or the circumstances whereby he found there were reasonable grounds to search the cellphone. He did refer to the fact that the ITO referenced the male suspect being captured on surveillance video using his phone at the scene of the murder in his decision supporting issuance. A fuller picture of the circumstances of the case emerges in the appeal decision in R. v. Skeete, 2017 ONCA 926, 357 C.C.C. (3d) 159. This was a police investigation of a first-degree murder of the victim who had testified against Mr. Skeete and another youth charged with an earlier attempt on the victim’s life. Two weeks after they were released from custody on those charges, the victim was shot in a pizza shop and killed, in alleged retribution. Both the use of the cellphone at the scene of murder as well as the circumstances of the potential motive provided reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found on the cellphone. It also appears that the informant expressly swore that from their experience cellphones can provide location information. In R. v. Fourtounes, 2015 ONSC 4813, the context was a planned break and enter by two individuals of a private home while the resident was briefly away on an errand. On his return, he interrupted the men, who fled with a safe, purses, and marijuana. Civilian witnesses saw two men in the area after the offence. Mr. Fourtounes was on his cellphone within minutes after the crime. The police arrested him in the area 20 minutes later still talking on his phone. Neither suspect lived in the area and there was no vehicle belonging to them located near the crime. These circumstances led to an inference that transportation to and away from the scene could well have been arranged by phone.
2. 2That acknowledged, the applicant’s possession of a cellphone both before the incident and on his arrest, is sufficient for the issuing justice to infer the applicant had one at the event.
3. 3The only other reference to cellphones in the ITO was a photograph showing Ms. Baiton and Ms. Mugni inside holding up cellphones at the event. There is nothing in the ITO about them using it. That said, the issuing justice could reasonably infer from the photo that given the posture in which the cellphones were held, they were either filming or photographing what was in front of them. This is unconnected to the applicant.
4. 4See for example, R. v. T.I., 2021 ONSC 2608, 491 C.R.R. (2d) 154, at para. 53.